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Why the NAACP pursued anti-lynching legislation with such vigour despite a decade 
of defeat in the Senate is the key research question this thesis considers. In doing so it 
analyses two aspects of the NAACP’s lobbying efforts during the 1930s: its attempts 
to push anti-lynching bills through Congress and its efforts to secure presidential 
endorsement for those bills. 
New insights on how the NAACP learned to lobby can be gleaned by 
considering the NAACP, Congress, and the President, as key influences on the anti-
lynching campaign. This thesis analyses previously neglected primary source material 
to shed light on President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s influence on the anti-lynching 
campaign. Additionally, it interprets the anti-lynching campaign through a theoretical 
lens. It considers theories of lobbying in Congress, presidential power, and 
congressional obstruction to contextualise the institutions, politics, and politicians at 
play in the anti-lynching campaign. 
Despite no anti-lynching legislation ever being passed, both Congress and the 
executive branch had a profound effect upon the NAACP’s political education. In 
response to Congressional conservatism towards the anti-lynching campaign, and in 
order to push anti-lynching legislation through the legislative branch, the NAACP 
learned to overcome legislative obstruction and conform to norms and procedures 
dictated by Congress. By working with FDR—who, contrary to popular belief, had a 
liberal reformist attitude towards anti-lynching—the NAACP learned how to work 
with the executive branch and how to write stronger legislation. FDR helped NAACP 
activists to rhetorically frame anti-lynching in terms of the function of government 
and proposed strategies to give the federal government the power to prosecute 
lynchings. NAACP activists gained confidence in their tactics and optimism about 
achieving their objective from their political education. In contrast to the undertone of 
failure running through existing literature, the events of the anti-lynching movement 
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Lynching—‘the ultimate expression of racism’—was a form of community sanctioned 
mob murder that occurred in all but four states of the Union.1 Organisations worked 
to end the practice: the Association of Southern Women for the Prevention of 
Lynching, the Commission on Interracial Cooperation, American Civil Liberties 
Union, and the Writers League Against Lynching all denounced mob violence and 
sought to eradicate the crime.2 But only one organisation, the National Association for 
the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), launched a national campaign to hold 
the federal government responsible for protecting black lives.3 Fundamentally, 
lynching was a denial of constitutional due process—a right guaranteed under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. And so, with the belief that it was the federal government’s 
duty to uphold the Constitution, the NAACP attempted to push anti-lynching 
legislation through Congress. In 2005, the Senate recognised that protection from 
lynching was ‘the minimum and most basic of Federal responsibilities,’ and it passed 
a resolution in which it apologised ‘for the failure of the Senate to enact anti-lynching 
legislation.’4 Yet during the first half of the twentieth century, when Congress was 
presented with hundreds of opportunities to uphold the rule of law, no anti-lynching 
bill was passed.5 
                                                 
1 According to Senate Resolution S.Res. 39, there were only four states in which lynchings did not 
occur. However, the records of Tuskegee Institute show that there were six states in which no 
lynchings occurred between 1882 and 1968. These states are Alaska, Connecticut, Hawaii, 
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island. However, Alaska and Hawaii only became States 
in 1959—by which time lynching had all but died out as a practice. This might account for the 
Senate’s figure. Senate Resolution S.Res. 39, 109th Congress, 13 June 2005. Accessed on 18/06/2016 
at https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/109/sres39/text; Zangrando, R. L., The NAACP Crusade 
Against Lynching, 1909-1950 (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1980), 5. 
2 Dowd Hall, J., Revolt Against Chivalry: Jessie Daniel Ames and the Women’s Campaign Against 
Lynching (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); Jack, J., ‘Ladies and Lynching: Southern 
Women, Civil Rights, and the Rhetoric of Interracial Cooperation,’ Rhetoric and Public Affairs, 14:3 
(Fall, 2011), 493-510; Zangrando, The NAACP Crusade Against Lynching, 112-14. 
3 Although the NAACP instigated the campaign, they sought help and resources from other 
organisations that were sympathetic to the cause to aid them in their national campaign. The Socialist 
Lawyers Association, the Congressional Education Society, the Women’s Peace Society, the 
Methodist Federation for Social Service, the Church League for Industrial Democracy, the National 
Urban League, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), the Interdenominational Preachers 
Meeting of New York and Vicinity, and the League for the Defense of Political lobbied collectively 
with NAACP activists, especially during the first half of the 1930s. Memorandum re: meeting at new 
school for social research, 6 December 1933, Box I: C233, NAACP Papers, Library of Congress. 
4 Senate Resolution S.Res. 39, 109th Congress, 13 June 2005. 
5 Although no legislation was passed by the Senate, NAACP-sponsored anti-lynching bills passed the 
House of Representatives in 1921, 1937, and 1940. 
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Historians have concluded that the federal government failed to enact anti-
lynching legislation because of the strength of the congressional obstruction that 
plagued the NAACP’s lobbying efforts.6 Congressmen reasoned that lynching was a 
local issue and should be dealt with by the states, that lynching was already in decline 
and therefore a federal bill was unnecessary, that any federal anti-lynching legislation 
would be unenforceable, and that the proposed legislation itself was unconstitutional. 
These arguments justified opposition to the bills, and obstructive tactics, including 
filibusters, were subsequently employed to block passage of every anti-lynching bill 
introduced to Congress. Anti-lynching was therefore seen as an unsuccessful 
movement. The NAACP did not achieve its objectives and as a result this has not been 
seen as a significant campaign in the context of the broader civil rights movement. 
Failure and obstruction have been prominent themes where the history of the anti-
lynching campaign has been concerned. At least, this has been the consensus. 
However, in striking contrast to the consensus view, the archival material 
available does not paint a picture of failure.7 Instead it suggests that throughout the 
1930s the NAACP was increasingly optimistic about the outlook of their campaign 
despite legislative obstruction. During their first attempt to pass legislation in 1934, 
the organisation calculated that there was ‘a good chance’ that the bill would pass, but 
in 1937 they predicted that the prospects for passage of a bill were ‘exceedingly 
                                                 
6 Dray, P., At The Hands of Persons Unknown: The Lynching of Black America (New York: The 
Modern Library, 2003), 356-7, 361; Finley, K. M., Delaying the Dream: Southern Senators and the 
Fight against Civil Rights, 1938-1965 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2008); Grant, 
D. L., The Anti-Lynching Movement: 1883-1932 (San Francisco: R and E Research Associates, 1975), 
175; Holmes, M. S., ‘The Costigan-Wagner and Wagner-Van Nuys Anti-Lynching Bills, 1933-1938’ 
(MSc diss., University of Wisconsin, 1965); Janken, K. R., Walter White: Mr. NAACP (Chapel Hill: 
The University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 221-22, 231; Jonas, G., Freedom’s Sword: The 
NAACP and the Struggle Against Racism in America, 1909-1969 (New York: Routledge, 2005), 111; 
Rable, G. C., ‘The South and the Politics of Antilynching Legislation, 1920-1940,’ The Journal of 
Southern History, 51:2 (1985), 201-220; Sitkoff, H., A New Deal for Blacks (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1978), 296-7; Sullivan, P., Lift Every Voice: The NAACP and the Making of the 
Civil Rights Movement (New York: The New Press, 2009), 108-9, 196-7; Weiss, N. J., Farewell to the 
Party of Lincoln: Black Politics in the Age of FDR (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 
118-9; Zangrando, The NAACP Crusade Against Lynching, 212-15. 
7 The archival collections consulted for this research are discussed later in this Introduction, but 
documents are largely drawn from the NAACP’s organisational papers housed at the Library of 
Congress, Washington D.C., and the FDR Presidential Papers housed at the Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt Library in Hyde Park, New York. 
8 
 
favourable.’8 Despite escalating legislative obstruction during the decade, the 
NAACP’s confidence in the outlook of their anti-lynching legislation actually 
appeared to increase. While NAACP Secretary Walter White said that the organisation 
was careful not to ‘succumb to over-confidence,’ this was a clear indication that the 
NAACP thought that their legislation would pass.9 Why the NAACP’s confidence 
appeared to increase in the face of significant legislative obstruction during the 1930s 
and why the NAACP continued with their federal anti-lynching campaign for nearly 
twenty years despite being unable to push a bill through Congress is the central 
question of this thesis. 
 
The NAACP’s Anti-Lynching Campaign 
The National Negro Committee, which quickly evolved into the NAACP, adopted a 
platform in 1909 that denounced oppression, systematic persecution, 
disfranchisement, and lynching.10 The NAACP’s programme was based on W. E. B. 
Du Bois’ model of social progress which espoused a gradualist approach that 
established social and political equality, as well as legal integration as its end goal.11 
The Association’s broader work enlightened Americans about race prejudice, 
demanded that public school expenditure be the same for black and white children, 
and defended individuals in the courts when their civil rights were violated. 
Additionally, they advocated that Congress strictly enforce the Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Amendments so that civil rights outlined in the constitution were guaranteed 
for all citizens.12 With educated and cultured black men and women at the forefront of 
the organisation, the NAACP sought to become the driving force behind the civil 
                                                 
8 NAACP Press Release, 6 January 1935, Box I: C233, NAACP Papers, Library of Congress; Walter 
White to Organisations Cooperating on the Anti-Lynching Bill, 1 February 1937, Box I: C258, 
NAACP Papers, Library of Congress. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Rudwick, E. M., ‘The National Negro Committee Conference of 1909,’ The Phylon Quarterly, 18:4 
(1957), 413-419. 
11 Sundaquist, E. J., (ed.) The Oxford W. E. B. Du Bois Reader (New York: Oxford University  
Press, 1996). 
12 that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, and that no 
person is denied the right to vote based on race or colour. ‘Platform Adopted by the National Negro 
Committee, 1909,’ accessed on 22/11/2014 at http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/civil-rights-
act/segregation-era.html; Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment, US Constitution, accessed on 
07/09/2016 at http://www.senate.gov/civics/constitution_item/constitution.htm#amendments. 
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rights movement. The eradication of lynching was a fundamental objective of the 
NAACP since their founding but it was only one aspect of their national agenda. 
The NAACP’s anti-lynching campaign spanned half a century from 1909 until 
roughly the 1950s.13 What the NAACP did during this time has been well 
documented.14 The Association’s broad movement was conducted on multiple fronts 
using various tactics. These included strategies designed to reach a wide audience. 
Speaking tours, publishing articles in the Crisis, and mobilising the press to spread 
information about the Association’s anti-lynching activities were all designed to 
educate and inform the public. Public rallies and mass meetings were held to arouse 
public sentiment against lynching and push the campaign forward, raise funds or 
stimulate public action—such as getting people to pressure local officials to act after 
a lynching. Creative projects, such art exhibitions and writing books about lynching 
were also a part of the NAACP’s campaign. Walter White’s book Rope and Faggot: 
A Biography of Judge Lynch is a prime example of how the NAACP used its leaders 
to produce literature about the issues facing black Americans, critique southern culture 
and present evidence they found during their investigative work.15 In the first decade 
of the Association’s existence the NAACP largely made localised efforts to 
investigate lynchings and bring known members of lynch mobs to justice by putting 
pressure on state officials to enforce the law. But unfortunately, the NAACP’s 
activities had little success at directly stopping lynchings. Even after such wide-
ranging activism, lynchings still occurred nationwide, and the success of the 
organisation in campaigning against lynching was not easily measurable. 
Seeing few tangible results from their activism in the states, the NAACP saw 
that the introduction of a federal anti-lynching law was an alternative route to justice. 
Many victims of lynching were denied their constitutional right to due process, and 
                                                 
13 By the 1950s, barring a few exceptions, lynching as a practice had largely died out in the United 
States. 
14 Grant, The Anti-Lynching Movement; Kellogg, C. F., NAACP: A History of the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Vol I 1909-1920 (Baltimore: The John Hopkins 
University Press, 1967); Zangrando, The NAACP Crusade Against Lynching. 
15 Rope and Faggot was based on White’s first-hand experience of investigating over forty lynchings. 
In the book, White provided statistical evidence disproving the belief that lynching punished black 
men for raping white women. White also included sections that analysed the cultural and economic 
roots of lynching. The NAACP recognised the value of artistic and cultural projects that their 
members were involved in after the Harlem Renaissance championed black artists and their work. 
There was value in it because people could engage with anti-lynching in different ways. White, W., 
Rope and Faggot: A Biography of Judge Lynch (New York: Knopf, 1929). 
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consequently this was a primary concern to NAACP activists and provided its central 
justification for federal intervention. Lynching was often defended as a punishment 
for crimes committed. Crimes that victims were accused of included murder, rape, 
suspected incendiarism, train wrecking, introducing smallpox, writing a letter to a 
white woman, and some were even lynched without cause.16 Mob violence was a way 
for communities to dispense punishment which they thought was appropriate for 
certain crimes—regardless of the guilt of the accused. In the case of the 1920 lynching 
of Lige Daniels, Daniels was held in a jail in Center, TX. Captain W. A. Bridges was 
ordered to protect Daniels from the mob however Bridges claimed he could not ‘find 
any members of his company in time for mobilization.’17 Subsequently one thousand 
men stormed the jail, battered down the doors, destroyed the cell, removed Daniels, 
and hung him from a nearby oak tree.18 Even though Daniels was already in custody, 
the mob placed their own need for swift justice above the rights of the prisoner in 
custody. After being accused of crimes, victims rarely stood trial, and were denied any 
form of defence as lynch mobs exacted their own form of justice before the accused 
could face the courts. This was because the ideology of popular justice rested on the 
notion of popular sovereignty, the belief that government was rooted in the people.19 
Consequently, the demands of the community were placed above the rights of the 
prisoner and communities enforced racial and class goals through ritualized, 
communally based punishment outside of formal law structures.  
The NAACP’s early anti-lynching work demonstrated a lack of confidence in 
local law enforcement, showing how lynch victims were denied the equal protections 
of the law; they were not extended the same rights, privileges, and protections as other 
citizens and were easily surrendered to the mob. In addition to prisoners being denied 
due process, lynchers enjoyed unfair privileges in the judicial system even when there 
was evidence against them. The NAACP saw the repeated failure of the courts to 
prosecute lynchers as a clear failure of the states to enforce due process. In 1911, the 
NAACP investigated the lynching of Zach Walker in Coatesville, PA, and it 
                                                 
16 Ida. B. Wells-Barnett, The Red Record: Tabulated Statistics and Alleged Causes of Lynching in the 
United States (1895), accessed on 02/09/16 at http://www.gutenberg.org/files/14977/14977-h/14977-
h.htm#chap7. 
17 Without Sanctuary, accessed on 07/06/13 at http://withoutsanctuary.org/pics_49_text.html. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Pfeifer, M. J., Rough Justice: Lynching and the American Society, 1874-1947 (Urbana: University 
of Illinois Press, 2004), 6. 
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highlighted the futility of state level activism for the Association. Walker pleaded self-
defence after he killed a Coatesville police officer during a fight. Wounded from the 
fight, Walker was recuperating in hospital when he was abducted by a mob. After 
being dragged through the streets, Walker was burned alive.20 The NAACP hired the 
William J. Burns detective agency to gather evidence to convict the lynchers. The 
Burns agency found the District Attorney to be in collusion with the lynchers from the 
outset and that there was little chance of prosecuting the case through official state 
channels.21 The NAACP took the case directly to the Governor of Pennsylvania, John 
K. Tener, but sustained efforts never resulted in the conviction of Walker’s 
killers.22 Similarly, NAACP Secretary Walter White noted that he personally 
investigated the lynchings of Thomas Shipp and Abram Smith that took place in 
Marion, IN, on 7 August 1930. White secured the names of twenty-seven alleged 
members of the mob with evidence against them and handed his findings to the 
authorities. White recalled that Mrs Merle Wall, special representative of the Attorney 
General, wrote to him that there was little hope of bringing to trial any of 
the lynchers at Marion.23 After years of similar attempts to bring lynchers to justice, 
to no avail, the NAACP recognised that they could not put faith in local and state law 
enforcement to stop lynch mobs, or prosecute lynchers after the fact, adding weight to 
the argument that the federal government should intervene. 
The early 1920s provided the NAACP with their first opportunity to ask for 
constitutional protections to be enforced by campaigning for a federal anti-lynching 
bill. During its first decade, the NAACP lacked the funds to be able to steer a national 
movement. But in 1916, the Association set the target of raising $10,000 to start an 
anti-lynching fund. With capital behind them the NAACP was able to respond to a 
request a few years later from Representative Leonidas C. Dyer who asked the 
NAACP to sponsor a bill to make lynching a federal crime.24 The so-called Dyer bill, 
                                                 
20 Kellogg, NAACP: A History, 212. 
21 Ibid, 213. 
22 Ibid, 213. 
23 Walter White to Mrs. Gustev Bachman, 24 September 1930, NAACP Papers, Part 7, Series B, Reel 
2, on microfilm at Cambridge University Library. 
24 Dyer showed persistent interest in helping black Americans throughout his time in office. After the 
East St. Louis race riot in 1917, Dyer called for a joint House-Senate investigation of the incident, and 
then later urged the NAACP to sponsor a bill to make lynching a federal crime. Based on the 
recommendations of Moorfield Storey, a lawyer and first president of the NAACP, the Association 
argued that the bill was unconstitutional. Consequently, the NAACP did not immediately support the 
bill. But the NAACP supported the Dyer bill from 1919 onwards after Story altered his opinion on the 
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introduced in 1918, was grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment and was ‘an act to 
assure to persons within the jurisdiction of every State the equal protection of the laws, 
and to punish the crime of lynching.’25 The bill stated that the failure of law enforcers 
to ‘make all diligent efforts’ to protect persons threatened by lynching amounted to a 
denial of due process and the equal protection of the law to victims of a mob.26  Murder 
was already a crime in the states which meant that the NAACP could not solely focus 
on the punishment of lynchers because it was not the responsibility of the federal 
government to police and prosecute this crime. Instead, the bills allowed subsequent 
federal intervention only if the states failed in their duty to act themselves. The bill 
specified that law enforcement officials who failed to attempt to protect victims of 
lynching should be punished and that doing nothing to stop the mob was as punishable 
as the crime itself. The bill was passed by the House of Representatives but was 
stopped by a filibuster in the Senate. However, it was the passage of the Dyer bill in 
the House on 26 January 1922, and the favorable report it was given in its Senate 
Committee, that led the NAACP to believe that Congress-wide support could be 
achieved for a federal anti-lynching bill in future. 
The federal anti-lynching campaign highlighted a shift in the NAACP’s anti-
lynching strategies. Over time, the Association made an increasing number of appeals 
to the federal government to uphold the Constitution to address racial issues. Anti-
lynching was therefore part of a broader program of national reform outlined by the 
Association. The NAACP made three key demands of the United States’ government 
to remedy the social ills it identified. The first was that there be ‘equal educational 
opportunities for all,’ where public school expenditure was the same for black and 
white children.27 The second was that the Fifteenth Amendment be upheld and the 
right of black Americans to the ballot should be on ‘the same terms as other citizens’ 
in every part of the country.28 The NAACP made legal challenges to address these two 
                                                 
bill. ‘NAACP History: Anti-Lynching Bill,’ accessed on 30/03/2017 at 
http://www.naacp.org/zangrandooldest-and-boldest/naacp-history-anti-lynching-bill/; Zangrando, The 
NAACP Crusade Against Lynching, 43-5. 
25 Dyer Anti-Lynching Bill, 1922 (viewed online at 
http://www.naacp.org/about/history/anit_lynching_bill/index.htm, 13/02/16). 
26 All of the NAACP’s subsequent anti-lynching bills were similar to the Dyer bill and grounded in 
the Fourteenth Amendment in the same way. Anon, ‘The Federal Anti-Lynching Bill’, Columbia Law 
Review, 38 (January 1938), 200. 





issues and they had Supreme Court victories with Guinn v. United States (1915) and 
Brown v. Board of Education (1954) in which the Grandfather Clause and segregated 
education, respectively, were deemed unconstitutional.29 However, it was their anti-
lynching campaign that satisfied the organisation’s third demand: that ‘the 
Constitution be strictly enforced and the civil rights guaranteed under the Fourteenth 
Amendment be secured impartially to all.’30 It is the NAACP’s pursuit of federal anti-
lynching legislation after this point that is the focus of this study. 
 
Scope of the Thesis 
The NAACP used the Dyer bill as a model for their federal anti-lynching activism 
which spanned almost twenty years between 1933 and 1950.31 But this thesis 
concentrates on the NAACP’s efforts during the 1930s. The decade represented the 
most intensive phase of the Association’s campaign, and served to shape their 
lobbying efforts for years to come. After Walter White was promoted to Executive 
Secretary in 1931, he led the NAACP’s most sustained efforts to pass a federal anti-
lynching bill, despite criticism from within the NAACP that the organisation should 
pursue a more militant economic program.32 
 But the key reason that the thesis explores the NAACP’s efforts in the 1930s 
is because the greatest strategic and rhetorical shifts can be seen in the NAACP’s 
lobbying activities between the start and end of the decade. For this reason, the bills 
that are the focus of this study are the Costigan-Wagner bill, the Van Nuys Resolution, 
and the Wagner-Van Nuys bill. The Costigan-Wagner bill was the first of the 
NAACP’s bills in their renewed anti-lynching campaign. It was debated in Congress 
between 1934 and 1935 and was easily defeated in both the House and the Senate. The 
1936 Van Nuys Resolution provided for senatorial investigations into the lynchings 
                                                 
29 These Supreme Court decisions were significant victories for the NAACP as they accomplished 
fundamental aspects of their program. Guinn and Beal v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915); Brown 
et al. v. Board of Education of Topeka et al., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
30 ‘Platform adopted by the National Negro Council, 1909,’ accessed on 22/11/2014 at 
http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/civil-rights-act/segregation-era.html. 
31 Appendix A documents the NAACP’s lobbying efforts between 1920 and 1940. 
32 James Weldon Johnson resigned in 1930. He was succeeded by Walter White, and Roy Wilkins 
took over as Assistant Secretary. The resignation of Du Bois on 11 June 1934 - Minutes of the Board 




that occurred in the United States since the defeat of the Costigan-Wagner bill in 1935. 
It was designed to get recent and up-to-date lynching facts into the congressional 
record, and to attract support for further anti-lynching legislation. The Wagner-Van 
Nuys bill was the NAACP’s second major attempt of the decade to pass a federal anti-
lynching bill between 1937 and 1938. The Wagner-Van Nuys bill received the most 
hostile reaction from southern senators of all the anti-lynching bills, and was subject 
to a near seven-week filibuster.33 But the changes that took place between the first and 
last bill in this study indicate that the NAACP gained new lobbying techniques, altered 
their rhetoric, and introduced different strategies. All of which suggests that the 
NAACP learned and were influenced throughout their time lobbying for anti-lynching 
legislation.  
The 1930s were significant because NAACP activists saw the greatest 
potential to enact anti-lynching legislation during this time. The country was 
overwhelmed by the 1929 Wall Street Crash that left the nation in the most devastating 
economic depression of the century. Some members of the NAACP, including Du 
Bois, called for a program that helped to relieve the economic strain on black 
Americans.34 Social commentator H. L. Mencken argued that the majority of 
Americans were ‘hunting for cover, not for freedom,’ and that this was not the time to 
pursue a national civil rights strategy.35 But leaders Walter White and Assistant 
Secretary Roy Wilkins believed that the Depression had led to greater opportunities 
for radicalism. In later years, Wilkins lamented that the thirties were ‘awash in 
revolutionary talk, fantastic dreams, and visions and radical formulas for restoring the 
country’s shattered economy.’36 Consequently, they thought this new attitude would 
also be transferred to the fight for civil rights, and to White and Wilkins, the time was 
right to launch a renewed national anti-lynching movement. 
 Recognising President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s willingness to push through 
legislation to aid national recovery in the wake of the Depression, the NAACP hoped 
that the President would also lend his powers to aid the campaign for civil rights. 
                                                 
33 The bills are sometimes talked about out of chronological order throughout the thesis so Appendix 
A shows the timeline of the various bills in Congress and key moments of the NAACP’s efforts for 
reference. 
34 Tompkins Bates, B., ‘A New Crowd Challenges the Agenda of the Old Guard in the NAACP, 
1933-1941,’ The American Historical Review, 102: 2 (April 1997), 341. 
35 Joshi, S. T., (ed.) H. L. Mencken: Mencken’s America (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2004), 144. 
36 Wilkins, R., and Matthews, T., Standing Fast: The Autobiography of Roy Wilkins (New York: The 
Viking Press, 1982), 146. 
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Consequently, NAACP activists had great optimism at the outset of the New Deal era. 
And so, after a decade-long hiatus, the NAACP renewed their anti-lynching campaign 
in the 1930s with a bill that by the NAACP’s own admission, was ‘virtually identical’ 
to the Dyer Bill.37 The New Deal was a broad national programme of recovery 
implemented by President Franklin D. Roosevelt to limit the effects of the Great 
Depression. But on occasion, instances of discrimination arose within New Deal 
programmes. For example, qualified black Americans were denied the opportunity to 
serve in supervisory positions in the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) camps and 
black workers did not benefit under the National Recovery Act.38 Whilst there were 
definite issues concerning inclusion and equality with some aspects of New Deal 
management, the programme overall brought optimism for the NAACP’s and their 
anti-lynching campaign. Given FDR’s wide-reaching policies, the NAACP recognised 
the potential for the president to endorse and support their federal anti-lynching bill. 
The 1930s was therefore the decade during which the NAACP had the greatest amount 
of communication with the White House over the issue of lynching. The NAACP’s 
relationship with FDR during their anti-lynching campaign is important because 
Congress was just one avenue to legislative success; the NAACP also lobbied FDR to 
champion the bill on their behalf.39 The NAACP targeted both Congress and the White 
House; lobbying these institutions constituted a significant part of their anti-lynching 
campaign in the 1930s. As such, this thesis will also consider the NAACP’s efforts to 
lobby both of these branches of federal government.  
The scope of my thesis encompasses the NAACP’s most concerted efforts, 
where they channelled the most time, resources and effort in order to push through a 
                                                 
37 Zangrando outlined the reasons why the NAACP took a decade-long hiatus from introducing any 
more anti-lynching legislation. He argued that the political climate in the 1920s was not favourable, 
and that the NAACP were going through a transitional stage. During this time, NAACP leaders 
questioned the direction of the organisation and what activities they should commit their limited 
resources to. Zangrando, The NAACP Crusade Against Lynching, 72-97; Walter White to Edward P. 
Costigan, 19 December 1933, Box I: C233, NAACP Papers, Library of Congress. 
38 NAACP Press Release, 27 April 1934, President’s Personal File: 1336, FDR Library, New York; 
Telegram from Walter White to FDR, 6 July 1933, Box 206, NAACP Papers, Library of Congress; 
Walter White to FDR, 10 May 1933, Box 206, NAACP Papers, Library of Congress. 
39 NAACP also lobbied previous and subsequent presidents, including Woodrow Wilson, Warren G. 
Harding and later Harry Truman, but they too failed to engage with the lynching issue. Some, such as 
President Wilson met with activists and made empty promises, but did not make any public efforts to 
stop the practice. Others simply had no interest in taking any action and ignored the NAACP’s efforts 
to contact them about it. And others, such as Truman, were unwilling to face political controversy in 
the name of lynching. Palmer, N., ‘More Than a Passive Interest,’ Journal of American Studies, 48:2 
(2014), 417-443; Zangrando, NAACP Crusade Against Lynching, 39-40, 56-7, 187-8. 
16 
 
federal anti-lynching bill. The 1930s was a key period in the NAACP’s anti-lynching 
campaign in terms of the development of the activists conducting the lobbying 
campaign, as well as the bills and strategies that they employed. Essentially, the 
decade offers the best insight into how the NAACP learned to lobby. 
 
Historiography of the Anti-Lynching Movement 
This thesis intersects with three separate historical debates of the twentieth century. 
The first concentrates on the significance of the NAACP’s anti-lynching movement 
itself. The second debate centres on President Franklin D. Roosevelt and his record on 
civil rights. And the third debate focuses on the responsibility of the federal 
government towards civil rights and why the Senate prevented any anti-lynching bill 
from being passed. The work relevant to this thesis typically focuses on one of these 
areas, concentrating on just one aspect of the movement to add nuance to what is 
understood about anti-lynching, the presidency, or Congress. But this thesis considers 
the NAACP’s anti-lynching campaign in relation to both Congress and the presidency 
to challenge current interpretations of the anti-lynching movement and federal 
responses to civil rights activism.  
Much of what is understood about the NAACP’s anti-lynching movement was 
articulated in what remains the most comprehensive account of it to-date: Robert 
Zangrando’s, The NAACP Crusade Against Lynching, 1909-1950, published in 1980. 
Zangrando’s scholarship explored the consequences of the campaign for the NAACP 
and for the emergence of the twentieth century civil rights struggle.40 The anti-
lynching movement had significance in that it was a defining moment for the NAACP. 
Zangrando argued that it ingrained the organisation into the public consciousness, the 
NAACP wove themselves into the liberal coalition on a national scale, that the anti-
lynching fight set preconditions for most civil rights advances by mid-century, and 
that the NAACP set the tone and style of interracial protest for years to come following 
the anti-lynching movement. Additionally, NAACP lobbyists established contacts 
within governmental circles, gained training in public affairs and exposure to political 
practices at highest level.41 Anti-lynching, Zangrando argued, was an important part 
                                                 




of the organisational development of the NAACP. Zangrando’s focus was 
predominantly on what happened as well as the chronology of the movement, and 
while this thesis does not disagree with many of his conclusions, it seeks to explain 
how and why these outcomes occurred.  
Most of the studies centring on the anti-lynching movement, including 
Zangrando’s, are broad in focus, encompassing the NAACP’s wider efforts to prevent 
lynching in addition to their attempts to lobby for a federal bill in Congress. Zangrando 
notes the activists’ battles to secure funds for the movement, their drives to educate 
the public about lynching, their efforts to publicise their activities, to name just a few. 
Smaller scale studies of the anti-lynching movement also focus on the NAACP’s 
efforts outside of the legislature. Authors Donald L. Grant and Minnie Finch drew 
attention to specific aspects of the movement.42 These studies largely concentrate on 
the NAACP’s investigations into the facts surrounding lynchings, a public education 
programme about the practice to dispel lynching myths, fundraising and membership 
drives, and their attempts to hold local and state authorities to account after a 
lynching.43 In raising awareness of the variety of activities that made up the anti-
lynching movement these studies praise the NAACP’s capabilities to conduct such a 
wide-reaching campaign, despite the fact that they did not achieve their ultimate 
objective of pushing through an anti-lynching bill.  
In these studies, there is relatively little detail of the NAACP’s lobbying 
activities. The significance of the legislative aspects of the anti-lynching movement 
have been recognised, though largely in unpublished scholarship. These works 
examine the events that took place in Congress for specific anti-lynching bills. Robert 
Goldstein and Michael Holmes detail the efforts to pass anti-lynching legislation from 
the Dyer bill through to the Wagner-Van Nuys bill respectively.44 They largely focus 
on the congressional debates on the bills, considering the objections over the bills, and 
why congressmen obstructed their passage. In doing so they reinforce the themes of 
racial conservatism and failure that are prevalent in most anti-lynching literature. The 
NAACP’s inability to push through anti-lynching legislation features heavily in 
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studies concerning their legislative efforts. Their failures are argued to be a result of 
the NAACP’s powerlessness against conservative coalitions in the Senate who sought 
to prevent the passage of anti-lynching legislation. Consequently, the NAACP is given 
little agency in the legislative process.  
In recent decades, the NAACP’s role within the broader movement against 
lynching has been gradually diminished. Shawn Leigh Alexander’s, An Army of Lions: 
The Civil Rights Struggle Before the NAACP, and Christopher Waldrep’s, African 
Americans Confront Lynching: Strategies of Resistance from the Civil War to the Civil 
Rights Era contextualised the NAACP’s efforts by establishing how they drew upon 
a useable past created by civil rights activists and organisations that came before 
them.45 This type of research began the trend in recent scholarship to redistribute the 
credit for the ideas, actions, and innovations away from the NAACP. The Association 
and its achievements were then seen as a product of the efforts of all of the civil rights 
activists and organisations that had previously tried to achieve the same goals. Whilst 
it is valuable to acknowledge how movements develop over time, the significance of 
the NAACP efforts within the anti-lynching movement were lessened through these 
studies. 
This trend has intensified in the last decade and the study of anti-lynching has 
virtually disappeared from current civil rights scholarship. In recent literature 
specifically concerned with the NAACP, anti-lynching is granted scant attention. In 
studies of the Association, published in 2009 to celebrate the NAACP’s centenary, the 
anti-lynching movement is noticeably absent from the narratives.46 One possible 
explanation for this is that the key events of the anti-lynching movement remain 
accepted as historical fact. Historians have agreed that no bill was passed because 
Southern Democrats obstructed their passage in the Senate,47 that FDR failed to 
endorse the NAACP’s anti-lynching legislation because he would not antagonise 
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Southern Democrats,48 and that anti-lynching was a failed movement.49 The omission 
of the anti-lynching movement, especially from histories of the NAACP are worrying, 
and suggest that contemporary scholars find the anti-lynching movement to be void of 
significance.  
But previous anti-lynching scholarship explains that the anti-lynching 
movement was actually very important to the NAACP, and to their later civil rights 
efforts. Given that much of the scholarship specifically written on the anti-lynching 
movement is largely concerned with what happened, rather than explaining why or 
how events played out as they did, there is significant scope to re-evaluate the events 
of the anti-lynching movement during the 1930s. 
The second historiographical debate addressed by this thesis is whether or not 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt gave any attention to the issue of civil rights during 
his time in office. His involvement, or lack thereof, in the anti-lynching movement is 
typically seen as an indicator of FDR’s stance on civil rights. There have been no 
dedicated studies to FDR and anti-lynching, but the subject features in studies that 
comment upon the President’s stance on civil rights.50 Zangrando was one of the first 
to highlight that although his actions against lynching were limited, FDR featured 
heavily in the anti-lynching movement because anti-lynching activists saw great 
potential for FDR to aid in the passage of an anti-lynching bill.51 FDR was therefore a 
regular target for the NAACP and their activism. Zangrando detailed the activists’ 
efforts to involve him and the opportunities they gave him to support the movement. 
Zangrando was one of the first to cement the notion that FDR was reluctant to act upon 
the lynching issue.52 
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Nancy J. Weiss was one of the first to offer a comprehensive analysis of FDR’s 
relationship with black Americans. In Farewell to the Party of Lincoln: Black Politics 
in the Age of FDR she argued that even though FDR did not prioritise anti-lynching 
he still conveyed that he was interested in it through his wife, Eleanor Roosevelt.53 
The First Lady communicated with anti-lynching activists to denounce lynching and 
convey the administration’s frustration at congressional resistance to passing a federal 
anti-lynching bill. In the grand scheme of things, whilst his silence over anti-lynching 
legislation was frustrating for activists, Weiss argues that because of his wife, this did 
not have a negative effect on FDR’s relationship with the black electorate. Weiss as 
well as Kenneth Robert Janken largely reconstructed FDR’s opinions on anti-lynching 
based upon Eleanor Roosevelt’s communications with Walter White in which she 
relayed the President’s opinions on the subject.54 This is one of the most common 
lenses through which scholars have studied FDR’s stance on lynching and in doing so 
it does suggest that FDR engaged with the lynching issue to an extent, if only in 
private. But in looking at the subject through a different lens—one that considers 
institutional politics—this thesis critiques the role of both Franklin and Eleanor 
Roosevelt to show that this is not the only way to gain insight on FDR’s engagement 
with the anti-lynching campaign.   
Much of the literature published on the subject since Weiss’ work supports the 
argument that civil rights were not a central concern for the President. FDR is argued 
to have given more attention to emergency economic measures during the New Deal 
over any legislation—such as an anti-lynching bill—that might benefit black 
Americans. It is a widely-held interpretation that FDR would not support anti-lynching 
for fear of alienating Southern Democrats because he needed their votes to push 
through economic measures.55 This narrative is the most common interpretation of 
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FDR’s stance on anti-lynching. But it is important to note that anti-lynching in this 
context is often just used as an example and is rarely subject to rigorous analysis. 
Scholars often use the same quotes from the same primary sources to make the same 
argument. Evaluations of the primary source material relating to this debate have been 
unconvincing. Robert Zangrando was particularly guilty of this and many 
opportunities for analysing FDR’s role in the anti-lynching movement were lost 
through Zangrando’s writing style. He summarised a lot of conversations, especially 
those between the NAACP and FDR, as well as any of FDR’s public references to 
lynching.56 In doing so he overlooked vital clues about FDR’s stance on lynching. 
Both Zangrando and others took FDR’s words at face value, with little or no 
interrogation of their meaning or context. This has led to the formation of an accepted 
narrative that is rarely questioned. 
There is only one key monograph that challenges the narrative that FDR was 
largely inactive towards anti-lynching and civil rights. In Reconsidering Roosevelt on 
Race: How the Presidency Paved the Road to Brown, Kevin McMahon looks at the 
subject through an institutional lens to understand how FDR used the federal 
institutions available to him as president to expand his civil rights agenda. McMahon 
argues that essentially FDR shaped the Supreme Court to move towards racial equality 
under the law.57 Just as Rexford Tugwell considered FDR to be an architect of the 
1930s in the wake of the Depression, McMahon argues that FDR also had a vision for 
civil rights reform.58 McMahon’s work gave FDR more credit for trying to instigate 
civil rights reform. Whilst this study was not focused on FDR and anti-lynching, 
McMahon recognised that FDR’s expansion of the executive branch that aimed to 
expand the powers of the federal government in the process included an anti-lynching 
agenda. As part of the expansion, the Civil Rights Section of the Department of Justice 
was established at the close of the 1930s. The new department aimed to prosecute 
lynchings under existing laws after 1940. This suggested that FDR did try and find 
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ways to end lynching during his second term in office, complicating the previously 
established narrative on FDR and anti-lynching. The book, however, does not consider 
Roosevelt’s efforts in the legislative arena towards civil rights, and so there is 
significant scope to examine the subject further. The value of this work is in its 
approach. This thesis builds upon McMahon’s work and looks at FDR’s earlier 
engagement with anti-lynching through an institutional lens. 
This debate tells us that the overwhelming consensus is that civil rights were 
not a priority for the President in the 1930s, and that his response to the anti-lynching 
movement was proof of this. Even McMahon’s study that gives credit to FDR’s efforts 
towards civil rights does not extend to the legislative arena so this notion has not really 
been challenged. This thesis argues that the standard narrative surrounding the 1930s 
anti-lynching movement with regards to FDR is unsatisfactory and the documents that 
survive leave much scope for analysis. 
The final debate on which this thesis sheds light concerns congressional 
responses to black civil rights activism through which scholars have looked to 
understand racial conservatism in Congress and federal responses to civil rights. A lot 
of literature draws upon examples across the twentieth century, but most of these 
examples are from the 1950s and 1960s due to the emergence of the Civil Rights 
Movement, often with a focus on the movement to end legal segregation and guarantee 
citizens’ voting rights.59 The focus on civil rights during this period has been 
extremely valuable in understanding the relationship between activists and the federal 
government. But given that Congress carried out such aggressive filibustering and 
obstruction against anti-lynching legislation decades before this, the 1930s anti-
lynching movement is also regularly analysed to shed light upon attitudes towards race 
in the US federal government. The scholarship that focuses on the 1930s has broadly 
agreed that Congress was complicit in maintaining racial hierarchies and upholding 
white supremacy.60 
How Congress did this has been a central research question in scholarship 
concerning federal responses to anti-lynching. Historians and political scientists have 
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come to the consensus that the methods used to prevent the passage of anti-lynching 
legislation—namely overt legislative obstruction—was a dominant symbol of white 
resistance to civil rights advancement.61 The southern filibuster is considered by Garth 
Koger to be one of the greatest hurdles that civil rights activists faced.62 This was 
argued to be the main cause of the NAACP’s failure to achieve anti-lynching 
legislation. Filibusters and congressional obstruction have therefore been a leading 
strand of research. Filibusters were influential to both the outcome of the anti-lynching 
movement, as well as to how the Senate developed its tactics of resistance. Before the 
anti-lynching movement, the Senate had not systematically resisted legislation in this 
way.63   
The question of why the Senate responded to anti-lynching activism in this 
way is still contested. Eric Schickler argued that it was during the 1930s that New Deal 
liberalism and racial liberalism started to converge.64 But it is a commonly held belief 
that this was not the case and the Senate resisted the anti-lynching movement because 
Congress was racially conservative.  In Getting Away with Murder: The Twentieth 
Century Struggle for Civil Rights in the United States, Vanessa Holloway argues that 
the prejudices held by southern Democrats towards black Americans before they took 
office were what motivated them to filibuster anti-lynching legislation in the Senate.65 
Simply put, it was institutional racism that accounts for congressional resistance to 
anti-lynching legislation. It was for this reason that Congress was active in obstructing 
any civil rights legislation.  
Others have considered that the federal government did not pass such 
legislation because the government would not be able to carry out what the legislation 
required of them. Thomas Sugrue suggested that federal inaction occurred as a result 
of a ‘lack of administrative capacity.’66 This was argued at the time as well, with many 
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congressmen objecting to the anti-lynching legislation on the grounds that Congress 
did not have the capability to act because it was not constitutional for the federal 
government to do so. But Daniel Kato asserted that Congress had the capability to 
legislate should they choose. Kato quoted FDR, who said that the U.S. Constitution 
‘is so simple and practical that it is possible always to meet extraordinary needs.’67 
Kato theorised that federal inaction over lynching was a choice of the federal 
government to maintain a policy of non-interference in racial matters despite being 
able to act on it should its members choose.68 
It has been noted that there are many methods of resisting civil rights activism, 
just as there were a multitude of reasons why this resistance occurred.69 While this 
thesis does offer some insight into different methods of Congressional resistance, and 
why this occurred, it predominantly comments on the effects of this resistance upon 
black activists—notably the positive effects it had. This is something that has been 
completely neglected in scholarship to date because scholarship typically centres 
around Congress. But the anti-lynching movement offers a window into the mindset 
of Congress and its attitude towards race during the 1930s as well as the impact this 
had on activists themselves due to the NAACP’s extensive records of their lobbying 
efforts. 
 
Methodology and Archival Sources 
In exploring the key research question of why the NAACP continued to pursue anti-
lynching legislation with such vigour despite a decade of defeat in the Senate, this 
thesis considers the two important aspects of the Association’s lobbying efforts: 
attempts to push anti-lynching bills through Congress and their efforts to secure 
presidential endorsement for those bills. Whilst previous scholarship has centred on 
either the NAACP, Congress, or the President, this study recognises that in fact, each 
one was a competing force in the anti-lynching movement and therefore all three need 
to be considered to achieve a more nuanced understanding of the anti-lynching 
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movement. For this reason, the sources used and methodology employed considers the 
NAACP’s efforts within its institutional setting, explaining their lobbying efforts in 
the context of the two branches of federal government in which it operated. 
 In doing so, this thesis consults primary source material from two key archives. 
These are the NAACP’s organisational papers housed at the Library of Congress, 
Washington D.C. and on microfilm at the University of Cambridge Library, as well as 
FDR’s presidential papers located at the Franklin Delano Roosevelt Library, Hyde 
Park, N.Y. Within the NAACP’s papers extensive organisational records were 
consulted. These included correspondences, records of day-to-day lobbying activities, 
reports from investigations into lynchings, and other documents collected throughout 
the period. These sources have been used by previous scholars of the anti-lynching 
movement primarily because they offer insights into the NAACP’s activities, their 
battles in Congress, and their interaction with FDR. It is for these reasons that these 
sources are the focus of analysis in this thesis. 
 In contrast, there was only one file in the FDR Library that contained 
documents pertaining to lynching and anti-lynching: File 93-A. This is the only file 
that exists on the subject despite a decade of continuous communication between the 
White House and the NAACP, as well as from members of the public who wrote to 
the President on the subject. Because there are few presidential records relating to the 
anti-lynching movement, previous anti-lynching literature has been very limited in its 
insights into FDR’s involvement with the movement. The predominant reason for this 
is that official records of FDR’s meetings with NAACP leadership do not exist. 
Archivists at the FDR Library informed me that FDR never took notes of any of his 
meetings or conversations, making it difficult to gain any comprehensive account of 
his thoughts. Scholars of anti-lynching suffer from FDR’s choice, and as a result, most 
historical interpretations of FDR’s involvement in the anti-lynching movement have 
only been able to draw upon the same few documents that speak directly to the 
subject.70 As a result, studies of his involvement exhibit a very similar narrative. 
However, this thesis draws upon sources within the FDR Library’s collections that 
have been previously neglected by anti-lynching scholars to ascertain FDR’s position 
on lynching and anti-lynching. My analysis draws upon FDR’s anti-lynching rhetoric 
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and any instances when FDR spoke publicly about lynching. Shifting attention to 
FDR’s speeches delivered throughout the 1930s reveals an alternate perspective on 
the President’s attitudes towards lynching and anti-lynching, indicating that he was far 
more active in the anti-lynching campaign than has previously been thought. FDR’s 
influence on the anti-lynching campaign is therefore evident in the sources that are 
available, even though they are few in number.  
 This thesis therefore contributes to movement history by offering a new way 
of studying activism as the theoretical frameworks through which it interprets the anti-
lynching movement have not been used in combination before. Until now scholars 
have often taken the primary source material available at face value. However new 
insights on the anti-lynching movement can be gleaned by interpreting them through 
a theoretical lens that considers the institutional contexts in which the NAACP, 
Congress, and FDR operated. These are theories of lobbying in Congress, presidential 
power, and congressional obstruction that contextualise the institutions, politics, and 
politicians at play in the anti-lynching campaign. They shed light on the traditions, 
procedures, and structures at play behind the NAACP’s activities. 
Considering how the NAACP functioned as lobbyists challenges the 
characterisation of the NAACP as victims of legislative obstruction and shows that 
they were active participants in the legislative process.71 To date few scholars have 
drawn attention to the NAACP’s lobbying activities. Charles Flint Kellogg’s, NAACP: 
A History of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Vol I 
1909-1920, details the NAACP’s lobbying activities in the 1920s. Zangrando goes 
further in The NAACP’s Crusade Against Lynching, 1909-1950, to provide a history 
of their lobbying efforts from the organisation’s founding to the 1950s. Both works 
outline the Association’s early protests of mob violence, their efforts to dispel 
lynching myths, as well as the introduction of anti-lynching legislation at both state 
and national level.72 But neither considers how the NAACP actually functioned as 
lobbyists. This omission in the scholarship has denied the NAACP agency—the ability 
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to influence—in the lobbying process. Theories of how interest groups operated in 
Congress aid in understanding how the NAACP operated as lobbyists, how effective 
the organisation was at lobbying, and helps to identify any lobbying missteps that were 
made by the activists. An analysis of the lobbying efforts to pass anti-lynching 
legislation is relevant to this study as it sheds light on the intentions and motivations 
of the NAACP, and allows the nuances in their lobbying campaign to be identified. 
The actions of congressmen and their responses to the NAACP’s activities is 
also important to take into account because congressmen ultimately decided the fate 
of the bills. As has been widely documented in the historiography, anti-lynching 
legislation was met with filibusters and obstructive tactics in Congress.73 Viewing the 
anti-lynching movement in light of the politics behind legislative obstruction and 
congressional conservatism in Congress show how the NAACP’s lobbying changed 
over time and explains how the NAACP found ways to circumnavigate the barriers 
they faced.74 It also sheds new light on the make-up of opponents to the anti-lynching 
campaign, broadening our understanding of racial conservatism in Congress during 
the 1930s. 
Presidential power is rarely considered important in relation to lobbying 
because typically presidents are not known to lobby or advocate on behalf of interest 
groups and therefore presidents are largely absent from studies of the relationship 
between lobbyists and Congress. However, as this thesis will argue, FDR had a 
significant role in the campaign. As such his powers as president are pertinent to 
understanding the NAACP’s relationship with the White House during this time and 
what FDR realistically could have done as president in response to the NAACP’s 
lobbying efforts.75 By viewing FDR’s interaction with the NAACP during the anti-
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lynching campaign through this lens, FDR’s actions can be contextualised against the 
structures he was operating within, as well as the broader aims of the executive branch 
of government at the time. This resolves the question of presidential silence on anti-
lynching as analysis of his involvement shows that he worked within the framework 
of the Modern Presidency to advance an anti-lynching agenda in line with the New 
Deal. 
In summary, this thesis offers original insight into the anti-lynching movement 
firstly by considering the NAACP, Congress, and the President, as key influences on 
the movement in contrast to other studies that largely focus on one of them at a time. 
Secondly, it analyses previously neglected primary source material to shed light on 
the largely inaccessible topic of FDR’s influence on the anti-lynching movement. And 
finally, this thesis interprets the primary source material available through a new lens 
that accounts for the political processes and structures at play in the anti-lynching 
movement. In combination, this approach allows for a reinterpretation of the 
significance of the anti-lynching movement, and it reveals that there is still much to 
uncover about the federal government’s relationship with the civil rights movement. 
 
Breakdown of Chapters and Summary of Argument 
This thesis is divided into five chapters. The first chapter contextualises the NAACP’s 
1930s lobbying efforts and establishes the nature of the NAACP’s approach to anti-
lynching before their federal lobbying campaign. It explains how the NAACP’s 
lobbying strategies in Congress were rooted in their previous efforts to stop lynching 
at local and state level. It explains how the anti-lynching movement was rooted in the 
ideology of W.E.B. Du Bois. Primarily, this chapter argues that the NAACP’s 
investigations into lynching, their programme of education, as well as their proclivity 
for protest all formed the basis of their future lobbying campaign.  
Chapters two and three interrogate the NAACP’s battle against congressional 
conservatism and federal resistance to the anti-lynching bills throughout the 1930s. 
Informed by theories of interest group access and influence in Congress, chapter two 
analyses the NAACP’s lobbying efforts to reveal that in addition to congressional 
obstruction, conservatism was also evident in the way Congress demanded the 
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NAACP adhere to congressional norms and procedures. This redefines scholarly 
understanding of conservatism within Congress. Chapter three addresses more 
conventional notions of congressional conservatism by looking at the overt legislative 
obstruction that the anti-lynching bills faced. But it shifts the focus from Southern 
filibusters in the Senate to the NAACP’s attempts to bypass this obstruction. 
Additionally, it considers the relationship between the NAACP, Democrats, and 
Republicans to demonstrate that anti-lynching bills faced obstruction from both 
parties. 
Chapters four and five focus on how the NAACP reconciled their efforts with 
FDR’s liberal reformist agenda. In chapter four, theories of presidential power help to 
explain FDR’s response to the NAACP’s efforts to gain presidential endorsement for 
their anti-lynching bills. The chapter attempts to reconcile the NAACP’s expectations 
of the President with the FDR’s capability to make lynching a federal crime using the 
powers of the executive office. This chapter challenges the standard narrative that FDR 
would not help the NAACP because he did not want to alienate southern senators. 
Chapter five accounts for the increased White House involvement in the NAACP’s 
lobbying efforts after 1936. It traces the changes within federal anti-lynching 
legislation as well as the NAACP’s communications with the executive branch to 
document FDR’s influence on the bill, and how the NAACP aligned to New Deal 
rhetoric in order to further their anti-lynching aspirations. 
The thesis’ conclusion draws out the themes of the study. These are themes of 
opportunity and hope, contrasting the notions of failure prevalent in current 
historiography. It also briefly explores the legacy of the anti-lynching movement in 
terms of the impact it had on the organisation’s future plan and programme, and the 
NAACP’s approach to civil rights activism in subsequent years. 
As the chapters will show, this thesis makes two principal claims. First, the 
legislative and executive branches of the federal government had opposing responses 
to the anti-lynching movement. This redefines what is known about federal responses 
to civil rights in the 1930s as current historiography claims that both Congress and the 
President were not supportive of anti-lynching legislation. Congress had a 
conservative response, they institutionalised the NAACP’s lobbying tactics by making 
them conform to congressional norms and procedures, and also obstructed anti-
lynching legislation. Both Republicans and Democrats worked purposefully to 
obstruct passage of the bill, either by means of a filibuster or by not voting for 
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measures that would break a filibuster. This dispels the notion that institutional racism 
in Congress was perpetuated solely by southern Democrats. It also contradicts the 
NAACP’s belief that the majority of congressmen wanted to see an anti-lynching bill 
passed. This points more broadly to the absence of civil rights liberalism, highlighting 
the 1930s as a period of racial conservatism in Congress.76 On the other hand—and 
contrary to popular belief—the executive office had a liberal reformist response 
towards anti-lynching. I argue that FDR did attempt to stop lynching using the powers 
of the Modern Presidency; he rhetorically framed anti-lynching in terms of the 
function of government and the New Deal and pursued legislative and institutional 
strategies to give the federal government the power to prosecute lynchings between 
1933 and 1940. This suggests that the roots of the Modern Presidency’s serious 
engagement with racial issues started as early as 1933. This challenges the conclusions 
of William Berman and Garth Pauley who suggest that this started with Truman in 
1945.77 Truman openly advocated civil rights reform in his rhetoric and established 
special committees, including the President’s Committee on Civil Rights in 1946 to 
investigate the state of civil rights in the United States and to suggest possible reforms 
to improve them.78 In suggesting that FDR engaged with civil rights long before this, 
the timeline of presidential engagement in civil rights is shifted forward over a decade. 
The second argument this thesis makes is that the federal government had a 
fundamental role in advancing civil rights despite no anti-lynching legislation ever 
being passed. This was because through their interactions with Congressmen and the 
President, the NAACP learned how to lobby, and it taught them how to contend with 
conflicting political ideologies within the federal government. For the NAACP, 
legislative obstruction and regular defeat were not limiting factors but opportunities 
for growth—through the anti-lynching movement the NAACP gained their political 
education. Both Congress and the executive office had a profound effect upon how the 
NAACP framed their arguments and operated within the federal government. This is 
not to deny activists agency, instead it shows how movements are moulded by the 
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structures and political climate in which they operate. In the case of anti-lynching, the 
activism of the NAACP was both constrained and strengthened by the institutions of 
federal government; constrained because they had to work within the political 
process—they could not just demand passage of the bill—and conform to political 
norms, but strengthened because this forced them to learn to lobby and be more 
creative in their tactics when faced with obstruction, essentially making the NAACP 
more effective lobbyists. 
 
Significance and Original Contribution to Scholarship 
In revising the history of the NAACP’s federal anti-lynching campaign, this thesis has 
significance in several areas of scholarship. Within anti-lynching scholarship this 
study elevates the importance of the movement to reveal how the NAACP operated as 
lobbyists, as well as the attitudes of the state towards legislation that benefitted black 
Americans. The anti-lynching movement was deeply important for the NAACP, and 
for national civil rights activism; even if they did not achieve it, the NAACP learned 
how to break black political impotency. By advancing from a position of protest and 
posturing to seriously engaging with the legislative process and the political agendas 
within it the NAACP gained a greater amount of agency in the legislative process than 
has ever been awarded to them before. The 1930s was therefore a pivotal moment for 
the NAACP in how they perceived the civil rights struggle and the organisation’s 
position within it. 
In the field of New Deal literature, this work adds nuance to the debate over 
the degree to which black Americans benefitted from the New Deal. If racial 
conservatism is at the foreground of the analysis, and if a political view of the 1930s 
is taken instead of an economic one, it can be seen that white privilege also extended 
beyond New Deal economic policy to also include the rule of law. This confirms the 
arguments of Harvard Sitkoff and George Lipsitz that blacks did not benefit from the 
New Deal. The New Deal government passed racialised social policies—such as the 
1935 Wagner Act, that guaranteed the right of private sector employees to organise 
into trade unions, and the Social Security Act, a system of social welfare that provided 
federal assistance to those unable to work—that excluded sectors of the workforce. In 
doing so black Americans were denied the protections and benefits routinely afforded 
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to whites by the federal government.79 But this argument is complicated if FDR’s 
involvement in the anti-lynching movement is brought to light. While a legislative or 
institutional solution did not materialise during the 1930s, FDR attempted to apply the 
same liberal reformist approach that he applied to the economy to lynching, to bring 
anti-lynching under the umbrella of the New Deal. 
More broadly, with both a racially conservative Congress, and a liberal 
President, this thesis comments upon the tension between liberalism and conservatism 
in twentieth century America. It suggests that instead of going through distinct periods 
of liberalism or conservatism, the two competing ideologies were in constant 
conversation and in constant competition within the federal government.80 This 
conflict was an integral part of the legislative process and the anti-lynching movement 
reflects this. This was because the debate over anti-lynching was demonstrative of how 
politics functioned in the United States. Regardless of the motivations behind FDR’s 
efforts to stop lynching, or Congress’ attempts to impede the NAACP’s anti-lynching 
and broader legislative agenda, it highlighted that competing ideologies both hindered 
efforts to enact reform but also offered opportunities to pass anti-lynching legislation 
at the same time. The competing ideologies within the federal government ensured 
that rigorous debate over anti-lynching took place to make sure that the bill was 
necessary, constitutional, and effective. The outcome of this particular legislative 
campaign shows that in that instance, conservatism triumphed over liberalism. But 
what this thesis aims to show is that regardless of this, the NAACP had many triumphs 
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The NAACP’s Approach to Anti-Lynching 
The chapters that follow explore how the anti-lynching movement was shaped through 
the NAACP’s interaction with the executive and legislative branches of the federal 
government. But this chapter first contextualises those efforts and looks at what shaped 
the NAACP’s anti-lynching approach between the founding of the Association—
which was largely in response to lynching and mob violence—and the 1930s.81 It 
evaluates the NAACP’s earlier attempts to campaign against lynching and shows the 
factors bearing on their decision to shift focus from protest to lobbying over the course 
of their campaign. 
At the start of their anti-lynching campaign, the NAACP entered the 
Washington political arena as an organ of protest with entrenched progressive and 
liberal values. These included beliefs in positivism, education, the maintenance of 
social order, and they had a firm conviction that the state was a primary instrument for 
reform.82 It was these values that influenced the organisation’s entire programme, 
including the anti-lynching campaign. They stemmed from the philosophies of the 
organisation’s leaders as well as the culture of reform in which the organisation was 
founded. This was still important in the 1930s because it defined the NAACP 
lobbyists’ outlook when they renewed their campaign for federal anti-lynching 
legislation. An anti-lynching campaign served the organisation’s particular political 
aspirations; it addressed what activists believed to be one of the most pressing issues 
for black Americans at the time, whilst working towards equality through their 
gradualist approach. 
Recent literature on the NAACP has also situated the organisation’s anti-
lynching efforts within the context of the activism that preceded it. Historians Shawn 
Leigh Alexander and Christopher Waldrep traced the NAACP’s organisational and 
anti-lynching roots. Both agree that Du Bois’ Niagara movement was not the only 
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organisation that influenced the NAACP’s activities.83 In addition to Du Bois, it was 
the individuals and organisations that were active before the NAACP that laid the 
groundwork for the NAACP and their anti-lynching movement. In the decades 
preceding the founding of the NAACP, both the Afro-American League and the Afro-
American Council organised in defence of civil rights, protested discrimination and 
lynching, and instituted a program of education to dispel racial myths.84 The founders 
of these bodies were some of the first to try and build national non-partisan 
organisations. Their members went on to form the NAACP, bringing their knowledge 
and strategies for activism with them. This chapter will consider how NAACP activists 
in the 1930s built upon this useable past to formulate their approach to anti-lynching. 
Early members of the NAACP included reformers such as Joel and Arthur 
Spingarn, Josephine Ruffin, Mary McLeod Bethune, Ida. B. Wells, Oswald Garrison 
Villard, Inez Milholland, Mary Church Terrell, John Dewey, Florence Kelley, Charles 
Edward Russell, and Walter Sachs. These members helped create a template for the 
NAACP’s activism, translating Du Bois’s model of social progress into a programme 
of activities that the Association carried out daily. These men and women drew upon 
their past experiences as reformers and lent their skills and strategies to the NAACP’s 
work. The strategies the NAACP used to stop lynching were typical of the broader 
movement of progressive social reform. Before the 1930s, the Association largely 
undertook what the Crisis deemed to be ‘quiet work.’85 This included investigations, 
education drives, and protests at a local and state level. Middle class reformers at the 
turn of the century felt a sense of duty towards social improvement and protested to 
hold the government accountable for a host of issues such as conservation, healthcare, 
child labour and workplace safety, temperance, and women’s rights.86 The NAACP 
                                                 
83 Alexander, S. L., An Army of Lions: The Civil Rights Struggle Before the NAACP (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012), 139; Waldrep, C., African Americans Confront Lynching: 
Strategies of Resistance from the Civil War to the Civil Rights Era (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, 2009). 
84 Alexander, An Army of Lions, 136-176. 
85 ‘The Best of the Anti-Lynching Fights,’ The Crisis, June 1935, 177. Accessed on 12/09/16 at 
https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=ClgEAAAAMBAJ&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q=quiet%
20work&f=false. 
86 Liberals campaigned for reform in several areas. For example, the National Parks Service was 
founded in 1916 in the interest of conservation. Labour strikes were prominent, highlighting 
reformers drives for improved working conditions. The manufacture, sale or transportation of alcohol 
was prohibited with the ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment in 1919 after temperance groups 
blamed poverty and social ills on the consumption of alcohol. Additionally, suffragists rallied for 
women’s suffrage until the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920.  Buenker, J. D., Urban 
Liberalism and Progressive Reform (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1973). 
35 
 
had similar aspirations with regards to guaranteeing civil rights for all American 
citizens and demanded federal legislative reform to protect the lives of black 
Americans in the face of lynch mobs. The NAACP’s efforts were reflective of the way 
social reformers operated during this era. 
The NAACP’s anti-lynching efforts up until the 1930s were therefore a 
product of the culture of reform in which the Association existed. This chapter 
considers what shaped the NAACP’s approach to anti-lynching up until the 1930s, and 
why the NAACP carried some of these tactics through into their federal lobbying 
strategy.87 Even though lobbying the federal government required a different skillset 
and alternative strategies, essentially, NAACP activists continued to think that their 
tried and tested tactics were still necessary and effective in the fight against lynching 
at the start of the 1930s. 
 
Du Bois and the Intellectual Foundations of the NAACP’s Anti-Lynching 
Campaign 
One of the strongest guiding influences on the NAACP’s anti-lynching movement was 
the organisation’s political philosophy. W. E. B. Du Bois, the NAACP’s resident 
intellectual, defined the organisation’s overarching aims as well as their approach to 
preventing mob violence.88 Positioned against other black intellectuals, such as 
Marcus Garvey and Booker T. Washington, at the turn of the century Du Bois aligned 
with the founding members of the NAACP. It was the rivalry between Washington 
and Du Bois that largely defined the basic terms of race relations in the United States—
‘militance versus conciliation, separatism versus assimilation, higher education versus 
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trade-school training.’89 The NAACP favoured Du Bois because Washington 
promoted segregation as a means to social betterment and accepted ‘the alleged 
inferiority of the Negro races.’90 The men and women of the NAACP chose to never 
accept a status of inferiority and instead saw legal redress and organised protest as the 
way to achieve equality as a fundamental right. It was Du Bois’ model of social 
progress that provided the NAACP’s justification for the pursuit of a federal anti-
lynching campaign. 
The type of reform advocated by the NAACP sought to improve the experience 
of black Americans in as many areas of society as possible. Du Bois recognised that 
the problems blacks faced were extensive. These included securing existence, labour 
and income, food and home, spiritual independence and democratic control of the 
industrial process, all of which Du Bois thought were necessary for blacks to gain 
equality in the United States.91 Ultimately, the NAACP’s work aimed to help black 
Americans compete with whites under capitalism. But Du Bois reasoned, ‘It would 
not do to concenter all effort on economic well-being and forget freedom and manhood 
and equality.’92 It was for this reason that the NAACP had a wide-reaching agenda to 
facilitate social progress on several fronts.  
The first of these fronts was education. For Du Bois, the fight for civil rights 
could not happen independently of the education of blacks. It was partly for this reason 
that the NAACP was home to educated black Americans who advocated on behalf of 
the masses and why Du Bois strongly advocated the higher education of black people; 
a cultured and ‘talented tenth’ should lead the way and ‘scatter civilization’ amongst 
the mass of black Americans.93 With educated and cultured black men and women at 
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the forefront of the organisation, the NAACP sought to become the driving force 
behind the civil rights movement. This translated into the NAACP’s organisational 
setting: legal and legislative battles, such as anti-lynching, were always accompanied 
with educational lecture tours, literature, press releases, and articles in the Crisis—the 
NAACP’s organisational magazine—to educate the public about the issues present in 
its civil rights work. Educating blacks about the root of their poverty and oppression 
was vital if they were to achieve upward social mobility. 
The NAACP highlighted increased black political participation as a 
fundamental goal. For Du Bois, blacks would never achieve equality if they did not 
have the power to hold authority accountable or have fair political representation.94 
But the barriers to political participation were great. Poll taxes, literacy tests, 
grandfather clauses, poor voter registration and the threat of physical violence kept 
many black Americans away from the polls.95 The NAACP did make legal challenges 
to reduce the barriers to political participation and in later years had some success in 
doing so.96 Disfranchisement was a pervasive issue throughout the NAACP’s 
existence. Because many politicians were not dependent upon the black vote for re-
election, black Americans had little political power. 
Increased economic competition with white people was a key need according 
to Du Bois. Building and strengthening the black middle classes was important for 
blacks to carve out economic footholds. One reason that Du Bois opposed Booker T 
Washington’s approach of industrial education was because if Washington’s plan was 
to succeed within the existing economic and political system, Du Bois asserted, he 
would require capital, investors, and protection from expropriation, all of which were 
not readily available to black people.97 In his essay critique of Washington, ‘Of Mr. 
Booker T. Washington and Others,’ Du Bois argued that by focusing on the economic 
problems of blacks Americans in the way that Washington did, it asked black people 
to sacrifice political power, civil rights, and the higher education of black youth in 
favour of prosperity.98  
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Black Americans could not easily carve out economic footholds because the 
black middle class were targets of white discontent, and black businesses, homes, and 
lives were targeted and destroyed. In 1906, black Americans had managed to prosper 
in Atlanta, Georgia; there was an expanding community of black urban labourers, and 
black businessmen had carved out opportunities in the area.99 However, by mid-
September, dozens of rumours spread that black men were raping white women. 
Tensions rose in what historian Philip Dray called a ‘pique of sexual and racial 
hysteria,’ that was exacerbated and perpetuated by local newspapers.100 In one 
instance a woman saw nothing more than a strange black man in her neighbourhood 
and called the police. One evening a lynch mob formed, searching for ‘a sinister 
looking Negro.’101 The mob grew until several thousand whites were chasing 
individual blacks and sweeping thought the streets, targeting and smashing up black 
businesses. In order for business owners with property to have financial security and 
profit under capitalism, the NAACP thought that the protection of their right to do so 
was of fundamental importance. One way of doing this was to remove barriers, such 
as racially motivated violence. The protection of the middle class was important in the 
movement for equality to safeguard any economic growth. 
An anti-lynching campaign was an integral part of the NAACP’s program 
because the threat of lynching prevented full participation in political, economic and 
social life. Even before the NAACP was founded, Ida B. Wells noted that lynching 
was used as a disincentive to petty capitalism, preventing black people from competing 
with white business. Tommie Moss, a friend of Wells,’ along with business partners 
Calvin McDowell and Will Stewart, opened up the People’s Grocery in the Curve, 
Mississippi. The men opened across the road from a white grocery store that held a 
monopoly in the area. The white store was run by a man named Barrett who attempted 
to remove his competition. Word spread that on Saturday night, March 5, 1892, a white 
mob was going to destroy the People’s Grocery.102 Moss, McDowell and Stewart 
asked for police protection but their store fell outside of the jurisdiction of the 
Memphis police. Instead, the three owners stationed armed men in the back of the 
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store to defend their property, and wounded some of the intruders. Convinced they had 
acted out of self-defence, Moss and his partners surrendered to the police the next day 
but were locked in jail. They were later removed from their jail cell and lynched for 
standing up for their rights.103 The NAACP argued that black people should be able to 
rely upon the rule of law to protect businesses from expropriation, instead of having 
to use violent self-defence.104 With this legal protection of black lives and their 
property, investments and economic gains could be made more securely. An anti-
lynching movement was therefore an important part of the NAACP’s agenda, because 
eradicating lynching would help black Americans feel safer to compete economically 
with whites.  
An anti-lynching movement was also part of the NAACP’s broader strategy 
for social progress and integration because it interrogated contemporary ideas about 
race. According to Du Bois, whose thoughts about race and class were almost 
unrivalled at the time, ‘racism was at the core of every issue relating to power, 
economic production, culture and society.’105 On this premise, the Association worked 
to show how racial ideology was present in the legal system, the education system, the 
political system, and in every day social relations, undermining a democracy that was 
valued by Americans nationwide. Major legislative acts in the civil rights arena for 
school desegregation, fair employment, fair housing, anti-discrimination in public 
places and accommodation—as well as the NAACP’s anti-lynching bills—were all 
designed to enhance the competitive capabilities of black Americans.106 As the 
NAACP was founded in response to mob violence, eradicating lynching was a worthy 
cause in itself but a legislative anti-lynching campaign served the NAACP’s agenda 
because, if successful, it could have helped to remove the barriers to American civic 
and economic participation. A federal bill also fit the NAACP’s legalistic gradualist 
approach that Du Bois advocated, making it a good fit for the Association. The 
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NAACP’s continued anti-lynching work was therefore justified largely by Du Bois’ 
writings of the early twentieth century, and in their eyes, continued to justify their anti-
lynching work well into the 1930s. The anti-lynching movement was therefore an 
integral part of the Association’s broad civil rights agenda. 
 
The Facts 
Whilst the principles espoused by Du Bois underpinned the NAACP’s justification for 
an anti-lynching movement, the Association’s strategies were guided also by the 
culture of reform in which it operated. Part of a tradition of resistance to lynching, the 
NAACP adopted many of the methods and strategies promulgated by their 
predecessors and the founding members of the Association.107 Founding NAACP 
member Ida B. Wells had a strong influence on the organisation’s anti-lynching 
campaign as they adopted her methods of investigation and exposure as a dominant 
strategy. This was because, as John Shillady, Secretary of the NAACP, argued in 1919, 
‘none of the several pleas which has been made to explain or excuse [lynching] can 
stand the light of reason.’108 Once the public and the authorities heard about the horrors 
of lynching, the Association’s leaders thought, they were sure to condemn the practice. 
With a view to ‘ascertain and publish the truth’—the NAACP challenged the 
legitimacy of lynching by investigating, recording, and publicising what happened 
during lynchings across the United States.109 This approach influenced much of the 
NAACP’s anti-lynching work, especially in the early years of the organisation’s 
history, and was a method that the NAACP would utilise throughout their lobbying 
campaign. 
The NAACP adopted Wells’ techniques of resistance to lynching because they 
were important to formulating the most effective anti-lynching strategies. Wells 
investigated and documented cases of mob violence to detail the causes of lynching as 
well as to determine the best ways to stop lynching.110 Her publications A Red Record: 
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Tabulated Statistics and Alleged Causes of Lynchings in the United States, 1892-1894 
and Southern Horrors: Lynch Law in all its Phases established that black Americans 
were lynched to repress race riots and black insurrections, deny black citizens the vote, 
and to allow swifter punishment than the prevailing legal system allowed, to name just 
a few.111 This groundwork allowed her to argue in Southern Horrors that the two most 
effective ways to stop lynchings were to threaten both the financial security and the 
lives of white people. Wells urged black workers to abandon their jobs, and leave the 
South in their thousands to bring ‘great stagnation in every branch of business,’ and 
to wield a weapon when all other forms of resistance failed, continuing the discourse 
of self-defence. She encouraged that ‘a Winchester rifle should have a place of honor 
in every black home’ because when white aggressors ran the risk of ‘biting the dust 
every time his Afro-American victim [did],’ he would arguably have greater respect 
for black lives.112 Whilst the NAACP disavowed violent protest, they used the facts to 
justify their activism in the same manner as Wells did. Wells therefore defined 
strategies for investigation, exposure of facts about lynching, and using statistics to 
substantiate activism. The NAACP used this template for years to come, highlighting 
the significance of Wells’ contribution to the anti-lynching movement.  
The NAACP sacrificed both financial resources and the personal safety of 
some of their leaders to accumulate lynching data in a similar vein to Wells. They 
collected news clippings and reports of lynchings nationwide to build a comprehensive 
archive of lynchings throughout the United States.113 Only cases where evidence of 
the lynching could be authenticated by the NAACP, an investigator, or a credible 
newspaper were documented.114 For some cases the NAACP sent one of its members 
or hired a private investigator to probe a recent lynching and discover the facts. Walter 
White often recalled his own experiences of ‘sleuthing,’ and on occasion he ‘passed’ 
for a white man to get communities to open up about the details of recent lynchings or 
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race riots.115 White claimed that on three occasions he had to make a quick escape 
after locals’ suspicions were aroused as to his identity.116 White recalled that his 
investigations into the Chicago race riot of 1919 almost cost him his life after he was 
shot at by a black man who mistook him for a white man.117 White risking his life to 
obtain such information, showed just how valuable evidence and information about 
lynchings were to the organisation’s anti-lynching movement.118 Without it, the 
NAACP’s only response to a recent lynching was to ‘telegraph a protest to the 
governor.’ From previous experience, the NAACP realised this tactic would achieve 
little more than a little publicity in the local newspapers.119 The NAACP activists 
expended so much time and resources to obtain lynching data because they believed 
that it offered the possibility of engaging in more effective activism. 
It was the different ways in which information could be used that gave it value. 
First and foremost, the NAACP published this data to educate the public about 
lynching and challenge commonly held beliefs about lynching. One of their most 
circulated pamphlets, Thirty Years of Lynching in the United States, 1889-1918, 
summarised one hundred lynchings that took place across the country.120 Through 
these publications and investigations, the NAACP argued that many stereotypes about 
black men as hypersexualised brutes, and the myth about the necessity to defend white 
womanhood, still prevailed. White claimed that the publication offered a ‘revelation 
of the falsity of the relation between lynchings and rape,’ and that the title ‘amazed 
those who read it’ as it revealed that less than one-sixth of all victims of lynchings had 
been accused of sex crimes.121 Having detailed accounts of a lynching allowed White 
to ascertain the cause of the mob violence under investigation and provide evidence to 
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challenge myths. Facts added weight to their arguments and allowed the NAACP to 
challenge the racial stereotypes perpetuated in the rhetoric surrounding lynching.  
With this information, the NAACP could make more targeted protests and 
appeals, and present authorities with the evidence needed to prosecute those 
responsible. After the death of Claude Neal—who was lynched for the suspected rape 
and murder of Lola Cannidy—White hired special investigator Edward ‘Buck’ Kester 
for $75 to go to Florida and gather ‘all the gruesome details possible together with any 
photographs of the body, crowd, etc., and as much evidence as is possible as to the 
identity of the leaders and members of the mob.’122 In particular, White instructed 
Kester to find ‘any evidence that Neal actually did or did not rape and murder Lola 
Cannidy.’123 The NAACP used published facts and investigative reports to pressure 
local and federal authorities to act, to keep the horrors of lynching in the public 
consciousness, and to dismiss the notion that black men should be lynched because 
they raped white women.  Kester reported that there was ‘little room for doubt’ that 
Neal killed Cannidy but ‘no evidence at all that there was any rape’ as the pair had 
been having sexual relations for some time.124 Investigations helped the Association 
to establish the chain of events that led to the lynching, to discover who the 
perpetrators were, and to see if any wrongdoing or injustice had been done on the part 
of the authorities.  
The details of brutal lynchings, and the emotive language in which it was 
described, allowed the NAACP to employ shock tactics and gain support for their 
national efforts. So, later, when the NAACP turned to the federal government to enact 
an anti-lynching law the NAACP also used facts to gain support for their bills. In 1934, 
White sent copies of Kester’s report on the Neal lynching to the President and First 
Lady, every member of Congress, 225 coloured press and approximately 150 white 
press, radio stations, Writers’ League Against Lynching members, and to specific 
columnists and editors, to name just a fraction of the recipients.125 Cases that so 
blatantly proved the NAACP’s case for reform were therefore distributed as far and 
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wide as possible. In Congress, in particular, the NAACP used the facts they obtained 
to dispute claims that an anti-lynching law was not needed, and to argue that lynching 
was not just a racial or a sectional issue.126 
White recalled, ‘the campaign for federal legislation publicized the facts about 
lynching.’127 But it was the facts that formed the foundation of the NAACP’s anti-
lynching campaign as it gave them the conviction to correct congressmen who 
defended mob violence or questioned the need for legislation, gave them the evidence 
they needed to present to congressional committees, and gave the justification for their 
national efforts in the first place. Lynching facts and statistics were therefore still just 
as important to the NAACP in the 1930s as they were when the Association first 
deplored the use of mob violence in 1909. But there was a shift away from using this 
evidence to provoke outrage and protest towards an effort to lobby. Nevertheless, 
accumulation and presentation of the facts continued to be a central feature of the 
NAACP’s activism and future lobbying campaign. 
 
Education 
Education was central to the NAACP’s program during their early years and one of 
the organisation’s key aims was to change perceptions about lynching. Education was 
important, leaders reiterated, because Americans remained ignorant about commonly 
perpetuated stereotypes and myths. If people knew the facts, argued the NAACP, then 
black Americans would be better equipped to help themselves and the ignorance of 
white Americans would be reduced. Such a program was designed to promote the 
philosophy of the NAACP over other reformers, to relay the findings of their 
investigations and research into the race issue, and to gain support—both moral and 
financial—for their activities and campaigns. By the 1930s, traces of the activists’ 
programme of education was evident in their lobbying activities. The campaign for 
anti-lynching legislation relied upon the NAACP’s efforts to persuade congressmen 
to vote for their bills and increase public sentiment against lynching. Education was a 
key method through which the NAACP tried to achieve this. 
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The primary mouthpiece through which the NAACP educated its members was 
the organisation’s magazine, the Crisis. Edited by Du Bois until 1934, and afterwards 
by Roy Wilkins, the object of the Crisis was to ‘set forth those facts and arguments 
which show the danger of race prejudice,’ through newspaper articles, editorials, and 
opinion pieces reflecting the views of both black and white America.128 Issued 
monthly, it set the tone for the organisation’s work and aimed to impart the inspiration 
that was needed for the success of the NAACP and for the larger civil rights 
movement.129 The circulation and readership demographic of the Crisis is largely 
unknown although it is thought that in the North, particularly in the first decade of its 
existence, readership was limited to educated and literate blacks and whites. This 
meant that through this medium, the NAACP were largely preaching to the converted. 
While roughly eighty percent of all Crisis readers were black, the NAACP’s 
propaganda, particularly over their first decade, failed to reach working-class blacks 
and non-members.130 As the Crisis only reached NAACP members, Du Bois and the 
NAACP were trying to educate members who already subscribed to its point of view. 
It would have to utilise other methods if it was to reach Americans nationwide and 
change the opinions of those who participated in the maintenance of white supremacy. 
To reach a wider audience the NAACP often embarked on speaking tours of 
the United States to promote the Association and increase membership numbers and 
public support. Du Bois and Joel Spingarn, chairman of the NAACP’s board from 
1914, went on speaking tours to promote the Association throughout the first decade 
of the organisation’s existence. Often this involved criticising other reformers in order 
to champion their own work. Just like preachers from the pulpit, these men proffered 
their ideas about the best way to solve racial inequality. ‘I let myself go about 
Washington tonight,’ reported Spingarn after one 1914 speech in which he publicly 
criticised Booker T. Washington and his approach to racial inequality.131 By 
denouncing Washington the speakers emphasised that the Association’s work was the 
best way to achieve social and legal equality, and pointed out that the likes of 
Washington would only hinder efforts for the uplift of black Americans. In three 
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speaking tours, Spingarn and Du Bois reached audiences of up to seventy thousand 
people, and while not all of those who attended a lecture would go on to join the 
NAACP, these were valuable forums to the fledgling organisation. 
It was important for the NAACP that their efforts to educate filtered out beyond 
their existing membership who were already in support of their cause. In addition to 
the Crisis, the NAACP used alternate publications to reach audiences who did not pay 
for the magazine. Pamphlet literature was disseminated in far greater numbers than 
the Crisis; these were short publications of few pages that provided information on 
particular issues or on the NAACP’s work. Some pamphlet titles from 1921 included 
‘Done in 1920 Program for 1921,’ ‘A Ten Year Fight Against Lynching,’ ‘An 
American Lynching,’ ‘Disfranchisement of Colored Americans,’ and ‘The NAACP 
vs the KKK.’132 In just one month—September 1921—the NAACP National Office 
sent out 9,091 pieces of literature, suggesting that across the years literature like this 
was wide reaching.133 They were sent to members, friendly organisations, potential 
members, church groups, and later to congressmen, to agitate, reinforce the need for 
action, and of course, to educate the ignorant. They were effective propaganda, 
winning the NAACP new members who wanted, in the words of convert Ellen Lund 
of the New Haven District Epworth League, ‘more fully to identify… with the work 
for justice and greater opportunities for the Negro.’134 
These publications allowed the NAACP to educate on specific issues, such as 
lynching, disfranchisement, unfair employment practices, and other social ills. In their 
pamphlets about lynching, the NAACP made use of the factual information they 
collected to reinforce the idea that justice was the responsibility of the state. Armed 
with statistical data, as well as written accounts in the case of lynchings, the NAACP 
aimed to ‘bring home to the American people their responsibility for the persistence 
of this monstrous blot on America’s honor.’135 The one hundredth lynching 
summarised in their publication Thirty Years of Lynching in the United States, 1889-
1918 taught people that it was possible for the state to uphold the rule of law in the 
face of a lynch mob.136 The case study described the city Mayor’s ‘promptitude and 
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courage’ in calling out the Home Guard to quash a mob in North Carolina, and outlined 
how Judge B. F. Long of the Superior Court sentenced fifteen white men from fourteen 
months to six years in prison for participating in the riot.137 Although not overt in their 
message, the NAACP ended the pamphlet with this case study designed to reinforce 
their message and make it known that lynchings, and the subsequent inaction on the 
part of the state, were not inevitable. 
The organisation also aimed to educate the public about the best solutions to 
the problems facing black Americans. It was for this reason that they also produced 
literature advocating their own program. As the NAACP’s legal committee was busy 
drafting an anti-lynching bill at the beginning of the 1930s, the NAACP enlisted 
support for the measure by educating about the need for a federal anti-lynching law. 
A two-page pamphlet published in 1934 and named ‘A Federal Law to Curb 
Lynching,’ stated that lynching was not a sectional or a racial issue, and that the need 
for a federal anti-lynching law was clearly rooted in the fact that the states had failed 
to act in cases of lynching.138 This type of propaganda, accompanied with their claims 
in the press that ‘only federal law will stop mobs,’ was instrumental in positioning the 
NAACP as the champion of civil rights, as the most knowledgeable about the lynching 
issue, and the most capable of stopping the crime.139 
Such literature also gave strength to the NAACP’s direct lobbying efforts in 
both Congress and the White House in the 1930s. The NAACP was keen to educate 
congressmen on the facts, disprove their opponents’ arguments, and gain support for 
their anti-lynching legislation. NAACP activists also kept FDR up to date on lynching 
statistics throughout the campaign. ‘During 1934 the total of lynchings has already 
reached the alarming number of 18,’ they informed him, convinced that if he knew 
how bad the situation was he would act—or, more importantly, endorse their anti-
lynching legislation.140 The NAACP believed that in part, FDR’s and congressmen’s 
objections to anti-lynching measures were due to ignorance of the facts or because 
they did not appreciate the gravity of the lynching situation. But, as the NAACP would 
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later find out, it would take more than facts to overcome institutional racism or gain 
presidential support. 
Proven to increase the membership numbers of the organisation, and 
differentiate the NAACP against other reformist groups, the NAACP always retained 
their educational program alongside any of their campaigns. Education became an 
important facet of the NAACP’s anti-lynching work and NAACP leadership 
committed time and effort to this tactic. The Association still advocated the use of 
lectures, literature, and public meetings in 1935 as they actively devised strategies to 
build public sentiment against lynching and increase public support for their 
legislative measures.141 Even if their tactics did not persuade congressmen to vote for 
the anti-lynching bill, increasing public sentiment for the bill could build a support 
base that would allow the lobbyists to apply greater political pressure if it was needed 
in the future. 
 
Protest as a Tried and Tested Method 
While NAACP activists adopted tactics from individuals and organisations who 
preceded them, they also chose to use methods that they had developed themselves. 
Protest was one of the tactics that the NAACP had fine-tuned over the years, and it 
was one of the Association’s most favoured.142 The NAACP’s protests were grounded 
in their moral ideas about what was right and wrong; they took many different forms 
and took place locally, regionally, and nationally. Protests were intended to elevate 
the voice of black Americans, make a spectacle, make their voices heard, and educate 
Americans by raising awareness. The NAACP had minor successes using protests in 
the decades preceding the 1930s. Consequently, NAACP activists used protest tactics 
in their anti-lynching campaign in Washington because lobbyists thought that it was a 
tried and tested method that could achieve results. 
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NAACP protests took place on a weekly, and sometimes daily, basis. Such 
public declarations served as a constant reminder to the nation that there were still 
issues of racism to be resolved, as well as to cement the notion that the NAACP would 
never accept discrimination and prejudice. In its simplest form, protest involved public 
condemnation of racism, lynchings, and inequality. The NAACP achieved this 
through regular press releases to both the black and white press, containing 
information about recent lynchings, cases of overt racism, or court cases in which they 
were currently involved.143 The Association also hung a banner outside their 
Manhattan headquarters that read, ‘A Man Was Lynched Yesterday,’ every time they 
were informed that a lynching had taken place.144 This was a visible protest on one of 
the busiest streets in the city that made people aware of the frequency of lynchings. 
Protesting in this way let the public know that racism was not an acceptable practice. 
When lynchings occurred, the NAACP made it clear that it was deplorable to defend 
lynchings, take part in a lynching, or fail to uphold the rule of law; no target was 
immune if they had done wrong. These protests were a constant reminder of the 
organisation’s activism and that there were issues that would not be resolved without 
public support and funding. 
Mass protest rallies or marches were employed to elevate an issue to the 
national headlines and gain media attention, often in response to race riots or 
particularly brutal lynchings. On 28 July 1917, the NAACP organized a ‘negro silent 
protest parade’ in New York City in which between 8,000 and 10,000 black Americans 
marched in lines from 59th St. and Fifth Avenue to 23rd St. and Madison Square. They 
organised the march ‘to bring the murderers of our brothers, sisters and innocent 
children to justice,’ in both the East St. Louis race riot and the lynching of Jesse 
Washington in Waco, TX.145 But their silence reflected their condemnation of 
American acceptance of racial violence; leaders deemed it a crime for anyone ‘to be 
silent in the face of such barbaric acts.’146 Men, women, and children filled the streets 
of New York to reach the nation’s consciousness, and its conscience. Du Bois and the 
other organisers of the parade also hoped that it would make President Woodrow 
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Wilson live up to his campaign promise to implement anti-lynching legislation and 
protect black lives. 
Sometimes publicity alone was insufficient to achieve tangible results, but the 
NAACP still used protest to pressure the authorities into doing their duty. The NAACP 
extended their protest up the ladder of authority, from local police, to state prosecutors, 
mayors, state governors, and even the President when they felt that laws had been 
violated and nothing was being done about it. When Walter White first joined the 
NAACP’s ranks, a black sharecropper, Jim McIlherron, was burned to death in Estill 
Springs, Tennessee, for defending himself when his employer beat him. Sending a 
telegraph to the Governor was the NAACP’s standard response to cases of lynching 
but the national office knew that without the facts, protesting to the Governor after a 
lynching ‘would do nothing more than possibly secure a few lines of publicity.’147 In 
this case, the NAACP used their investigative work to strengthen their appeals, and 
sent White to Tennessee to discover the facts. The NAACP therefore combined their 
tactics to put forward a more significant and irrefutable protest to the Governor. 
The organisation’s predilection to protest made its way into all areas of their 
work, including their early attempts at lobbying.148 These attempts were mostly 
protests to the federal government against the poor treatment of blacks in federal 
projects. After the 1927 Mississippi floods, hundreds of thousands lost their homes 
and lived in Red Cross camps for months. The federal government was accused of 
favouring whites in the recovery operations, but it was the treatment of black labourers 
who were forced to participate in the relief efforts that the NAACP found most 
deplorable. Roy Wilkins and George Schuyler spent three weeks undercover as 
labourers in camps to investigate the claims. The men found that most black workers 
received a dollar or two dollars a day—half of that paid to white workers. A system of 
peonage ‘organized by the federal government [U.S. Army Corps of Engineers] and 
paid for with American tax dollars’ was in place, designed to push black labourers to 
work as much as possible for as little pay as possible.149 Wilkins published his findings 
as ‘Mississippi River Slavery 1933’ in the Crisis. The NAACP generated national 
interest by engaging in a letter writing campaign to Congress, publishing articles in 
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black newspapers, and bombarding members and non-members alike with information 
about debt peonage to heighten black Americans’ awareness of life inside levee 
camps.150 But their appeals to Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover and President 
Calvin Coolidge to provide relief and protection for displaced black Americans failed 
to deliver an acceptable solution. In response, the NAACP demanded attention from 
the War Department, and sponsored a resolution, introduced by Senator Wagner, in 
the 72nd Congress, calling for a senatorial investigation of levee camps.151 The 
NAACP lobbied in support of the resolution and after a period of filibustering, the 
Senate passed the resolution allowing Wagner to head the investigation into the 
government’s Mississippi Flood Control Project.152 This provided momentum for the 
NAACP as they successfully demanded the attention of the federal government. 
But it was their lobbying to prevent the nomination of Judge John J. Parker to 
the Supreme Court in 1929 that cemented the practice of lobbying as a means of protest 
in the NAACP’s strategic repertoire. In 1920, a decade prior to his nomination, Parker 
made comments to the Greensboro Daily News in support of a 1900 disfranchisement 
law. This came five years after the Supreme Court had declared the grandfather clause 
unconstitutional in 1915. Parker stated that ‘the participation of the Negro in politics 
is a source of evil and danger to both races and is not desired by the wise men in either 
race or by the Republican party of North Carolina.’153 The NAACP argued that 
Parker’s own statements ‘condemn him as unfit to sit on the U.S. Supreme Court,’ and 
for this reason the NAACP launched a lobbying campaign to prevent his selection.154 
NAACP lobbyists sent a wave of press releases to news distributing agencies, kept 
track of senators’ positions on the nomination and notified members in various states 
of when and how strong pressure should be exerted on them. The NAACP also urged 
editors to give editorial support to the fight, and White, Spingarn and Du Bois 
addressed mass meetings. When Parker’s nomination was rejected by a vote of 41 to 
39, the Crisis reported that ‘the outstanding blows against the Parker nomination were 
struck by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People,’ and 
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hailed their protests as ‘the greatest political victory which united Negro America has 
won since the Civil War.’155 But its significance, the article argued, was in the fact that 
as a result of this achievement, the black man was ‘No longer as a suppliant who might 
be disregarded at will or convenience, but… a full-fledged citizen and a bearer of 
political responsibility and power, the Negro’s voice was heard.’156 The perceived 
power in this type of protest spurred the NAACP on to launch their anti-lynching 
campaign in the 1930s. Their efforts gave them experience in Washington politics, if 
only a little. But most importantly, it gave the NAACP the perception that they had 
influence in the federal political arena. Although the campaign against Parker was not 
directly a part of their anti-lynching programme, this victory energised the NAACP 
activists who thought they could use similar methods in the fight against anti-lynching.  
 Since their founding, the NAACP’s methods of protest proved effective for the 
organisation. Although their private protests to authorities were largely ineffective, 
their large scale public protests raised awareness of their cause, and demonstrated that 
they were capable of organising in large numbers. Attempts at lobbying in protest to 
get the government’s attention and force their hand to reject a nomination or guarantee 
civil rights in relief efforts were some of the NAACP’s proudest achievements outside 
of the courts before the 1930s. It was therefore unsurprising that such a successful 
tactic was adopted again on the national stage throughout their anti-lynching 
campaign. After all, they brought their experience with them, and it just so happened 
that the NAACP were most experienced with protest tactics. 
 
Conclusion 
Despite their efforts, the NAACP’s early strategies to stop lynching were ultimately 
unsuccessful; no lynchers were punished and no lynchings had been prevented as a 
result of this type of activism. The Association had made little progress on the lynching 
issue since their founding; the numbers of lynchings even increased in the early 
1930s.157 This raises the question of why the NAACP fell back on these methods 
during their two decade long federal lobbying campaign. But it was because these 
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strategies were deep-rooted within the organisation and had proven to be effective in 
their earlier efforts that the NAACP still relied upon these tactics. 
What shaped the Association’s efforts in the 1930s was in large part due to the 
people who made up the organisation in its early years. Du Bois’ liberal political 
philosophy was important in determining their anti-lynching strategy because it 
defined their approach and aims. Founded on these beliefs, the NAACP decided to 
pursue non-violent, legalistic, and gradualist methods from the outset. Just like their 
efforts to end discrimination and legal segregation, the anti-lynching movement was 
part of a broader strategy to achieve equality.  
 Ida B. Wells cemented their determination to discover the facts, and demystify 
lynching. This belief in positivism meant that the Association placed great importance 
on having the facts; they thought that knowledge of the realities of lynchings would 
change minds and gain support for their campaign. Their investigative work was the 
bedrock of their anti-lynching campaign. Fundamentally, investigative work allowed 
the Association to understand the lynching issue and to test out what did and did not 
work in the fight against the practice. Knowing the causes, the contributing factors, 
and the context to many lynchings provided all the evidence the NAACP needed to 
claim that a federal anti-lynching bill was needed. Statistical evidence could also be 
presented to the public, to the authorities, and to Congress to educate people about 
lynching, and to support any legal arguments they made. It therefore was a prominent 
aspect of their anti-lynching work, and was evident in their lobbying. Having proof of 
the horrors and injustices displayed in lynching cases became ever more important in 
Congress, as the activists had open and strong opposition to persuade otherwise. 
But when the NAACP found themselves capable of influencing federal 
decisions with their protests, it gave NAACP leaders the belief that protest was still an 
effective type of activism. The NAACP national office seemed to have more success 
on the national stage than it did with local authorities. The prevention of Judge 
Parker’s nomination to the Supreme Court opened up new possibilities for the future 
of the anti-lynching campaign. NAACP activists therefore showed no fear in lobbying 
the federal government for a federal anti-lynching bill because lobbying appeared 
particularly effective to the activists in light of their victory against Parker. 
The NAACP’s early work led the Association to focus on federal legislation 
in the 1930s instead of state action. Du Bois’ philosophy put the onus on the 
government to guarantee the rights of individuals and protect them from lynch mobs. 
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Its investigative work showed NAACP leaders that state authorities were mostly 
unwilling or unable to stop lynchings. In addition, success in protesting the federal 
government against the Parker nomination and for investigations into levee camps in 
Mississippi Flood Control Projects showed the Association that its activists could 
influence national politics. Collectively, these factors led the NAACP’s national office 
to seek a federal solution to lynching in the 1930s and continue to do so for the 
proceeding two decades. It was therefore a combination of ingrained tactics, and minor 
successes that shaped the NAACP’s anti-lynching up until the 1930s. Although this 
statistic cannot be directly or solely linked to the NAACP’s efforts, a Gallup poll 
showed that by 1937, 70 per cent of Americans agreed that Congress should enact a 
law that would make lynching a crime.158 This supported the NAACP claims that the 
majority of Americans wanted to see an end to lynching as the decade progressed, 
reinforcing their conviction that they could alter public opinion through their work. If 
the NAACP could alter public opinion, then logic followed that they could alter the 
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Congress and the Shaping of the NAACP’s Lobbying Practices 
The NAACP lobbied the legislative branch of the federal government for nearly two 
decades in order to achieve passage of an anti-lynching bill.159 Having been 
predominantly an organ of protest for the preceding two decades, lobbying posed a 
new challenge for the NAACP in the 1930s.160 Lobbying in protest, like they had done 
to oppose Judge Parker’s Supreme Court nomination, was very different to lobbying 
in favour of an anti-lynching bill. It required skills of persuasion instead of mere 
statements of condemnation. Yet the NAACP’s lobbying is not a widely-studied 
aspect of their programme; organisational histories describe the Association’s 
activism, their drive towards reform, and their congressional campaigns to pass anti-
lynching legislation, but the details of the organisation's lobbying efforts are seldom 
talked about and rarely analysed.161 With few experiences of lobbying in Washington, 
it was no surprise that the NAACP’s efforts left significant room for improvement. 
But over the course of the decade, their lobbying strategy and tactics changed; the 
Association shifted from a position of protest to serious engagement with the political 
process. In the interest of understanding the evolution of the NAACP’s lobbying 
practices this chapter analyses the congressional influences that shaped them. 
Political science theory about how interest groups function in Congress offers 
a lens through which to interpret the changes to the NAACP’s lobbying strategy. The 
NAACP’s lobbying efforts can be analysed in relation to three main theories: political 
resources, access to congressmen, and persuasion.162 Viewing the anti-lynching 
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movement through this lens reveals why the NAACP used particular lobbying 
methods, how effective they were, and any lobbying missteps they made that might 
warrant any objections. This approach is significant because it contributes an alternate 
way of studying movement history that brings the process of reform to the fore, and, 
more importantly, it shows that NAACP activists had agency—the ability to 
influence—in the lobbying process, something that they have previously not been 
given credit for. 
An analysis of the NAACP’s lobbying reveals that their strategy changed in 
response to congressional resistance and obstruction. While the idea of congressional 
resistance to anti-lynching bills is not new—in fact congressional obstruction, 
particularly in the form of filibustering, is one of the most widely recognised aspects 
of the anti-lynching movement—congressional objection to the NAACP’s lobbying 
itself is yet to be explored.163 These objections were primarily verbal or conveyed to 
the NAACP through written correspondence. An analysis of these interactions reveal 
that critiques of the NAACP’s lobbying efforts were not always meant to derail the 
activists or their anti-lynching bills, and feedback on their methods was sometimes 
given with the hope that the NAACP might succeed. Regardless of congressmen’s 
motives in highlighting the NAACP’s inexperience, this was evidence of a particular 
type of congressional conservatism faced by the NAACP. This chapter explores this 
phenomenon, broadens scholarly understanding of congressional conservatism, and 
looks beyond overt legislative obstruction as the only way in which Congress 
challenged the NAACP’s lobbying efforts. 
Objections arose when the NAACP openly, and often unknowingly, defied 
congressional norms. This was a particular kind of conservatism whereby Congress 
demanded that the NAACP conform to behaviour befitting lobbyists. Essentially, 
Congress institutionalised the NAACP’s lobbying practices. The NAACP was 
moulded by this conservatism; it helped them become more effective lobbyists as they 
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learned how to reduce objections to not only their proposed legislation, but their own 
approach as well. Obstruction provided the NAACP with an opportunity to learn, and 
was not solely, as other scholars have concluded, a limiting factor for the NAACP.164 
Washington D.C. became the arena in which the NAACP would learn just what it took 
to pass legislation in Congress. The campaign for the 1934 Costigan-Wagner bill 
tested the effectiveness of their lobbying skills, and the positive and negative responses 
to the Association’s actions became an important source of feedback that allowed the 
Association to hone their strategy. 
 
 
A Lack of Financial and Political Resources 
 
It is a dominant perspective on interest group influence that lobbyists can be effective 
in swaying Congress through their use of political resources.165 This can include either 
financial or organisational assets. However, not all of these methods were available to 
the NAACP throughout their lobbying campaign. Restricted in the ways they could 
influence congressmen, particularly by a lack of financial resources and political 
power, the NAACP were limited to direct lobbying to secure votes within the 
legislative process. Whilst NAACP activists gained lobbying skills throughout the 
decade, at the start of their campaign when they only had very modest resources 
available to them, the NAACP’s lobbying techniques were influenced by 
organisational limitations. Consequently, NAACP activists relied upon informational 
lobbying techniques to push their anti-lynching bills through Congress during this 
time. 
 Making campaign contributions was not an option for the NAACP in the 
1930s. Lobbyists often paid to maintain their presence in Washington, support 
candidate elections, and contribute to party funds. There is debate regarding the level 
of influence financial contributions can achieve. Some scholars have found no link 
                                                 
164 Goldstein, R. P., ‘The Dyer Anti-Lynching Bill: The Movement for Federal Control of Lynching, 
1900-1922’ (MA diss., University of Wisconsin, 1966); Holmes, M. S., 'The Costigan-Wagner and 
Wagner-Van Nuys Anti-Lynching Bills, 1933-1938' (MSc diss., University of Wisconsin, 1965). 
165 For literature on this theory see: Goldstein, K. M., Interest Groups, Lobbying, and Participation in 
America (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1999); Hansen, Gaining Access; Kau, and Rubin, 
Congressmen, Constituents, and Contributors; Kollman, K., Outside Lobbying: Public Opinion and 
Interest Group Strategies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998); Sorauf, F. J., Inside 
Campaign Finance: Myths and Realities (Yale University Press: New Haven, 1992). 
58 
 
between money and votes.166 Others have found that contributions can only buy access 
to Congressmen and time with committee members to discuss issues.167 Nevertheless, 
the NAACP did not have the finances to lobby in this way during the 1930s. Most of 
the NAACP’s funds came from donations made by their own membership. As 
Secretary of the NAACP, White often wrote to the Association’s branches for funds 
to help fight ‘the grim struggle.’168 During the anti-lynching campaign he told them to 
‘raise as much money as possible to help pay the cost of publicity, travelling expenses 
of witnesses, etc.,’ but more often than not members contributed as little as $1 at a 
time.169 Whilst the Association did apply for larger grants, they found that few 
organisations were willing to fund black activism.170 As a result, the NAACP’s anti-
lynching fund remained modest and did not allow for both lobbying expenses and 
campaign contributions. 
‘We are conducting this campaign on a shoe-string,’ White proclaimed, as 
financial limitations affected all areas of the Association’s lobbying.171 The Secretary 
reported to the NAACP’s Board of Directors that he was not able to afford to send all 
necessary telegrams to senators and complained that the lobbyists had ‘no funds for 
stenographic services, which frequently necessitated the Secretary and volunteer 
workers working as late as two and three o’clock in the morning.’172 The NAACP’s 
finances were so stretched that White had to relay to Will Alexander of the 
Commission on Interracial Cooperation (CIC) they ‘won’t be able to pay the expenses 
of witnesses,’ witnesses that Alexander had secured to testify at congressional 
hearings in Washington.173 The organisation had to pay staff wages, as well as fund 
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court cases, and the rest of their program. Lobbying was only one area of the NAACP’s 
work and they could not direct all of their resources to the anti-lynching campaign. 
This meant that the NAACP could barely cover their own expenses, let alone provide 
additional financial incentives to convince congressmen to vote for the anti-lynching 
bill. 
In addition to limited financial resources, the NAACP lacked sufficient 
political resources. Political resources refer to political power achieved through 
political mobilisation. Organising to influence could potentially have real impact on 
legislative outcomes, and this aspect of interest group relations is undisputed by 
scholars.174 The more political power a group has, the more pressure their membership 
can put on congressional representatives. Pressure could be exerted by asking 
members to urge congressmen to vote a certain way, or by threatening a 
congressman’s career by voting for other candidates who were more sympathetic to 
the lobbyists’ cause. The NAACP knew that mobilisation of their members could be 
an effective lobbying strategy and its first port-of-call on any campaign was to ask its 
members to demand action from their local representatives. They encouraged 
members to express their opinions about lynching to their elected officials, and 
implore them to stop the crime. An NAACP press release issued shortly after the 
NAACP started drafting the Costigan-Wagner bill rallied their 378 branches to 
interview their congressmen and senators seeking pledges of support for their 
proposed anti-lynching bill in Congress in January 1934.175 In doing so, the branches 
helped the national office to collect information on how particular representatives 
might vote. The importance the NAACP placed upon its membership contacting local 
representatives highlighted the Association’s awareness that congressional 
representatives’ votes could be swayed by their constituents’ opinions on a bill. 
Another way of exerting political pressure was at the polls. The NAACP 
encouraged its members to bear in mind a politician’s stance on anti-lynching when 
electing them to office. Motivating a Senator with the idea of losing their position in 
office was a common strategy for the anti-lynching lobbyists and when a congressman 
indicated that they were hostile to a federal anti-lynching bill, the NAACP wasted no 
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time in employing this tactic. ‘Voters should cast their votes solidly against any man 
who endorses lynching or who refuses to vote for anti-lynching laws, regardless of 
party lines or previous “good will.” Negroes… must use every weapon at their 
command and they must use them in a fight to the finish.’176 But the NAACP 
suggested that they had more sway with the black electorate than was actually the case. 
The NAACP knew how a vote could be secured, but could not reinforce their 
knowledge with action: the NAACP’s membership was not large enough to influence 
the decision of congressmen in every state. Additionally, many black people still faced 
restrictions on voting because of poll taxes, literacy tests, and other legal or illegal 
means imposed by white authorities. In February 1934, Walter White reported to the 
Senate Sub Committee on the Judiciary that the Association boasted a membership of 
eighty-five thousand.177 This meant that spread across the country, even if all members 
voted according to the NAACP’s recommendations, it would have had little effect 
upon electoral outcomes. This was pointed out to Roy Wilkins by the editor of the 
Kansas City Call, C. A. Franklin, who said that, ‘my opinion is that the NAACP’s 
great need is mass appeal… you will come into real power only after the Negro in the 
streets thinks of the N. A. A. C. P. as his big brother.’178 The Association still did not 
have mass appeal and legislators knew that they did not have the electorate behind 
them. 
In addition to a small membership, the NAACP also had a small lobbying team. 
Despite the anti-lynching campaign being an initiative of the NAACP’s national 
office, the vast majority of the organising efforts and direct lobbying in Washington 
stemmed from one man: Walter White. White coordinated the lobbying campaign with 
the help of Assistant Secretary Roy Wilkins; he organised, gathered evidence and 
information to present to legislators and committees, and personally lobbied many 
congressmen. While this was a great achievement, White’s personal reach was finite. 
He could not be in two places at once, and he was not permanently based in 
Washington to lobby at the political epicentre. Although White’s correspondence was 
voluminous, he could not lobby entirely by himself. But due to a lack of personnel, 
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the organisation had a sporadic and understated presence in Washington as White split 
his time between the Capitol and the NAACP’s New York offices. 
In terms of lobbying, blacks remained far behind groups such as labour, 
farmers, and business lobbyists in the political power that they could muster in 
Congress.179 For this reason, and due to the NAACP’s small national staff, the 
Association co-ordinated its lobbying activities with other organisations. The Socialist 
Lawyers Association, the Congressional Education Society, the Women’s Peace 
Society, the Methodist Federation for Social Service, the Church League for Industrial 
Democracy, the National Urban League, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), 
the Interdenominational Preachers Meeting of New York and Vicinity, and the League 
for the Defense of Political Prisoners pooled their resources with the NAACP to lobby 
for the anti-lynching bill. But even collectively they had little political experience.180 
Black Americans were not a previously well-organised group, many of them were not 
in unions, and they were not represented in many areas. None of these organisations 
had experience in pushing through a federal bill, and while collectively their 
membership was larger and increased the pool of political resources the NAACP could 
draw upon, anti-lynching was not the sole focus of all these organisations. They each 
had their own agendas and priorities so these organisations could not contribute all of 
their resources to the anti-lynching lobby. 
The NAACP was very aware of the potential influence it could have over a 
congressional vote if only it had the resources. The organisation ran the campaign on 
an extremely tight budget, and were unable to offer financial incentives to gain access 
and influence in Congress. Furthermore, the Association’s membership was only a 
tiny fraction of the population at the time, meaning that their ability to influence 
elections and representatives’ opinions, especially when many black Americans were 
still disenfranchised, was wishful thinking at best. For the NAACP, this meant the 
activists had to lobby by providing convincing information about the benefits of anti-
lynching legislation. Despite this, gathering information and educating people about 
the facts was a key tenet of the NAACP’s activism, so they had considerable 
experience in using this tactic. But with non-procedural avenues unavailable to them, 
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The limited organisational resources of the NAACP defined how its activists 
functioned as lobbyists in the first half of the 1930s. The NAACP were restricted to 
the use of persuasion-orientated lobbying tactics to influence legislative decisions 
whereby activists presented Congress with convincing arguments to support their 
bill.181 This type of lobbying played to the NAACP’s strengths as they had to 
accumulate and present facts to support their arguments, something the organisation 
had been doing for decades. However, the NAACP’s particular type of informational 
lobbying—typically lobbying to influence policy decisions by strategically 
transmitting information that would secure legislators’ votes—often relied on moral 
protest.182 Protest as a form of lobbying was ineffective and legislators remained 
unconvinced by both the NAACP’s lobbying methods and moral arguments. 
The NAACP participated in congressional committee hearings on anti-
lynching bills, in which the activists supplied information from subject experts to 
convince legislators of the necessity, constitutionality, and effectiveness of their 
proposed legislation. Among the experts who testified in 1934 before the Senate Sub-
Committee on the Judiciary on the Costigan-Wagner bill were lawyer Charles H. 
Tuttle, former U.S. attorney for the southern district of New York, Herbert K. 
Stockton, and Professor Karl Llewellyn of Columbia University Law School. The 
Writers League Against Lynching also elected Fannie Hurst, Heywood Broun, Stuart 
Chase, Harry Hansen and Faith Baldwin to appear.183 The type of information 
presented by these witnesses varied in nature. Some reassured legislators of the 
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constitutionality of the bill, the need for such a measure, as well as seeking to convince 
legislators that the bill would be both enforceable and effective. Walter White also 
gave a statement before the Senate Sub-Committee in which he aimed to dispel 
lynching myths by addressing common misconceptions, in doing so justifying the need 
for a federal bill. One of these misconceptions, ‘which is still believed by otherwise 
well-informed and fair-minded persons is that there is some connection between 
lynching and sex offenses by Negroes on white women.’184 Furthermore, White tried 
to dismiss the notion that lynching was a sectional or a racial issue; he presented 
evidence that showed that white people were lynched, in both the North and South. 
The Secretary produced evidence from contemporary studies such as James H. 
Chadbourn’s Lynching and the Law and Arthur Raper’s The Tragedy of Lynching to 
add weight to his arguments.185 In combination with examples drawn from the 
NAACP’s years of investigative work, the activists provided accurate, up-to-date 
information, about lynching that helped them make their case for an anti-lynching bill. 
Direct lobbying was not solely about convincing others of the benefits of anti-
lynching legislation, it also provided the NAACP with information in return. At the 
start of their anti-lynching campaign the activists used this technique ‘to line up 
senators and congress’ to ascertain their positions on anti-lynching legislation.186 
Some Senators gave a favourable response. For example, Senator William W. Barbour 
wrote: ‘I assure you that I am actively supporting the Costigan-Wagner Bill, as I 
believe it to be a necessary step forward in our civilization.’187 Others refused to 
support the bill because they believed it to be unconstitutional, or that the bill would 
not solve the lynching issue. These efforts informed the NAACP of the legislators 
opposed to the bill, what their specific objections were, and how many Congressmen 
they would need to convince to vote in favour of the bill. It helped them to determine 
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whether congressmen needed information to reinforce their position or to change it. 
The NAACP could then address the specific uncertainties that individual legislators 
had. They disseminated information about the status and prospect of bills under active 
consideration, provided information about the electoral implications of legislators’ 
decisions to support or reject pending legislation, and they predicted the likely 
economic, social or environmental consequences of proposed policies.188 According 
to John Wright this was based on the idea that legislators are motivated by three basic 
goals: ‘reelection, good public policy, and influence within the legislature’189 Direct 
lobbying was beneficial for the NAACP because responses of congressmen guided the 
activists’ lobbying and provided them with information about the extent to which 
congressmen needed to be convinced to vote for the bill.  
In response to those legislators who opposed the anti-lynching bill, the 
NAACP addressed each individual concern with specific information designed to 
change congressmen's opinions on particular issues. NAACP activists drafted 
responses to the four key chief concerns in a document designed to increase support 
for the Costigan-Wagner bill.190 The Association tried to improve confidence in the 
bill by stating that previous objections raised to the Dyer bill—namely that lynching 
was both a sectional and a racial issue—were no longer relevant. In a letter to the Chair 
of the Board of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, Mrs. 
Hannah Clothier Hull, White explained an argument he used in Congress. ‘The recent 
lynchings in California and Governor Rolph’s outrageous statement have helped 
mightily towards minimizing the racial issue.’191 Rolph was reported to have defended 
the lynching of two white men in San Jose, and subsequently refused to prosecute the 
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lynchers.192 Rolph’s remarks helped the NAACP to argue that the law was not being 
upheld even when the victims of lynching were white. It reinforced the argument for 
the necessity of the bill because it showed how authority figures such as Rolph helped 
to support and uphold the practice of lynching, and it showed that lynching was not 
specifically a racial issue or solely a problem of the South. 
But the NAACP frequently relied upon moral protest to both reaffirm and 
change congressmen’s opinions on the anti-lynching bill. To those congressmen who 
had already agreed to vote for the anti-lynching bill, the NAACP forwarded copies of 
the bill and reports of recent lynchings, such as that of Claude Neal in 1934. The 
distribution of pamphlets such as these were designed to reinforce a congressman’s 
objection to lynching. White also used details of Neal’s murder to convince senators 
who had previously voted against federal anti-lynching legislation to change their 
mind. Included in the Neal report were details of the crime of which Neal was accused, 
the gruesome details of Neal’s murder, as well as the evidence that the NAACP’s 
investigator had collected regarding the role of law enforcement and their failures to 
protect their prisoner.193 He thought that, given the gruesome facts, and presented with 
evidence to prove that injustices had taken place, senators would fulfil a moral duty to 
uphold the rule of law. In a telegram to Senator Dieterich, a chief opponent of the 
Costigan-Wagner bill, White reminded him that ‘good citizens would never allow 
lynching.’194 Details of lynchings were used to continue to disgust anti-lynching 
supporters, as well as argue that the law was not being upheld to convince others to 
change their minds. But these arguments were largely grounded in morality, designed 
to amplify the horrors of lynching to garner a sympathetic response, and support for 
their bill. But congressmen still objected to the bill regardless of these arguments as 
they did not always vote according to the NAACP’s moral compass. 
Another pitfall in their informational approach was that activists were not 
always able to supply trustworthy information to back up their claims. Some 
legislators argued that the bill would not prevent lynchings because federal action 
would only be taken after a lynching occurred. In response, NAACP lobbyists offered 
lynching statistics they collected to suggest that the number of lynchings would 
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decrease as a result of the bill. 'The answer is that the mere threat of federal legislation 
has operated to deter lynchings. Following the national campaign for a lynching bill 
in 1922, lynchings in 1923 dropped to 28 from 63 for the previous year.'195 Their logic 
then followed that the downward trend would continue if the Costigan-Wagner bill 
was passed. Unfortunately, the NAACP had no evidence to link the fall in the rate of 
lynchings to their lobbying efforts for the Dyer bill. It was established at the time that 
the occurrence of lynchings was also affected by socio-economic conditions, local 
customs, and demographics, to name just a few.196 The NAACP were unable to explain 
how the bill would actually work in practice so the NAACP used statistics selectively, 
ignoring the other factors that may have contributed to the trend in order to make their 
point. So, while this prediction about the consequences of the Costigan-Wagner bill 
supported the NAACP's argument, it was unfounded nonetheless and undermined their 
efforts. 
The NAACP often undermined their own efforts by sending contradictory, and 
sometimes harmful, information to congressmen. Their letters and requests for support 
for the bill sometimes sounded desperate and did not inspire confidence in their anti-
lynching bill. Senator James Couzens highlighted this issue when Roy Wilkins asked 
for his support for their federal anti-lynching bill.197 After Wilkins implied that the bill 
was in danger of not being reported favourably by the Senate Judiciary Committee, 
Couzens replied that ‘there is very little that others of us can do,’ especially given ‘the 
unfavourable report contained in your letter.’198 In the hope of gaining support when 
the bill needed it most, the NAACP sometimes reported on the dire situation the bill 
was in and argued that congressmen should vote for it or else it would fail.199 The 
Association thought that this would pressure the congressmen to assist the bill, but 
                                                 
195 'Support the Federal Anti-Lynching Bill!' NAACP, undated, Box I: C206, NAACP Papers, Library 
of Congress. 
196 Chadbourn, J. H., Lynching and the Law (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1933); 
Raper, A. F., The Tragedy of Lynching (Montclair: Patterson Smith Publishing Corporation, 1969), 
originally published in 1933 by Dover Publications. 
197 Senator James Couzens to Roy Wilkins, 3 February 1934, Box I: C234, NAACP Papers, Library of 
Congress. 
198 Roy Wilkins to Senator James Couzens, 2 February 1934, Box I: C234, NAACP Papers, Library of 
Congress; Ibid. 
199 The NAACP often adopted this approach with FDR also. One way the activists tried to inspire 
FDR to act on their behalf they would contacted him to inform him of a 'crisis' with the bill. If the 
President did not act, they argued, ‘all the efforts that have been put forth are about to go for naught’ 




telling legislators that the bill was about to fail was not a convincing reason for anyone 
to vote for the bill. 
Whilst not always successful in doing so, the informational lobbying carried 
out by NAACP activists aimed to reassure congressmen about the position of the bill 
and if it was likely to pass, confirmed that it would be effective in stopping lynching, 
and educated congressmen about lynching and the necessity for the bill. The NAACP 
corresponded extensively with congressmen and continued this type of lobbying 
throughout the anti-lynching campaign, proving themselves effective with this 
activity. However the specifics of what they told legislators often hindered their 
efforts. Ultimately, the anti-lynching bill did not pass after the NAACP used these 
tactics from 1934-5; they were not effective enough to push legislation through 
congress. By providing information that could easily be argued against, painting a 
negative picture of the position of the bill in Congress, relying on moral arguments, 
and asking congressmen to act when the bill was tied up in committee, the NAACP 
unintentionally sabotaged their own efforts, leaving congressmen unconvinced that 
they should vote for the anti-lynching bill. 
 
Defying the (Congressional) Norm 
 
After establishing their lobbying tactics throughout the first half of the decade—even 
though some of them undermined their own efforts—NAACP activists expected their 
activism to reward them with favourable votes for their anti-lynching bills. But on 
occasion, the activists received criticism instead. It was Congress that regulated the 
behaviour of lobbyists because they controlled the legislative process. The NAACP—
and any other activists or lobbyists trying to push through legislation—had to adhere 
to congressional rules and norms in order to engage with the legislative process. These 
unwritten norms were largely unknown to the inexperienced NAACP lobbyists and 
with no one to guide them, and with limited lobbying experience, they often violated 
such norms. Introducing bills and initiating procedures, for example, were the 
responsibility of congressmen. In their inexperience, the NAACP often overstepped 
their bounds as lobbyists and violated such congressional norms.200 Congressmen 
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were quick to pull the NAACP up on these incidents. In doing so they exhibited a 
particular type of congressional conservatism; Congress objected to the NAACP’s 
approach and demanded institutional conformity in the way NAACP activists lobbied 
and approached congressmen, shaping how the NAACP operated in Washington. 
 Typically, lobbyists were not allowed open access to Congress or to act like an 
elected representative. They were not allowed to initiate congressional procedures, for 
example. But Walter White’s enthusiasm and commitment to see NAACP anti-
lynching bills progress through Congress often caused him to forget his limits. In 1936, 
NAACP activists wrote to one hundred and ninety Democratic congressmen to try to 
circulate a petition to call a House Democratic Caucus.201 Representative John D. 
Dingell explained why he considered White’s lobbying to be improper: ‘You as an 
outsider, not a member of Congress, should work through some member of Congress. 
You, nor any individual, has a right to cross-examine a Congressman from another 
district. Much less do you have the right to attempt the calling of a caucus as you 
undertook to do.’202 Dingell’s complaint was that White was too direct and he tried to 
act like a member of Congress. In this instance, when White questioned the views of 
congressmen on their anti-lynching stance, Dingell highlighted that White was not 
working in the way that Congress expected of him. Dingell suggested that NAACP 
activists should behave in a proper manner in Congress; implicit in his words was that 
there was a right and wrong way for the NAACP to lobby. Dingell advised White that 
in future: ‘the best thing for you to do… is to enlist the aid of some friend in Congress 
whose privilege it is to do so. Then you will not arouse any animosity, not against the 
anti-lynching bill necessarily but against your plan and method of bringing it out.’203 
Dingell implied that enlisting help of ‘friends in Washington’ was an exercise in 
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observing congressional norms. While White had the help of a few senators he still 
did a lot of direct lobbying himself. In this case, it was improper for White to be 
proposing congressional action, and his contacts should have been the ones to put 
forward these types of ideas. This encounter was a lesson in how the NAACP should 
use the congressional contacts they had to minimise antagonism towards their efforts. 
But during the first few years of the 1930s, the NAACP had few contacts who held 
office in Congress. Consequently, NAACP activists had few legislators to inform them 
of such rules. 
 But within the relationships that the NAACP did cultivate, they were supposed 
to be mutually beneficial: the activists were expected to contribute to relationships just 
as much as congressmen. In return for a vote, or for a favour, it was an unwritten rule 
that activists were supposed to give congressmen something of value too. In 1936, 
Representative Emanuel Cellar refused to sign a petition to call a Democratic Caucus 
upon the request of the Association, protesting the fact that the NAACP did not 
acknowledge the work he did to introduce the Costigan-Wagner bill in the House in 
1934. According to White, Cellar said that, ‘It’s always called the Costigan-Wagner 
bill and I am never mentioned by your association for the speeches I have made and 
the work I have done. I don’t want to have anything to do with your association 
because you’ve never seen fit to give me credit.’204 The NAACP lobbyists did not 
always take into consideration that congressmen might want something, such as credit, 
in return for the work they did on behalf of the lobbyists. Congressmen were quick to 
inform the NAACP of this expectation and this taught the activists that individual 
relationships were fragile and that the Association had to give something in return for 
what they asked. In not considering the needs of congressmen, the NAACP opened 
themselves up for criticism, as well as jeopardised some of the relationships they 
formed. This taught the NAACP that once gained, relationships with congressmen 
could just as swiftly be lost. Demanding that the NAACP give credit where credit was 
due, Cellar set the expectation that relationships between lobbyists and congressmen 
should be mutually beneficial. 
 Much of the NAACP’s lobbying efforts were carried out independently and 
without the aid of congressional contacts. But this led to criticism not only of their 
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actions but also of the timing of them. NAACP activists lobbied at abnormal times, in 
comparison to seasoned lobbyists, trying to persuade congressmen to act when, at time 
in the legislative process, it was essentially pointless to do so. Senator James Couzens 
offered Roy Wilkins a word of advice after Wilkins contacted him regarding his 
support for the bill while it was tied up in committee hearings—a time when 
congressmen outside of that committee had little influence on a piece of pending 
legislation.205 Couzens advised that ‘your efforts should be devoted to the committee 
reporting the bill to the Senate. Unless that happens, there is very little that others of 
us in the Senate can do about the matter.’206 The NAACP wrote to Congressmen at 
any point in the process—they did not know that their lobbying would be more 
effective at certain points in the process. The NAACP lacked knowledge about timing 
their communications effectively. But the advice given by congressmen shows that 
some were willing help the NAACP improve, and that congressional conservatism 
was not necessarily an attack on the NAACP or an objection to anti-lynching. By doing 
what was expected of them, it was implied that the NAACP would have a greater 
chance of success, and would not rile congressmen with improper or poorly timed 
communications. 
The conservatism displayed by congressmen shaped the NAACP’s lobbying 
because NAACP activists started to conform to the norms of which they were made 
aware. During their time lobbying in Washington, the NAACP did start to bow to 
congressional conservatism in order to reduce resistance to their methods and shut 
down opportunities for both the organisation and the anti-lynching bill to be criticised. 
The NAACP did this by trying to increase their access to Congress and congressmen. 
Relationships were highly valuable to an organisation such as the NAACP as access 
to congressmen could provide them with information about the bill’s progress, enable 
them to enlist other congressmen to lobby on their behalf, and teach them about 
legislative procedures.207 White attempted to reconnect with the few existing contacts 
he made the previous decade for assistance with their campaign, including former 
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Representative Leonidas C. Dyer of Missouri and Senator Edward P. Costigan of 
Colorado.208 The Secretary cultivated particularly good relationships with the Senators 
who lent their names to the anti-lynching bill: Senators Costigan and Wagner. Gaining 
access was hugely beneficial because, as it has been noted, ‘interest groups exchange 
technical expertise and political information [with legislators]... in return for access to 
the policy process, be it control over policy outcomes or monitoring information on 
the political process.’209  
The NAACP’s relationship with Senators Costigan and Wagner did just that; 
it taught the anti-lynching lobbyists what kind of information they should provide in 
order to be effective in committee hearings, a particular part of the political process. 
An example of this came after White received a letter from journalist and social critic, 
H. L. Mencken, in which Menken made ‘a very important and valuable suggestion—
namely, that all persons concerned in the notorious Armwood lynching on the Eastern 
Shore of Maryland be required to testify. The more hostile or reluctant the witnesses, 
the more valuable will be the effect of their hostility or reluctance to testify in showing 
the country at large how necessary it is that federal action be taken against 
lynching.’210 Mencken's letter arrived as White was contemplating the best arguments 
to present to the congressional committees, and which lynching examples should be 
used to justify a federal anti-lynching bill. But his relationship with Senators Costigan 
and Wagner allowed White to discuss Mencken’s suggestion with them.211 White 
could discuss policy options, how to proceed with the legislation, and problems that 
arose along the way, showing just how beneficial increased access to Congress was 
for the Association. 
With the help of these newfound allies, White addressed the specific criticisms 
he received from other congressmen in order to hone his lobbying skills. When White 
was told to get congressmen to lobby on his behalf, he developed a beneficial 
relationship with Costigan who offered to push the bill in Congress. This demonstrates 
the NAACP responded to criticisms in order to succeed. But Costigan’s efforts also 
highlights the Senator’s own investment in a positive legislative outcome. When 
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Costigan was unable to attend a committee hearing on the Costigan-Wagner bill due 
to other commitments, Costigan reassured White that he would use his position in 
Congress to help the bill progress: ‘I can be of more service after the bill is reported 
out [of the committee]. Then will come the task of getting the bill up for consideration 
and that, as you know, will take a good deal of personal work and button-holing of 
senators.’212 Costigan became the NAACP’s main educator in the lobbying process; 
he gave White information on procedure and what would be required to be able to 
overcome the next legislative hurdle they would face. But most importantly, as a result 
of their close working relationship, Costigan was willing to give ‘all the time and effort 
I possibly can’ to assist in lobbying for the bill.213 
Access to Senators Costigan and Wagner also granted White access to the 
spaces these men occupied. When in Washington, White informed his correspondents 
that ‘I can always be reached during the day at Sen. Costigan’s office.’214 White 
conducted his lobbying from inside Costigan’s office, allowing him to see how a 
congressman operated on a day-to-day basis and to hear news from Capitol Hill as 
soon as it happened. This geographical proximity to Washington politics allowed 
White to observe how Congress functioned, as well as the President’s relationship to 
the legislative branch of federal government. But this level of access took Walter 
White two years—from 1933 to 1935—to achieve, highlighting just how long it took 
to build this type of relationship with congressmen, and that the activists did not learn 
the finer points of lobbying overnight. Nevertheless, increased access to Congress and 
productive relationships with even just a couple of congressmen gave the NAACP 
greater insight into the process and instructions on how they should behave. 
Due to their inexperience, the NAACP defied many of Congress’ norms in 
their attempts to lobby for anti-lynching legislation. White’s approach even alienated 
some members of Congress as he was perceived to have acted in a manner unbefitting 
a lobbyist. This was largely due to the fact that NAACP activists had few contacts 
inside Washington to guide them on what they should and should not do. But they 
listened to the criticism they received and they started to modify their lobbying 
strategies as a result. In analysing the NAACP’s attempts to gain access to Congress, 
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it is evident that the access they did gain, even only to a few congressmen, proved to 
be particularly advantageous for the Association. By late 1935, White referred to 
Senator Costigan using his nickname, ‘Chief,’ when addressing him in 
correspondence, demonstrating that he was capable of turning a formal relationship 
between a lobbyist and a legislator into a friendly and productive working 
relationship.215 Objections to White’s approach to lobbying and to his behaviour in 
Washington D.C. made the Secretary realise that objections would not only be raised 
to the bill itself but to their behaviour as well. Taking on board feedback enabled the 
NAACP to hone their lobbying skills, gain a greater understanding for the written and 
unspoken rules surrounding lobbying in Congress, and in turn comply with the way in 
which Congress demanded the activists behave. As a result, the close relationships 
Walter White formed enabled him to discuss strategy, learn from those in office, keep 
up to date with progress on the anti-lynching bill, hear any information about 
congressional processes, and have geographical proximity to the action in 
Washington. The congressional conservatism towards the activists’ behaviour 




The Institutionalisation of the NAACP’s Lobbying Practises 
 
In the years that followed the NAACP’s campaign for the Costigan-Wagner bill, 
NAACP activists realised that adhering to Congressional norms and procedures was 
beneficial to their efforts. The NAACP’s lobbying efforts between 1936 and 1939 
showed evidence of a change in strategy that was a significant shift away from the 
informational lobbying techniques the NAACP employed previously. Instead of 
waiting for congressmen to support anti-lynching after presenting them with ‘the 
facts,’ the NAACP became more proactive in assuring passage of the bill. For the 
campaigns after 1935—including efforts to pass the Van Nuys Resolution in 1936 and 
the Wagner-Van Nuys bill in 1937-38—the NAACP shifted from using person-
centred persuasive tactics to process-orientated strategies that adhered to 
congressional procedures. This change in strategy came as a direct result of the 
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resistance they faced in the previous attempt to pass the Costigan-Wagner bill. By 
honing in on political process to pass legislation, the NAACP shifted away from their 
moral rhetoric, and focused instead on ensuring the proper function of democratic 
government. This signalled a move away from protest towards serious engagement 
with politics and the political process. 
 Evidence of the NAACP’s shift to conform to institutional norms was evident 
in the ways they tried to push through legislation in the face of obstruction. Legislative 
obstruction was a defining feature of Congress, in both the House of Representatives 
and Senate. It was a common and important part of the legislative process, and by no 
means exceptional to the anti-lynching bills. In May 1936, thirty one anti-lynching 
bills were being held up by the House Judiciary Committee because the Committee 
Chairman Hatton W. Sumners boasted that he would never permit a favourable report 
on an anti-lynching bill as long as he was chairman.216 In this instance, the NAACP 
recognised that an informational approach would not work and chose to adopt 
‘practical step[s],’ to tackle the obstruction.217 The NAACP attempted to use a new 
method of legislating which involved calling a House Democratic Caucus.218 The aim 
was to get the Caucus to give a definitive opinion on anti-lynching legislation (so the 
majority who had promised to support anti-lynching legislation could enter their 
declaration of support into the Congressional Record), and then request a rule from 
the House Rules Committee for immediate consideration of the bills pending in the 
Judiciary Committee.219 House membership consisted of 321 Democrats, 104 
Republicans, 7 Farm Laborites, and 3 Progressives. If the Democratic Caucus voted 
to support the anti-lynching bills, then all Democrats were required ‘as a matter of 
honour’ to vote in the House as the Caucus majority voted.220 The representatives who 
intended to obstruct anti-lynching legislation from being debated and voted upon 
would be obliged to support it if that’s what the Caucus decided. Using the Democrats’ 
own procedures against them was a clever way of circumventing Democratic 
opposition and getting the party to declare their support, if that was what the majority 
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decided. Southern Democrats could not filibuster a caucus, and the NAACP could 
indirectly obtain their support through the conventions of the caucus.  
The friendly relationships garnered through the NAACP’s access to Congress 
taught them about the finer points of legislative processes and how to reduce 
obstruction to their strategies. Virginia E. Jenckes, Representative for Indiana, gave 
her support for the Caucus petition when asked, and also advised White that the 
petition should be circulated by a member of Congress in order to ‘remove any 
possible charge of lobbying.’221 White took heed of this advice and replied that he was 
‘taking up with several of the introducers of the bills…the matter of circulation of the 
petition.’222 White’s receipt of this advice indicated that the NAACP had gained allies 
in Congress, allies who sought to help them succeed by giving them information that 
could prevent further obstruction.223 But by complying with legislative procedure in 
the way that Jenckes advised, the NAACP overcame that obstruction. When asked to 
present the petition for a Caucus on one sheet of paper, White retraced his steps and 
recirculated a single petition to comply with Taylor’s technicality.224 In doing so the 
activists produced a petition that Taylor accepted. Unfortunately, congressmen 
obstructed their efforts whether or not the NAACP took preventative measures like 
the one Jenckes suggested. But the NAACP could keep the bill on track by following 
procedure and doing what was asked of them. 
This particular decision to petition the Democrats to call a Caucus 
demonstrated that NAACP activists had thought logically about the strategies that 
could realistically help them pass the legislation instead of, as they had done in the 
past, merely protest that lynching should be legislated against. The NAACP decided 
to initiate a call for a meeting of the Democratic Caucus after weighing up the options 
available to them; they worked out which strategy would reap the greatest reward.225 
The NAACP could have used a more traditional strategy to stimulate action in the 
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House; they could have circulated a discharge petition to force the Judiciary 
Committee to release their anti-lynching bill for a vote on the House floor. But White 
was opposed to this option; he argued that petitions created hostility, and therefore 
seldom ever passed when voted upon, that it would take a long time to collect all the 
necessary signatures on the petition, that thirty days had to elapse after the signatures 
had been obtained before action could be taken, and that they anticipated that the 
Democratic leaders would attempt to block the petition delaying passage until the next 
session of Congress.226 Absent were the NAACP’s impassioned protests and in their 
place were institutional procedures. White had fully debated using both the discharge 
petition and calling a Democratic Caucus, but concluded that the Caucus method 
would have fewer negative consequences and a clear-cut declaration of policy and 
principle by the Caucus would have ‘almost as much effect as the passage of the 
legislation itself.’227 The NAACP’s lobbying strategies were targeted to overcome 
specific obstacles. In doing so the organisation displayed greater engagement with the 
political process establishing themselves as credible lobbyists. 
Unfortunately, the NAACP’s shift to procedural methods did not prevent 
obstruction. In fact, activists faced a barrage of obstruction by Congress as a result. 
Unsurprisingly, some Democrats were not keen to declare their stance on anti-
lynching legislation and the lobbyists reported that, ‘Every trick was called out of the 
bag’ by the Democrats to avoid making a definite statement on anti-lynching in the 
Caucus.228 In addition to the difficulty that White had in circulating the petitions, when 
the NAACP had successfully submitted the petition, Taylor made sure there was no 
quorum present when the Caucus was eventually held on 22 May 1936. It was revealed 
that Taylor had not given forty-eight hours’ notice of the meeting to Democrats before 
the Caucus was scheduled.229 Furthermore, the Caucus was scheduled for a Friday 
knowing that most Congressmen would have left town for the weekend.230 The 
NAACP deemed these tactics to be unfair and dishonest, as most were used to make 
sure that Congress adjourned before any debate or vote on anti-lynching legislation 
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could take place.231 But it shows that Congress had to strengthen their resistance to 
prevent NAACP activists from getting the Democratic Party to declare their stance on 
anti-lynching legislation. It was a credit to how much the NAACP had developed their 
strategies; they had learned legislative procedures that could force members of 
Congress to participate in a Caucus and support anti-lynching legislation—if that is 
what the Caucus majority decided.     
 Nevertheless, the NAACP’s new focus on the legislative process highlighted 
their shift from a position of protest to one that indicated serious engagement with the 
legislative process. The lobbyists’ efforts later in the decade showed a greater depth 
of knowledge regarding lobbying and legislating, which they used when they realised 
informational lobbying was ineffective. Efforts to legislate using the Caucus method, 
and making sure no objections could be raised over their efforts to do so show just 
how much the NAACP shifted their strategy in response to earlier objections to their 
lobbying practices. Even though Democrats tried to avoid the event, the NAACP still 
managed to force a Democratic Caucus to take place, proving their new tactics to be 
far more effective than at the beginning of the decade. This newfound focus on 
function of government and democratic process within their lobbying strategy was an 
important reflection of just how much Congress helped to shape their activism in the 





Due to their organisational set-up, some avenues of lobbying were not available to the 
NAACP. They did not have extensive financial or political resources with which to 
influence legislators in Congress. Initially this was one of the biggest influences in 
how NAACP activists lobbied. But after putting these informational lobbying 
techniques into practice, their efforts had limited impact. This was largely due to the 
activists’ lack of knowledge about the legislative process and their inexperience in 
direct lobbying when the Costigan-Wagner bill passed through Congress in the early 
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1930s. The lobbyists were rarely persuasive in their communications, and they 
frequently acted inappropriately for lobbyists, often unknowingly and in ignorance. 
But the NAACP’s lobbying efforts became more effective over the course of 
the 1930s as the Association adopted more process-orientated strategies, such as 
legislating using the caucus method. Analysing the NAACP’s lobbying efforts through 
a theoretical lens helps to explain why the NAACP’s lobbying strategy changed over 
the course of the 1930s. This approach also exposed a particular type of congressional 
conservatism directed towards the NAACP’s lobbying methods. While the NAACP’s 
lobbying may have been ineffective at times, congressmen’s responses to their 
lobbying taught NAACP representatives about their missteps, prompting the activists 
to change their strategy and rethink their approach. In small ways, congressmen 
nudged the NAACP to conform to congressional norms and to learn the best way to 
approach congressmen. This indicated a more subtle level of congressional 
conservatism that helped define NAACP lobbying strategies in future years. 
Congressmen were quick to keep the activists in check when they had made any 
transgressions and made it clear on occasion that the NAACP would have to conform 
to congressional norms and proper procedures otherwise they would arouse more 
antagonism to both their lobbying efforts and in turn their anti-lynching bill. 
It was this congressional conservatism that shaped the NAACP’s lobbying 
activities. White and Wilkins stopped expecting congressmen to be shocked by the 
details of lynchings and they learned how to progress their anti-lynching bill when the 
bill faced obstruction and when persuasion alone was ineffective. Gradually, through 
informing NAACP activists when they had done wrong, or when they needed to adjust 
their approach, Congress institutionalised the NAACP’s lobbying efforts. The result 
of this was that the NAACP became much more knowledgeable about lobbying, 
Congress, and politics, proving that congressional conservatism aimed at the NAACP 
was not always crippling. In this case, the feedback they received led them to stop 
‘looking for salvation from the whites,’ as Du Bois had previously described their 
efforts, and it was actually a driving force for the Association to forge relationships in 
Washington and find their own solutions to their legislative issues.232 
 
                                                 





The NAACP’s Battle against Racial Conservatism in Congress 
Subtle congressional conservatism—such as resistance to the NAACP’s lobbying 
activities—influenced the way in which the NAACP lobbied in Congress, making the 
Association ‘an ever more effective machine for justice.’233 But it was the more overt 
legislative obstruction the Association faced that plagued the NAACP’s efforts to push 
through anti-lynching legislation during the 1930s. This chapter considers 
conventional notions of congressional conservatism by looking at this overt legislative 
obstruction. This obstruction took many forms.234 Tactics included the direct 
filibuster, holding up the bills in committee, or extending debates on other legislation 
to prevent the anti-lynching bills from being scheduled for debate before Congress 
adjourned. Congressional obstruction posed significant challenges during all of the 
NAACP’s attempts to legislate, but it was the direct filibusters in the Senate that were 
particularly effective in preventing passage of federal anti-lynching bills. 
After the failure of the 1934 Costigan-Wagner bill, when the NAACP 
considered introducing further anti-lynching legislation a year later, former Missouri 
Representative and sponsor of the Dyer anti-lynching bill, Leonidas C. Dyer, warned 
the NAACP that ‘there is no chance whatsoever’ for the legislation in the present 
Congress because ‘no Democratic congress will ever enact antilynching legislation 
with any teeth in it.’235 Dyer recognised the threat of legislative obstruction in the 
Senate to the passage of any anti-lynching bill. His assessment reflected the traditional 
narrative that it was Southern Democrats and the filibusters that they undertook that 
was the dominant reason why the federal government failed to uphold the rule of law 
when pressured to pass an anti-lynching bill.236 The filibusters held significance, it has 
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been argued, because it was not until anti-lynching legislation was lobbied for that 
Congress started to systematically apply the filibuster, a tactic that was employed 
regularly to inhibit civil rights legislation throughout the century.237 Having such an 
impact on Senate procedure, as well as on the NAACP’s efforts, the filibusters have 
attracted considerable attention in analyses of the anti-lynching movement.238 
In contrast to this historiography, the analysis in this chapter shifts attention 
away from the filibusters towards the NAACP’s efforts to overcome these filibusters. 
As historian Keith Finley stated, ‘caricaturing white opposition solely in terms of its 
most egregious actions obfuscates less dramatic but arguably more important facets’ 
of white resistance to the civil rights movement.239 By examining the NAACP’s efforts 
to overcome the filibusters more closely, assumptions made by both the NAACP at 
the time and historians decades later can be challenged. The first assumption is that 
the predominant reason anti-lynching bills did not pass was because of southern 
filibusters. While the filibusters themselves cannot be disputed as they did indeed 
block the passage of all anti-lynching bills, it should not be assumed that racially 
conservative southern senators were the only ones responsible for this. The second 
assumption that can be challenged is the NAACP’s hypothesis that their anti-lynching 
bills would pass should they ever be brought up for a vote. 
The experience of trying to overcome or bypass legislative obstruction 
therefore challenged the NAACP’s understanding about who obstructed passage of 
anti-lynching legislation and why they were doing it. The NAACP’s perceptions 
changed as a result throughout the second half of the 1930s as the NAACP discovered 
their anti-lynching bills were met with resistance from both Republicans and 
Democrats. Legislative obstruction shaped the nature of the NAACP’s lobbying 
strategies for the anti-lynching campaign, and had a profound impact on both their 
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present and future lobbying efforts; legislative obstruction was a significant part of the 
Association’s political education. 
 
Support of and Opposition to Anti-Lynching Legislation 
In the lead-up to most of their attempts to pass anti-lynching legislation, NAACP 
activists were always confident that ‘enough votes to assure passage [of the bill] were 
already pledged.’240 NAACP activists wrote to Congressmen or spoke with them to 
ascertain their position on their anti-lynching legislation. From these discussions, the 
NAACP calculated that their bill had reached the required level of support to pass 
should it be brought up for a vote. This was indicative of the way the NAACP 
perceived congressional support for their anti-lynching bills. They took congressmen 
at their word when they pledged to vote for a bill. In hindsight, the NAACP faced 
significant and continuous obstruction, and the support pledged would not secure 
passage of anti-lynching legislation. The NAACP was also well-aware of the strength 
of opposition after the defeat of the Dyer bill in 1922. Why, then, the NAACP was so 
confident in its calculations that their subsequent bills would pass if they were brought 
up for a vote is a central concern. The NAACP had different lobbying tactics for the 
bills’ opponents and for their supporters. It is therefore important to understand who 
the Association considered to be their friends in the anti-lynching fight and who they 
considered their opponents in order to explain the activists’ strategy. 
The NAACP’s progressive roots and a belief in positivism influenced the 
organisation’s perception of support and opposition for anti-lynching legislation in 
Congress. Throughout their campaign, the NAACP never doubted that they had 
majority support for all of their anti-lynching bills in both the House of 
Representatives and the Senate. This opinion was largely formulated based on the facts 
and figures they collected in the form of reports and polls.241 In 1937, their own counts 
from speaking to Senators as well as from polls that circulated in Washington directly 
informed the Association that they had enough support for the Wagner-Van Nuys bill 
to pass. Polls published in Congressional Intelligence said that ‘the bill can pass the 
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Senate if it should come to a vote.’242 This reassured the NAACP that the bill did 
indeed have majority support and that the only thing they had to worry about was 
getting the bill to a vote in the first place. As they had done in the past, NAACP 
activists trusted in ‘the facts’ and the counts that told them their bill had majority 
support. 
As well as the polls, the NAACP’s own experience confirmed that the most 
difficult aspect of the legislative process that they had to contend with, in terms of 
opposition, was a lengthy southern filibuster in the Senate. Because the senators most 
outspoken against the anti-lynching campaign were southern, the NAACP thought that 
it was only this ‘small minority’ in the Senate who prevented the bill being brought to 
a vote.243 This affected the NAACP’s focus. Anticipating opposition from these 
individuals, from the first meetings on the lobbying strategy for the Costigan-Wagner 
bill they were the primary targets of the NAACP’s protests and persuasive tactics. 
Their strategy from the outset was to divide southern opposition by securing a southern 
Congressman to introduce the bill and encourage open displays of support for anti-
lynching legislation.244 Apart from writing to other congressmen, the NAACP 
concentrated their efforts on what they knew might be an obstacle.  
NAACP activists believed that after they had attempted to reduce legitimate 
concerns about the anti-lynching bills and increased public support for them that this 
would reduce the likelihood of a southern filibuster taking place. White believed that 
positive public sentiment for the bills would directly correlate to votes in favour of the 
bill. As such the Association placed great importance on getting their own members, 
as well as those in friendly organisations, to send letters and telegrams of support for 
the bill to their state representatives. In 1935, Walter White boasted to Marvin 
McIntyre that there was increased support for the anti-lynching bill from white 
southerners. Resolutions passed by Southern organisations such as the Woman’s 
Missionary Council of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, led White to believe 
that this support had ‘materially lessened opposition’ from Southern Congressmen.245 
‘We do not believe that there be any fear of a sustained filibuster,’ he continued.246 
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When expressions of support appeared to outweigh those of opposition, the NAACP 
was confident that the bill would be brought up for a vote. But there was no proof that 
there was any correlation between public sentiment—which was not easy to measure 
anyway—and votes in Congress. Nonetheless during the early 1930s, increased 
numbers of expressions of support influenced the NAACP’s perceptions of the 
strength of the opposition they faced. 
But the NAACP swiftly learned not to assume that senators would vote for a 
bill even if the people in the state they represented were in favour of that legislation 
because congressional alliances were an additional factor in how a congressman would 
vote on a particular policy. A prime example of this came in 1937, when Walter White 
tried to prevent Senator Bailey of North Carolina from participating in a proposed 
filibuster of the Wagner-Van Nuys bill. Bailey admitted to Senator Wagner that to his 
own amazement, from the number of protests his office had received about his 
participation in the filibuster, he discovered that North Carolina favoured the anti-
lynching bill. Despite this, Bailey said that ‘he had promised “the boys” to go along 
with them on the filibuster and he “had to keep his word.”’247 However, White 
believed they had done all the right things to reduce legitimate opposition and increase 
public support for the legislation. For this reason the Association did not force matters, 
and let events play out in Washington, D.C. Believing they had done enough to secure 
favourable votes, the activists became complacent as they assumed they were in 
control of the legislative process. 
The NAACP never had reason to suspect that they had opposition from anyone 
other than southern Democrats. Republicans had openly supported the anti-lynching 
movement since the progressive era and so the NAACP had little reason to doubt their 
commitment to the cause. It was even a Republican congressman, Leonidas C. Dyer, 
who first solicited the help of the NAACP in 1918 to assist with a federal anti-lynching 
bill. A few days before Dyer introduced his anti-lynching bill to the House of 
Representatives in 1918 he contacted the NAACP and sent them a draft of his measure. 
On 13 May of that year the NAACP Board of Directors voted to actively support the 
bill and work with the Republican Representative. White told Dyer that members of 
the NAACP would testify in committee hearings for the bill, and the NAACP would 
                                                 




launch a national campaign to rouse public support for it.248 This partnership propelled 
the NAACP into national politics and gave them their first experience at federal 
lobbying. Because they were approached by Republicans to help with the anti-
lynching bill, the NAACP formed a cooperative relationship with members of the 
Party on civil rights issues.    
The wider Republican Party, too, expressed their commitment to stopping 
lynching. Since 1896 the Republican platform gave increasingly strong support to anti-
lynching. The Republicans condemned lynching in their 1896 and 1912 platforms but 
made no serious effort to do anything about it at the time.249 In 1920, whilst not directly 
supporting the Dyer bill, the Republican platform urged Congress ‘to consider the 
most effective means to end lynching.’250 At the same time, President Harding 
reaffirmed this sentiment when he said that ‘the Federal Government should stamp out 
lynching and remove that stain from the fair name of America.’251 But by 1928 the 
Party declared that, ‘We renew our recommendation that the Congress enact at the 
earliest possible date a Federal Anti-Lynching Law so that the full influence of the 
Federal Government may be wielded to exterminate this hideous crime.’252 These 
declarations, increasing in their level of support each time, led the NAACP to believe 
that the Republican Party was friendly to the anti-lynching movement. As a 
consequence, Republican commitment to securing an anti-lynching bill was never 
scrutinised by the Association.  
Despite these obvious pledges of support, the NAACP did not wholly embrace 
the Republicans and their platform. The NAACP envisaged some problems with 
associating anti-lynching with the Republican Party. Knowing that anti-lynching 
legislation would also require support from southern Democrats to pass the Senate, 
the NAACP was worried that making this a party policy would deter Democrats from 
supporting the bill. When they launched their own independent federal anti-lynching 
campaign in the 1930s, the NAACP therefore launched the campaign in the hope of 
achieving bi-partisan support. The NAACP was advised by Ludwell Denny, of the 
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Scripps-Howard Newspaper Alliance, that ‘it would be better to have a Democrat’ 
introduce the Costigan-Wagner bill in Congress than the Republicans who did so in 
the previous decade.253 The NAACP followed this advice and approached 
congressmen to introduce their legislation in 1934.254 White reported to Costigan, ‘our 
efforts to find a southerner, however, have not been successful.’255 Unsurprisingly, 
southern senators were not lining up to introduce the bill on the NAACP’s behalf. 
Southern Congressmen felt that sponsoring such a bill would be ‘political suicide’ as 
they were dependent upon a white electorate for return to Congress.256 In trying to find 
a Democrat to introduce the bill, the NAACP shifted their strategy from the decade 
before to include Democrats in their lobbying efforts to bolster support from both 
parties and to encourage the notion that the bill was not an attack on the South by 
northern liberals.257 As the Republicans had already declared their support, the 
NAACP paid more attention to what they could do to win over Democratic support.  
The NAACP therefore had a tendency to trust the reports about support that 
they received. Denouncements of lynching by southern institutions suggested to the 
NAACP that this was proof of growing public sentiment against lynching. The 
NAACP also took congressmen at their word when they said there would not be a 
sustained filibuster during the early years of the anti-lynching campaign. Furthermore, 
Republicans included anti-lynching in their Party Platform for a number of years 
suggesting that they were agreeable to the idea of anti-lynching legislation. This meant 
that the NAACP saw visible signs that they had the support to push through the anti-
lynching bill and they had little reason to doubt those who offered support. Filibusters 
only highlighted the opposition of the minority of congressmen that was already 
anticipated. No doubt was therefore cast upon the other congressmen involved in the 
legislative process. 
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Reframing the Debate around the NAACP’s Attempts to Invoke Cloture  
Southern Democrats have been credited for successfully obstructing all attempts to 
pass legislation by using filibusters to prevent anti-lynching bills from being brought 
to a vote.258 As such, who obstructed passage of anti-lynching legislation has never 
been challenged. The filibusters in which southern senators participated have always 
been the focus of academic analysis because they were the most dramatic and obvious 
reflection of southern sentiment towards lynching—and the most apparent reason for 
why the bills never passed. But the filibusters only provide half of the story.259 De-
centring the filibusters and focusing instead on the NAACP’s efforts to invoke cloture 
reveals that Republicans were also active in obstructing passage of anti-lynching 
legislation, and what is known about legislative obstruction can be re-examined.260 
By 1938 NAACP activists were no longer confident that their persuasive 
lobbying tactics could convince senators not to obstruct their bills. This prompted the 
NAACP to look for other ways in which to influence the legislative process. As 
excellent as their arguments for anti-lynching legislation were, some congressmen 
such as Senators Bilbo of Mississippi and Borah of Idaho, still objected to the Wagner-
Van Nuys bill and the NAACP had no way to change their mind. The activists started 
to search for other ways to prevent or stop a filibuster. One suggestion involved voting 
southern senators out of office and replacing them with candidates sympathetic to the 
Association’s civil rights agenda.261 But, as previously discussed, the NAACP did not 
have this kind of political power. Furthermore, Roy Wilkins recognised that ‘there 
isn’t anything that can be done.’ In speaking about Senator Borah, he said, the Senator 
had been in the Senate so long that ‘he is an institution.’262 So, when persuasive tactics 
failed, and other options would be ineffective, the NAACP turned from focusing on 
persuading the people they had no influence over, to focusing on the legislative 
process to stop the filibuster. 
                                                 
258 Finley, Delaying the Dream; Patterson, Congressional Conservatism; Rable, ‘The South and the 
Politics of Anti-Lynching Legislation, 1920-1940,’ 220. 
259 Filibusters were a senator’s constitutional right and last line of defence against legislation they 
opposed. 
260 Cloture was, and still is, a method to limit debate on a pending bill in the Senate by securing a vote 
on that bill after an agreed number of hours of debate has come to an end. If two thirds of Senators 
agreed, then a vote could be forced on the NAACP’s anti-lynching bill.  
261 R. E. Arnold to Roy Wilkins, 6 January 1938, Box I: C260, NAACP Papers, Library of Congress. 
262 Roy Wilkins to R. E. Arnold, 8 January 1938, Box I: C260, NAACP Papers, Library of Congress. 
87 
 
The NAACP’s previous lobbying helped them to discover a new strategy that 
had the potential to end to any filibuster. The access the activists gained to Congress 
through their earlier lobbying efforts allowed them to intercept the rumours and 
information circulating around Capitol Hill. Through these channels, White heard of 
a speech that Senator George Norris of Nebraska gave in which he mused about how 
a filibuster on the anti-lynching bill could be broken. He argued that this could be 
achieved through ‘a strict and technical enforcement of the rules.’263 Norris referred 
to Senate Rule 22: the rule to invoke cloture. As the Senate filibuster on the Wagner-
Van Nuys bill was fiercer and more prolonged than any other filibuster on an anti-
lynching bill, the NAACP was keen to use this method. It is important to note that 
from the 66th to the 86th Congresses (1919 – 1960), only twenty-three cloture votes 
took place. Of those, only four were successful so a cloture vote was not guaranteed.264 
Despite this, cloture was significant for the NAACP at the time because it meant that 
a vote on the bill was possible even with strong objection from a small number of 
senators. It gave the NAACP hope, agency, and the knowledge that they could 
influence Congress using its own rules and procedures. It challenged the inevitability 
of defeat. 
 Not only did this have a profound effect upon their strategy, but it also made 
the NAACP question their understanding of who obstructed the passage of the anti-
lynching bills. The NAACP doubted that the Democrats were solely to blame when 
their first attempt to invoke cloture failed. Even with this technical knowledge of 
congressional procedure, the NAACP could not end the filibuster on the Wagner-Van 
Nuys bill. This was because in arguing against cloture, senators defended the right to 
filibuster. One Republican Senator wrote, ‘I am in favour of the [anti-lynching] bill 
and shall vote for it,’ but ‘I shall never vote to curb this freedom of debate and thus 
wipe our Democracy’s final and last defense against dictatorship.’265 But this 
argument made little sense to the Association and they questioned why a Republican 
senator would not wish for the bill to be voted on if he had previously given his support 
for anti-lynching. Before the Wagner-Van Nuys bill was brought up for debate, the 
Association reported that more than seventy senators had either pledged in writing to 
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vote for the bill or indicated unmistakably in polls that they were in favour of it.266 If 
they had enough support for the bill, then it followed that the NAACP should have 
had enough support to invoke cloture, and get the anti-lynching bill brought up for a 
vote. But this was not the case.267  
By using this new tactic, fresh opposition manifested itself; the strategy 
challenged the NAACP’s assumption that only southern Democrats opposed the 
legislation. The NAACP’s efforts showed that Republicans, too, obstructed the anti-
lynching bill. Republican senators became the new target of NAACP lobbying after it 
was calculated that they would be the ones to decide the cloture vote. Roy Wilkins 
worked out that ‘there are 76 Democrats in the Senate, of whom 23 are definitely 
opposed to the bill… but 53 are not 2/3rds of 96.’268 Republican senators would be 
needed to pass the motion, and while this should have been good news for the NAACP, 
an Association press release reported that Republican Senators were ‘hanging back’ 
from invoking the rule.269 Wilkins noted that Republican senators such as Minority 
Leader Charles McNary and John Hamilton protested that they were against cloture 
as a matter of principle.270 Wilkins pointed out the double standard in this argument 
after he found out that McNary would not vote to invoke cloture on anti-lynching but 
previously did so on ‘banking and tariff bills and on other bills, including the migratory 
birds refuges bill.’271 NAACP activists only started to notice these kinds of 
contradictions after they gathered statistics and information about how senators voted 
in previous attempts to invoke cloture. This baffled the NAACP given that the Dyer 
bill passed a Republican-controlled House of Representatives in the 1920s and 
Republican congressmen had openly supported the legislation. But as Republicans 
were the ones to decide the outcome of the vote—a vote that was denied twice during 
the 1938 filibuster—the NAACP came to accept the proposition that ‘a [Republican] 
vote against cloture might conceivably be a vote against the bill.’272 
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At the beginning of 1938, Spingarn said to FDR that ‘the question of lynching 
transcends party lines’ as it was an issue that united black voters from across the 
political spectrum.273 What Spingarn did not realise was that the issue of lynching also 
transcended party lines in Congress. While southern senators were the loudest in their 
objections to the bill, they actually detracted attention from others who also did not 
favour the bill. As noted by historian of the southern fight against civil rights in the 
senate, Keith Finley, ‘southern senators could not have blocked significant civil rights 
advances without the support of their northern colleagues, or in this case, 
Republicans.’274 The filibusters that occurred up until this point meant that 
Republicans never had to declare that they did not support the legislation—they could 
pay lip service to the NAACP by pledging their support but be secure in the knowledge 
that southern senators would not let the bill be brought to a vote. But Walter White 
claimed that on their first attempt to invoke cloture, ‘all the Republicans with the 
exception of Senator [Arthur] Capper’ voted against cloture.275 This defies the 
conventional narrative that southern Democrats were chiefly the ones who opposed 
federal anti-lynching legislation. 
After the cloture votes, the NAACP started to doubt Republican commitment 
to a civil rights agenda. For the previous fifteen years Wilkins believed the Republican 
Party was ‘sincere’ when it professed a desired to enact a federal anti-lynching law.276 
The Party Platform of 1928 was clear about their support of an anti-lynching bill.277 
But when Republicans did not seize the opportunity to enact such legislation, Wilkins 
speculated that the move was strategic and that Republicans might have been using 
the bill as ‘political bait’ to lure black voters back to the Party.278 The reluctance of 
almost the entire Republican bloc to vote for cloture on the anti-lynching bill suggests 
that there is still much more to be understood about the dynamics of who opposed anti-
lynching legislation.279 By decentring the filibuster, or looking at the anti-lynching 
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movement from alternative perspectives, the different opponents of the movement are 
revealed, complicating our understanding of racial conservatism in Congress. 
 
The Political Threat of Black Americans 
In addition to revealing more about who opposed federal anti-lynching legislation, the 
NAACP’s attempts to invoke cloture also helped the activists to understand why the 
bills faced so much obstruction. Why the Republicans and Democrats actively 
prevented enacting anti-lynching legislation that would uphold the rule of law has been 
a central concern of historians and political scientists studying congressional 
conservatism. While some have argued that it was because the federal government did 
not have the capability or the capacity to do so, others claimed that it was a choice to 
passively maintain the status quo.280 But congressmen’s words and actions indicated 
that, at least for the few willing to voice their reasons, their obstruction of anti-
lynching legislation was racially motivated. 
 One congressman in particular articulated that his reasons for opposing anti-
lynching legislation were less about the past and more about the future. As early as 
1936, Senator James F. Byrnes, a prominent figure in the Democratic filibuster of the 
Costigan-Wagner bill, predicted what White would do if their anti-lynching bill 
passed: ‘[White] would come back with a bill to open the schools, hotels and 
restaurants in Washington to negroes, and the next step would be to abolish Jim Crow 
laws in the South.’281 Byrnes feared that the passage of the anti-lynching bill would 
lead to increased black political power and that blacks would have ‘as full run [in 
Washington D.C.] as in New York or other northern cities.’282 Byrnes recognised the 
potential for the NAACP to use an anti-lynching bill as a legal precedent that could 
aid other legislation that could help black Americans to make economic and political 
gains and opposed it on these grounds. But Byrnes made these comments to the 
Greenville S.C. News as his comments were too discriminatory to gain traction openly 
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in Congress. It is difficult to make generalisations about the reasons why all, or at least 
many, congressmen opposed anti-lynching legislation because overt racism was less 
acceptable in Congress by the mid 1930s. As a result, fewer congressmen openly 
voiced their opinions in the same manner as Byrne. However, these views indicated 
towards pervasive underlying sentiments of the white elite—and they manifested 
themselves in the legislative obstruction the NAACP faced throughout the decade. 
This highlights that to some congressmen that black Americans were a political 
threat with the capability of influencing federal politics in the future; if they gained 
economic and political ground with the capability to influence federal policy then they 
could be a threat to the white federal establishment. Originally, Hugo Blalock created 
the political threat model in order to understand lynchings; it contends that black 
Americans, when armed with the vote, had the potential to influence southern political 
institutions. Lynching was therefore one technique used to discourage and punish 
black political participation.283 The same model can be used to interpret legislative 
obstruction of the anti-lynching bills. While lynchings were an extra-legal method, 
filibusters and obstructive tactics used by congressmen can be interpreted as legal 
ways of preventing black political participation at a federal level. Obstructing anti-
lynching bills achieved two things. Firstly, it prevented the NAACP from using anti-
lynching legislation as a legal precedent to introduce other legislation that could 
benefit black Americans. Secondly, if no federal anti-lynching bill was passed then 
this indirectly allowed lynching to continue unchecked, which maintained local 
disincentives for black Americans to participate politically at the local level. This had 
far reaching consequences for any federal anti-lynching bill and future civil rights 
legislation. 
 Congressmen’s concerns about the future were therefore directed towards the 
anti-lynching campaign launched by the NAACP. The intensity of legislative 
obstruction to those efforts increased as the NAACP became more effective lobbyists 
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and as the passage of anti-lynching legislation seemed more likely. By 1938, reports 
circulated around Washington that the NAACP had enough votes for the Wagner-Van 
Nuys bill to pass should it be brought up for a vote—although the results of the votes 
for cloture later cast doubt over this assertion.284 The NAACP’s methods for trying to 
bring the bill to a vote reflected how knowledgeable and confident they had become 
as lobbyists. They called for a Democratic caucus to force southern senators to toe the 
party line in supporting their bill with the majority, they circulated discharge petitions 
to get their bill out of committees and onto the House floor for debate, and they 
attempted to invoke cloture at every available opportunity after they learned of the rule 
to limit the ways in which congressmen could stall or prevent passage of their bill.285 
These were aggressive tactics that, with enough signatures or votes, could realistically 
influence the legislative process. 
There was also evidence that some congressmen were threatened by the 
strength of the Wagner-Van Nuys bill itself. The bill, according to the Department of 
Justice, was more likely to pass the constitutional test than any previous piece of anti-
lynching legislation.286 But congressmen tried to sabotage the passage of the bill by 
pushing through an alternative anti-lynching bill instead: the Mitchell bill.287 The 
battle that ensued over the Mitchell bill speaks volumes about the opponents to anti-
lynching. If they were willing to support an anti-lynching bill—if only to defeat the 
NAACP’s more effective one—it suggested two things. Firstly, that congressmen 
thought that the NAACP’s bill might actually pass, and secondly, that they had doubts 
about their own abilities to hold off the NAACP. After years of attempting to prevent 
the NAACP from pushing through an anti-lynching bill, support for the Mitchell bill 
was significant. After all, if congressmen were confident that they could stop the 
NAACP’s anti-lynching bill, why would they bother to support an arguably weaker 
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bill? The NAACP was convinced of the Mitchell bill’s inferiority to their own. 
Activists documented a list of the ‘outstanding weaknesses’ of the Mitchell bill, 
considering it to be significantly weaker than their own bill.288 One of the reasons that 
congressmen thought that this would be an effective end to the NAACP’s movement 
was because they did not think that the NAACP—who had been campaigning for anti-
lynching legislation for nineteen years at this point—‘would have the nerve to oppose 
passage of a bill introduced by the one Negro member of Congress.’289 But Roy 
Wilkins asserted that the nation would be ‘better off with no bill passed than with a 
weak bill,’ and so the NAACP lobbied against the Mitchell bill in 1939.290 If the 
Mitchell bill was pushed through, then Congress would not pass another anti-lynching 
bill as well, which would prevent the NAACP’s bill from ever being passed. This 
spurred the NAACP on to vehemently oppose any action on the Mitchell bill. With 
the organisation’s help, the Mitchell bill was defeated by a vote of 257 to 122.291 
The overarching aims of their opponents did not dawn on NAACP leaders until 
1938 when the Wagner-Van Nuys bill was put aside to debate FDR’s proposed relief 
measure. It was then that the NAACP became conscious of the fact that ‘the fight for 
the Anti-Lynching bill is far greater than a fight for the Negro or against lynching.’292 
Communications over a proposed amendment to the $250,000,000 Relief Bill 
highlighted that the sentiments Senator Byrnes evoked two years earlier in the 
Greenville S. C. News were indeed an important factor in opposing anti-lynching bills. 
Senator Wagner proposed to introduce an amendment to the Relief Bill that included 
provision for workers on projects financed by the bill to have the right to bargain 
collectively with employers. Wagner phoned White to report that southern senators 
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were bitterly opposed to the amendment and ‘exceedingly nasty in their attitude.’293 
Senator John Overton of Louisiana opposed the amendment on the grounds that 
Wagner’s sole purpose in suggesting it was ‘to permit Negroes to organize, 
particularly Negro workers on the Mississippi Flood projects.’294 Once again, it 
suggested that congressmen were opposed to any bills that would allow black 
Americans to gain political power. Reflecting on these comments, Wagner and White 
linked the objections to the Relief Bill amendment to the objections to the anti-
lynching bills. Both bills would allow black Americans to feel safer and more secure 
to enter into economic competition with whites. White noted that this demonstrated 
‘the real economic basis of the fight by the reactionaries who will oppose not only 
anti-lynching legislation but all progressive legislation.’295 Blocking an anti-lynching 
bill, as well as an amendment to allow workers to organise collectively, prevented the 
potential of economic stability for black Americans. This indicated that objections to 
an anti-lynching bill were about more than lynching itself. It was also more broadly 
about how blacks could benefit if barriers to social progress were removed. 
But the irony was that black Americans lacked the political power to be able 
to really influence congressional votes. It only took a few senators to filibuster and 
thwart the legislative program of the NAACP because black Americans lacked the 
power to vote these men out of office. Despite counting enough sure votes to pass 
should the bill be voted on, White stated that it took so few senators for the majority 
who were committed to the bill to be ‘powerless to bring the bill to a vote.’296 It was 
not until 1938 that White fully realised the limits of black influence in politics and that 
this was why an anti-lynching bill had not yet passed. White believed in the anti-
lynching cause. He believed that the facts justified federal intervention. He believed 
in the effectiveness of the legislation. But it was at this point that White realised that 
a belief in a cause was not enough, and there was one significant thing preventing 
black Americans from political and economic gain: a lack of political power. 
Congressmen were not compelled to consider the interests of black people in their 
policy making decisions because the black electorate was small and lacked influence. 
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At this point in time, the NAACP was not the political threat that southern senators 
perceived it to be. But the activists must have done a great job to suggest otherwise if 
their opponents would expend so much time, effort, and federal funds to obstruct their 
efforts. 
This made the NAACP realise that the passage of any bill they drafted or 
sponsored could not be passed with effective lobbying alone. This had to be backed 
up with black votes. In an analysis of the 1938 anti-lynching fight in the Crisis, one 
article noted that, ‘the true lesson of the anti-lynching bill, namely, that citizens must 
have the right to vote if they expect to have their interests represented and 
protected.’297 But the idea that black Americans needed more political power to 
achieve their political goals was not a new concept. The need to increase political 
power was recognised by Du Bois and was reflected in the NAACP’s early work.298 
Furthermore, it was something that the lobbyists were encouraged to include in their 
1930s programme before they took up another anti-lynching fight. In 1934, the 
Committee on Future Plan and Program, established just before the NAACP decided 
to fully launch a new crusade against lynching, reported that the NAACP’s program 
did not guarantee economic and political freedom for the black masses and that it was 
an important pursuit in order for black Americans to progress socially and 
economically.299 Even though the NAACP was aware of the lack of black political 
power, the fact that the NAACP campaigned for individual issues such as anti-
lynching and desegregation without that political power behind them highlighted how 
the national branch was more focused on the particular issues that black people faced 
instead of how it might achieve social and political change. It was only in 1939 that 
the NAACP came to the sobering realisation that a lack of political power significantly 
affected their ability to campaign for specific issues. It was an important turning point 
in the NAACP’s anti-lynching fight because it turned the Association’s attention to 
the broader political issue at work. It gave the activists a new appreciation of the 
process of reform and they were no longer focused solely on the problem of lynching. 
Congressional attempts to block the passage of anti-lynching legislation 
therefore could be argued to be attempts to discourage black Americans from current 
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and future political participation. The extensive legislative obstruction the NAACP 
faced aimed to stop blacks from being able to gain economically from federal 
legislation—whether being free to enter into capitalist competition with whites 
without fear of violence, or by having the power to collectively organise the black 
workforce. The NAACP pushed for anti-lynching legislation so that black Americans 
could feel freer to enter into economic competition with whites. But it was at this point 
that White realised that the federal government were putting political barriers up in 
addition to the economic barriers blacks faced in the community, completely altering 
the NAACP’s perception of the reality of getting future civil rights legislation passed. 
Conclusion 
For the NAACP activists, their experience with obstruction was one of the most 
challenging aspects of their efforts to legislate. Not only because the NAACP’s tactics 
of protest and persuasion were insufficient when faced with a barrage of obstruction 
but also because it opened their eyes to unforeseen opponents. While it is important to 
study the filibusters, focusing on them exclusively gives too much agency to a 
minority of congressmen and detracts from the views of the hundreds of other 
legislators involved in the legislative process. 
Reframing the analysis around the attempts to invoke cloture allows for 
congressional conservatism towards anti-lynching to be re-examined. Congress can be 
argued to be racially conservative across party lines because a greater number of 
congressmen opposed the bill than was first thought. Previously, it was southern 
Democrats who were accused of preventing the passage of anti-lynching legislation 
between 1920 and 1950. But the attempts to invoke cloture during the filibuster of 
1938 show that the entire Republican bloc, apart from one Senator, refused to vote for 
cloture. This new opposition from congressmen who previously claimed to be 
‘friendly’ shifted the NAACP’s understanding of who opposed anti-lynching during 
the 1930s. It suggests that there were gradations in white opposition to anti-lynching, 
and that even if congressmen did not participate in the most egregious obstructive 
actions, they might still quietly obstruct the bills by not voting to end filibusters. 
While the NAACP was well-aware of the reasons why congressmen opposed 
anti-lynching legislation throughout the campaign—these included concerns over the 
constitutionality, infringements on states’ rights, and worries over the enforceability 
of the bill—they were unaware of the more deep-rooted reasons until 1938. But it was 
97 
 
at this point that Senator Overton of Louisiana openly declared that he wanted to 
prevent black Americans from gaining economically or politically by agreeing to the 
amendment which would allow them to organise. This was a revelation for NAACP 
activists and it opened their eyes to what they would need to do to achieve legislative 
reform in the future. 
1938, the year in which the battle to push through the Wagner-Van Nuys bill 
ensued, was a pivotal year for the NAACP. It was the year in which the organisation 
had the greatest amount of knowledge about the legislative process and about the 
extent of the challenge they faced from racially conservative congressmen. No longer 
were they naive about their opponents, and as a consequence they could work on the 
deeper issues that prevented black Americans from participating politically. 
Understanding what prevented them from pushing the bill through was an important 
realisation because it informed the NAACP that the issues ran far deeper than the anti-























A New Deal for Mob Violence 
Congressional conservatism taught the NAACP about the legislative processes that 
allowed the activists to develop and improve their lobbying skills. But they were still 
unable to push through anti-lynching legislation despite their best efforts. With limited 
success persuading congressmen to vote for their anti-lynching bills, the NAACP 
looked for other ways to secure passage of the bills in Congress. It was for this reason 
that the NAACP lobbied the executive branch of government at the same time. With 
growing public concern over the treatment of black Americans, President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt (FDR) faced increasing domestic and international pressure to curtail mob 
violence. Even Adolf Hitler encouraged FDR to deplore American mob violence: ‘I 
would consider it a great favor,’ he wrote, ‘if you would use your own good and 
powerful office to better protect your defensless [sic] black people.’300 
Throughout the NAACP’s existence, its leaders had always called upon sitting 
Presidents to take a firm stance against lynching but their calls were never 
satisfactorily answered.301 The nature of the New Deal offered hope that FDR may 
lend his powers to help struggling black Americans too. The NAACP were therefore 
encouraged to demand the inclusion of blacks in New Deal agencies, and fight for fair 
access to relief projects. The NAACP also pressured FDR for his endorsement and 
support of their anti-lynching legislation. 
The presidential actions that could result in the passage of the NAACP’s anti-
lynching bill were numerous as FDR had a fine-tuned method for passing legislation. 
First, he assembled data and information from studies in the field of the proposed 
legislation, then he publicised the legislation to generate public support and to bring 
to bear the influence of constituents on their Congressmen. Using his relationship with 
congressional leaders he would later see that his bills were referred to sympathetic 
committees to ensure their passage.302 The President could therefore influence 
legislation through his personal relationships with individual senators, something the 
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NAACP were keen to exploit. If presidential endorsement or active support for the 
Costigan-Wagner bill was obtained then, in essence, the president could lobby on 
behalf of the NAACP, relieving the civil rights activists of their mammoth task 
In theory the liberalism espoused by the President aligned with the liberalism 
championed by the NAACP as both advocated greater state intervention to remedy 
social inequalities. The Association maintained that it was the federal government’s 
responsibility to protect black lives and the New Deal offered hope to reformers who 
sought greater federal intervention in problems such as poverty, poor housing, 
unemployment, and lynching. For this reason, and because the Association were under 
the impression that the President favoured the bill, the NAACP came to expect either 
‘open or quiet support’ from the White House.303 But while FDR expressed hopes for 
anti-lynching legislation, he took no steps to turn those aspirations into a reality during 
the push for the Costigan-Wagner bill. 
While FDR did not make the step from rhetoric to legislation, from moral 
criticism to law, his silence did not represent an unwillingness to tackle lynching. 
Instead, it pointed to a disconnect between the NAACP’s expectations and what was 
realistically within FDR’s power as the nation’s leader. The NAACP sought crime 
control, which was typically a concern of the states, whereas FDR was more concerned 
with the criminal justice system, something that he could shape from the executive 
office. The president would not endorse a cause purely on moral grounds, it also had 
to be within the federal government’s capability to act—something that was limited 
by the Constitution. By comparing the NAACP’s expectations of the President to 
FDR’s own strategy for anti-lynching, an alternative explanation for FDR’s silence on 
the Costigan-Wagner bill, as well as the reason why the NAACP failed to gain 
presidential endorsement, becomes clear. 
 
FDR’s Anti-Lynching Rhetoric 
FDR’s stance on anti-lynching is typically defined by his public silence on the 
NAACP’s federal anti-lynching bills. Historians have explained and excused this 
silence by FDR’s need to remain quiet on controversial subjects in order to push 
                                                 




through New Deal economic reforms.304 FDR’s aides argued that it would not be 
politically expedient for him to be associated with the anti-lynching movement and 
consequently often kept anti-lynching, and the NAACP, from the President’s 
attention.305 But several speeches given by FDR suggest that the narrative was a lot 
more complex. FDR actually confronted lynching throughout his presidency, and 
spoke publicly about it three times between 1933 and 1935. Surprisingly, scholars 
have neglected to analyse FDR’s anti-lynching rhetoric. This is largely because on the 
rare occasions that FDR spoke about lynching, his speeches were framed in such a 
way that meant lynching never seemed like his central concern. Nevertheless, they 
offer a new insight into the President’s views and clearly reveal that, just like his New 
Deal economic reforms, FDR framed lynching in the language of social and political 
disrepair, extending his ‘new philosophy of government’ to encompass lynching.306 
While FDR did not outline any specific policies on lynching in his speeches, they 
suggest that he aimed to expand the powers of the federal government to broaden its 
capacity to fight lynching in a different way to the NAACP. FDR’s practice of using 
rhetoric to frame future policy refers to what scholars have deemed ‘the rhetorical 
presidency,’ an essential feature of the ‘modern presidency.’307 While FDR appeared 
to take no action on lynching, instead he laid the foundations for future federal action 
by establishing his own anti-lynching rhetoric. Considering FDR’s anti-lynching 
rhetoric between 1933 and 1935—the period when he was seen to take the least action 
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against lynching—reveals how the President legitimised potential future federal 
reforms against the practice. 
  While on the surface the President appeared to merely denounce mob violence, 
the broader context of the 1933 speech FDR made to the Federal Council of Churches 
of Christ in America (FCC) actually contained the seed of what would become FDR’s 
public strategy towards lynching during his time in office.308 Steeped in moral rhetoric, 
FDR’s speech was well-targeted for that particular religious audience.309 FDR praised 
the Churches for being ‘the greatest influence in the world.’310 For him this made 
church representatives the perfect audience to ‘spread the gospel of unselfishness’ and 
accept ‘a new philosophy of government,’ to usher in his new regime.311 If the church 
was on board with his policies, then Roosevelt believed, its representatives would filter 
this down to their congregations; churches could influence public opinion at a time 
when Roosevelt was looking for public support for his policies. It was here that FDR 
asserted that ‘we know that [lynching] is murder and a deliberate and definite 
disobedience of the Commandment, “Thou shall not kill.”’312 FDR highlighted the 
immorality of lynching and guided his audience to denounce lynching with him.  
Although his speech was steeped in moral rhetoric, FDR brought the rhetoric 
of civil rights in line with the New Deal by framing mob violence in bureaucratic 
language. He suggested that lynching, just like America’s other social ills, was another 
sign of a country in disrepair; first and foremost, lynching was a symptom of broken 
government. He acknowledged that, ‘The judicial function of government is the 
protection of the individual and of the community through quick and certain justice. 
That function in many places has fallen into a sad state of disrepair.’313 FDR argued 
that lynching had flourished because the government had failed to ensure due process 
and the equal protection of the law, something that he attributed to the corruption of 
those in ‘high places.’ But FDR declared, ‘we do not excuse those in high places or in 
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low who condone lynch law.’ He deplored participants of lynch mobs and stated that 
in order to fix the situation, ‘it must be part of our program’ to re-establish the proper 
function of government.314 Anti-corruption was a recurrent crusade throughout FDR’s 
career; he previously took a strong stance against Tammany Hall, the Democratic 
political machine and engine of political corruption that dominated New York City 
politics during the nineteenth century.315 FDR’s emphasis on lynching as a result of 
corrupt government was therefore entirely consistent with his pre-existing views. 
  By framing lynching in terms of government instead of in terms of race, FDR 
attempted to make lynching a less controversial issue. As such, the solution to 
lynching, according to FDR, was to tackle the root cause; lynching was a problem of 
government that could in turn be solved by the proper function of government. While 
lynching had been talked about in terms of the law for a century by social 
commentators, activists, and journalists—even the NAACP made these arguments to 
justify federal intervention—the federal government had never done so until this 
point.316 In no uncertain terms FDR situated his anti-lynching rhetoric firmly within 
the context of his nation-building New Deal policies that legitimised the expansion of 
federal powers in the national interest. Crime, just like economic crises, could be 
solved by strong government, he argued. FDR therefore called for ‘action by collective 
government… toward the ending of practices such as [lynching].’317 But framing 
lynching in this way simplified the causes of lynching, ignored the plethora of causes 
that had been identified by anti-lynching activists over time, and overlooked the 
institutional racism prevalent in the criminal justice system. Additionally, it meant that 
lynching was no longer a problem particular to black Americans, and instead it became 
a problem of United States law enforcement. This was a significant speech as it clearly 
marked FDR’s desire to end lynching and hinted that this should be achieved at the 
federal level, just not on the NAACP’s terms. 
  Following FDR’s denunciation of lynching in his speech to the FCC, the 
NAACP activists were convinced of FDR’s interest in seeing an end to lynching. 
Walter White even sent a telegram to the President expressing his gratitude. ‘Thank 
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you a thousand times,’ White exclaimed, ‘for your magnificent and unequivocal 
condemnation of lynching tonight. Twelve million negroes and many millions of 
whites applaud your every word.’318 The excitement of a presidential statement that 
both condemned lynching and advocated federal action meant that NAACP activists 
expected FDR to progress towards an endorsement of their federal anti-lynching bill. 
Consequently, White bombarded the White House with letters and telegrams 
imploring the President to speak out in favour of the Costigan-Wagner bill. Stephen 
Early, FDR’s Press Secretary, commented that White’s file of correspondence was 
‘voluminous’ as he relentlessly sought presidential endorsement.319 While FDR’s first 
speech unequivocally denounced lynching he did not outline how the federal 
government would act. But given the NAACP had a ready-made next step in the form 
of their anti-lynching bill, it made sense to them that FDR would go on to endorse 
their bill. 
  Proving that his comments on lynching in his speech to the FCC were not a 
one-off, the President reaffirmed his commitment to stop lynching a month later in his 
State of the Union Address on 3rd January 1934. FDR claimed that ‘crimes of 
organized banditry, cold-blooded shooting, lynching, and kidnapping have threatened 
our security.’320 He called for their ‘immediate suppression’ and asked Congress to 
cooperate to build ‘a new structure designed better to meet the present problems of 
modern civilization.’321 While lynching was not a primary focus of the State of the 
Union address, its inclusion in the speech indicated a firm desire for the eradication of 
lynching. The State of the Union address typically allows a president to recommend 
issues to Congress for their consideration. Given that in the rest of the speech FDR 
mentioned providing further relief for unemployment, regulating business, ending 
crimes that stemmed from Prohibition, seeking repayment of debts owed by foreign 
nations, and taxation reform—all areas that he later took action on—his inclusion of 
lynching in this particular speech was a compelling indicator that anti-lynching was 
on the president’s agenda. 
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  FDR’s anti-lynching rhetoric was inextricably bound with his rhetoric 
surrounding the ‘war on crime.’ The war on crime was an initiative that saw the federal 
government expand their role towards crime control to tackle crimes that developed 
out of the Prohibition era.322 In order to achieve this, under FDR’s advisement, the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) proposed a legislative program for tackling crime that 
was deemed the ‘Twelve Point Program.’323 The Program dealt with racketeering, the 
transportation of stolen property in interstate or foreign commerce, stealing from 
banks operating under the laws of the United States, and fleeing the state to avoid 
prosecution or the giving of testimony, to name just a few.324 Both the DOJ and the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) pursued agendas that would increase federal 
authority to tackle a range of crimes during the first half of the 1930s. Whilst a 
provision to make lynching a federal crime was not explicitly part of this program, 
FDR’s anti-lynching rhetoric suggested that federal powers could be expanded to 
tackle lynching in the same way. Open support for an anti-lynching measure was likely 
to lose FDR support in Congress, but in extending federal powers to fight crime more 
broadly, lynching could be tackled by the institutions of federal law enforcement. 
  Evidence of this alternative approach to tackling lynching came at an address 
given by FDR to a national conference on crime convened by Attorney General Homer 
Cummings between 10th and 13th December 1934.325 The conference met to discuss 
the future of federal crime control and was attended by six hundred representatives 
from national, state, and local institutions, as well as independent organisations.326 The 
conference appealed to its delegates for ideas on how to transform federal crime 
control and FDR gave an address to the delegates that escalated his anti-lynching 
rhetoric and revealed his own remedy for lawlessness. His address featured recurrent 
themes from his previous speeches showing that lynching would be included in a 
broader program for crime control. 
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FDR advocated a dispassionate response to lynching; he diverted public 
attention away from the crime itself towards more practical solutions. The President 
mused, ‘At one moment popular resentment and anger may be roused by an outbreak 
of some particular form of crime such, for example, as widespread banditry; or at 
another moment, of appalling kidnappings; or at another, of widespread drug peddling; 
or at another, of horrifying lynchings.’327 But the American people, Roosevelt argued, 
‘must realize the many implications of that word “crime.” It is not enough that they 
become interested in one phase only.’328 While FDR mentioned lynching, he only did 
so to reinforce his point that the practice could not be reduced by targeting participants 
in lynch mobs alone. In doing so, he distanced himself from the NAACP’s Costigan-
Wagner bill that focused specifically on lynching and bringing lynchers to justice. 
With no specific crimes on the agenda, it was clear that the conference was 
about the function of federal government and how to make it a more effective machine 
for tackling crime. FDR asserted that the federal government was not prepared to deal 
with contemporary crime and lamented that criminals ‘have been better equipped and 
better organized than have the officials who are supposed to keep them in check.’329 
According to the conference programme, the delegates considered ‘crime prevention, 
detection, apprehension, police administration, prosecution, court organization and 
administration.’330 There were significant problems with many of these phases of 
crime control that were identified as contributing factors in lynchings. Some lynchings 
were advertised in advance and could have been prevented with a more efficient 
response from law enforcement. Additionally, law enforcement had trouble in 
apprehending lynchers; members of mobs frequently absconded, or were well known 
to have taken part in a mob but were still never apprehended. Few lynchers were ever 
prosecuted at local or state level either, indicating that there were several aspects of 
the criminal justice system and crime control practices which could be reformed to 
stop lynchings. FDR made a direct statement regarding the increase of federal power, 
and more specifically, its capability to tackle crime. The President proclaimed that, 
‘Widespread increase in capacity to substitute order for disorder is the remedy.’331 
This was a distinct rhetorical escalation from a year earlier when he had only alluded 
                                                 







to the idea of federal intervention. It reflected the nature of FDR’s rhetorical methods. 
He would float an idea and then gradually strengthen the rhetoric surrounding it until 
he could assert what he wanted, and felt that he would be supported. 
  It appeared then, that both the NAACP and FDR had the same goal: for the 
federal government to take responsibility for lynching. FDR’s methods for doing so, 
however, were profoundly different to the NAACP’s. Instead of endorsing the 
NAACP’s federal anti-lynching bill that sought to bring lynchers to justice—
something that might have hurt his broader New Deal legislative agenda—FDR used 
strategic rhetoric in speeches. This rhetoric suggested that a better way to stop 
lynching was to expand the powers of federal law enforcement to make the state more 
effective at each phase of crime control, removing the need to make lynching a federal 
crime or for FDR to publicly support the NAACP’s anti-lynching campaign. Framing 
lynching in this way was subtle and unless FDR’s speeches were read and interpreted 
side by side, the thrust of his arguments were easily missed. The speeches were spaced 
out over the period of a year and to make things even less clear, they were never solely 
about lynching. His anti-lynching rhetoric was presented alongside other New Deal 
reforms, especially in his State of the Union speech and his address to the crime 
conference. But FDR’s lack of public endorsement for the Costigan-Wagner bill 
cannot merely be explained away as a lack of interest in the issue. The President did 
not simply ignore lynching because it was politically expedient to do so. Instead, FDR 
was active in shaping his own anti-lynching strategy, it was just not the one the 
NAACP advocated. 
 
Gaining Access, Not Influence 
The NAACP pursued presidential endorsement for their anti-lynching bill because 
FDR denounced lynching in December 1933 and January 1934. When the NAACP 
introduced the Costigan-Wagner bill into Congress in January 1934 it made sense to 
the Association that FDR, having denounced lynching, would go on to support the 
NAACP’s anti-lynching measures. But as time passed and FDR made no clear 
endorsement, the NAACP could not understand why FDR would not speak out in 
favour of their bill. Its leaders therefore made unceasing demands of FDR between 
1933 and 1935. The President, however, continued to take no action on the Costigan-
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Wagner bill and ignored the NAACP’s requests. Whilst the need to make up for their 
lobbying failures in Congress led the NAACP to seek help from the White House in 
the first place, the organisation also held the conviction that ‘the White House favors 
the passage of the bill.’332 It was for this reason that NAACP activists persisted even 
when White House staff sought to keep Walter White and anti-lynching from FDR’s 
attention. But the access they achieved indirectly through First Lady Eleanor 
Roosevelt did not influence FDR’s position on anti-lynching legislation.333 
Furthermore, communication with Mrs. Roosevelt led the NAACP to believe the 
President was actually more invested in the Costigan-Wagner bill than his silence over 
it would suggest. 
 In order to gain FDR’s support for the Costigan-Wagner bill, the NAACP had 
to lobby the President. But before the NAACP could influence the President they had 
to gain access to him. At first White adhered to White House procedure and 
approached Roosevelt’s Appointment Secretary, Marvin McIntyre, for ‘the 
opportunity to have a few minutes with the President.’334 But McIntyre always denied 
the NAACP’s requests; he was described by White’s biographer, Kenneth Janken, as 
a staffer who was more favourably disposed to southern politicians, and someone who 
‘filter[ed] out African American perspectives from the President’s attention.’335 
Deference to southern politicians, however, was not the only reason that White was 
kept from the White House; he faced negative racial stereotyping from White House 
staff that earned him an unfavourable reputation. This was evident in a memorandum 
sent by Stephen Early, White House Press Secretary, to Eleanor Roosevelt, that aimed 
to discourage her from engaging with him. When White House staff kept anti-lynching 
from FDR’s attention, White pursued access to the President indirectly through First 
Lady Eleanor Roosevelt to circumnavigate White House staff.336 Early’s memo was a 
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character assassination of White based upon commonly perpetuated stereotypes of 
black males. Early painted White as belligerent in his attempts to communicate with 
the President. Early claimed White had been ‘bombarding’ the President with 
telegrams and letters, ‘demanding’ passage of the Costigan-Wagner bill before 
Congress adjourned, and ‘complaining’ about the War Department’s policy regarding 
the assignment of black officers in CCC camps. Early evaluated the tone of White’s 
letters as ‘decidedly insulting,’ confrontational, and aggressive, feeding into the 
stereotype of the belligerent black male.337 White suffered discrimination by White 
House staff and this had a significant bearing upon White’s ability to access the 
President. 
 Early’s arguments sought to invalidate Walter White’s efforts and taint his 
reputation in the White House in order to distance the administration from White and 
anti-lynching, and convince Eleanor Roosevelt to not grant White the access he 
sought. In order to further discourage Eleanor Roosevelt from communicating with 
White, Early depicted White as a violent ‘troublemaker,’ criminalising the Secretary 
in the process.338 The depiction of black men as inherently violent is an enduring 
stereotype; lynching was often justified by the physical threat that blacks posed to 
white society.339 McIntyre justified this view by telling of an incident that took place 
in the Capitol Building restaurant in which White allegedly ‘demanded that he be 
served, apparently deliberately creating a troublesome scene, compelling his eviction 
from the restaurant.’340 Although White was not explicitly described to have 
committed an overtly violent act, the language used in the memo suggested that White 
deliberately escalated the situation, and the need for White’s eviction from the building 
incriminated White as physically threatening. The accusations that White was 
insulting, a troublemaker, and someone whose actions were largely ‘for publicity 
purposes’ were all laced with notions of moral inferiority. The immorality of black 
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Americans was also a widely held view.341 Notably, the letter did not even mention 
White’s lobbying efforts, the anti-lynching campaign, or the resistance they faced in 
Congress. Instead it attacked White personally, and used this as grounds to deny White 
access to the White House. 
White was unaware of the extent of the White House staff’s tactics to block 
access to the President at the time, but in his autobiography White noted that, ‘the lean 
and saturnine Marvin McIntyre… had intercepted my letters and telegrams, showing 
none of them to the President.’342 White was forced to seek indirect access to FDR 
because he could not get an appointment by asking for one through the ‘regular 
channels.’343 Believing that if he could spend just a few minutes with the FDR, he 
could convince him to endorse and support the anti-lynching bill, White sought 
indirect access to the President through other contacts in the White House with just as 
much vigour. At first, White approached Irvin and Elizabeth McDuffie, FDR’s valet 
and maid respectively. Elizabeth McDuffie suggested black artists and glee clubs that 
might sing in the White House, and occasionally voiced concerns about discrimination 
to the President.344 She was going to serve as his ‘SASOCPA’—‘self-appointed-
secretary-on-colored-people’s-affairs.’345 However, the McDuffies’ influence was 
extremely limited; employed in service jobs, and not in the president’s inner circle, 
White would not have been able to lobby the President through these contacts. 
 The other connection that White developed was closer to FDR. Walter White 
conversed frequently with First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt and despite Early’s attempts 
to prevent her involvement, she was sympathetic to the NAACP’s plight. 
Consequently, Mrs. Roosevelt was key in helping White gain access to the President 
during their crusade to pass the Costigan-Wagner anti-lynching bill between 1934 and 
1935. During this time, White urged Mrs. Roosevelt to soften FDR’s objections to the 
Costigan-Wagner bill, persuade him to insist on congressional votes, to arrange 
meetings with the president for him, to make appearances and speeches at events, get 
FDR to speak out against lynching or in support of anti-lynching legislation, and to 
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present FDR with articles or information regarding the lynching situation.346 Mrs. 
Roosevelt complied with many of the NAACP’s requests and she even arranged for 
White to meet informally with the President to discuss anti-lynching legislation.347 
Mrs. Roosevelt achieved two main things in her communication with White. Firstly 
she reaffirmed the notion that the administration opposed lynching. This was 
consistent with FDR’s rhetoric and led White to persist in seeking FDR’s 
endorsement. But in communicating that message to White, she also unofficially 
placed the administration in favour of anti-lynching legislation. But FDR did not 
support the NAACP’s anti-lynching legislation and so Mrs. Roosevelt significantly 
increased the NAACP’s expectations of gaining presidential endorsement for their bill 
when FDR had made it clear that this would not happen.  
 This alters the narrative surrounding Eleanor Roosevelt’s involvement in the 
anti-lynching movement and suggests that the consequences of her actions were not 
entirely positive. Her role as conduit between FDR and Walter White has been 
uncontested by scholars for decades.348 Current interpretations of Mrs. Roosevelt’s 
influence argue that she was able to assure black audiences that it was ‘not the 
intention of those at the top’ that black Americans should be subject to discrimination. 
Nancy J. Weiss, and later Doris Kearns Goodwin, claimed that these comments, 
combined with Eleanor’s willingness to engage with black Americans, boosted the 
image of the administration.349 In Kearns Goodwin’s book No Ordinary Time, the 
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author noted that ‘though the president had taken no specific initiatives in behalf of 
the Negroes, and had failed to support the antilynching campaign, he managed, with 
Eleanor’s substantial help, to convey to blacks that the administration was on their 
side.’350 In the case of anti-lynching, Mrs. Roosevelt said that FDR was specifically 
on their side with regards to the Costigan-Wagner bill too. This contradicted what 
FDR suggested in his speeches, and on the occasion when White met informally with 
FDR, as arranged by Mrs. Roosevelt. White recollected that he gained ‘only a moral 
victory’ as the President agreed that there was a need to end lynching but he was 
‘frankly unwilling to challenge the Southern leadership of his party.’351 
 Additionally, Mrs. Roosevelt was aware that FDR would not speak out in 
favour of the anti-lynching legislation as he had personally informed his wife of his 
objections to it. When Eleanor enquired if FDR would ask Congress to pass an anti-
lynching bill on behalf of the NAACP in early 1936, FDR replied in a memorandum, 
‘In view of the simple fact that I keep repeating to Senate and House leaders that the 
White House asks only three things of this Congress (appropriations, a tax bill and a 
relief bill)… I think that no exceptions can be made at this session.’352 While Mrs. 
Roosevelt openly communicated these objections to White it highlighted the fact that 
she knew that FDR had no intention of pushing anti-lynching legislation on his 
congressional agenda and that he was unwilling to grant the NAACP’s requests. This 
indicates that anything that Mrs Roosevelt then said to White that deviated from FDR’s 
position was said of her own volition. 
  When relaying FDR’s refusals to comply with White’s demands, Mrs. 
Roosevelt had a tendency to give a hopeful spin to each situation. Minor 
embellishments to FDR’s words gave the NAACP hope of presidential action when 
FDR made no such commitment to do so. When relaying FDR’s message that he 
would not ask Congress to push the Costigan-Wagner bill through she said to White, 
‘I have spoken to the President about your letter of February 28 concerning the 
Costigan-Wagner Bill. He says, in view of the fact that he is only asking three things 
of Congress, he does not see how he could specify this particular bill.’ But she also 
speculated on FDR’s actions, ‘Of course he is quite willing that it should be pushed 
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by Congress itself, and I feel quite sure he will give it any help he can.’353 FDR did 
not say this last part in his memorandum to Eleanor. But in trying to give the NAACP 
a positive outlook she alluded to potential presidential action that could help the bill. 
Placing the administration in favour of anti-lynching legislation has previously been 
considered to be a positive consequence of her correspondence. But in this instance, it 
only highlighted the contradiction between the President’s words and his actions, or 
lack thereof towards the anti-lynching bill. 
  Mrs. Roosevelt’s correspondence implied that FDR was taking an active role 
in aiding the passage of the Costigan-Wagner bill. With each new lynching, and each 
hurdle in pushing legislation through Congress, the NAACP remained convinced that 
any new information about recent lynchings or legislative obstruction in Congress 
would convince FDR to offer his help to remedy the situation despite his earlier 
objections. After the particularly brutal lynching of black farmhand Claude Neal in 
Marianna, Florida, White sent reports of the Association’s investigation into the 
lynching to highlight the NAACP’s case for legislative reform and dispute claims that 
an anti-lynching law was not needed.354 In the hope that details of this gruesome 
lynching would sway the president in the Costigan-Wagner bill’s favour, White 
contacted Mrs. Roosevelt to champion the bill on their behalf. She replied, ‘I talked 
with the President yesterday about your letter and he said that he hoped very much to 
get the Costigan-Wagner Bill passed in the coming session. The Marianna lynching 
was a horrible thing.’355 Eleanor’s use of the verb ‘get’ suggested that FDR’s actions 
would aid the passage of the Costigan-Wagner bill. Continuously opposing lynching 
and alluding to presidential action through subtleties in the language she used, Eleanor 
Roosevelt gave the NAACP hope that FDR had an interest in seeing the Costigan-
Wagner bill passed. She continued to imply that FDR supported anti-lynching 
legislation and on more than one occasion Mrs. Roosevelt suggested that FDR was 
‘going to do everything he could’ and that he was working ‘quietly’ to avoid raising 
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opposition to the bill.356 Denouncing lynching and suggesting the president would act 
gave the NAACP hope that FDR was on their side and had an interest in seeing the 
Costigan-Wagner bill passed because of a genuine interest in seeing an end to the 
crime. 
  With the intention of being optimistic after the Neal lynching, in addition to 
speculating on her husband’s actions, Mrs. Roosevelt also speculated about the future 
response of the Department of Justice to the crime. The NAACP demanded action 
from the DOJ on the case because Neal was taken from a jail cell in Alabama and 
across state lines by lynchers to Florida, where Neal was later killed. The NAACP 
attempted to get Attorney General Cummings to act under the 1934 amendment to the 
Lindbergh Kidnapping Act. The statute was enacted as part of FDR’s legislative 
program for crime control and it enabled federal action for crimes against a person 
who is held ‘for ransom or reward or otherwise.’357 But Cummings did not yield to the 
NAACP’s requests. ‘I have serious doubts,’ he wrote in an internal memo, ‘whether a 
court, bearing in mind that is it a criminal statute, would give it so sweeping an 
interpretation,’ because he did not believe that Congress passed a kidnapping statute 
wide enough in scope to use in the prosecution of lynchings.358 Despite this, and 
without contacting the DOJ to determine their official stance, Mrs. Roosevelt wrote to 
White, ‘I wish very much the Department of Justice might come to a different point 
of view and I think possibly they will.’359 White was overjoyed after reading the First 
Lady’s letter. It ‘brightens the scene immensely,’ he replied, ‘in bringing us good news 
that the President is hoping to get the Costigan-Wagner bill passed in the coming 
session of Congress and that the Department of Justice may act in the Claude Neal 
case.’360 Mrs. Roosevelt’s wishful thinking only set Walter White and the NAACP up 
for further disappointment when both FDR and the DOJ continued to take no action. 
  By instilling the NAACP with hope about future federal action, Eleanor 
Roosevelt actually delayed progress on their broader anti-lynching campaign. As the 
NAACP saw the opportunity for federal action, the Association continued to invest 
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time, money, and effort in pursuing legislative avenues that the administration did not 
support—and would be difficult to push through Congress without open public 
support by FDR. However, the Association’s reactions show that the NAACP had 
great trust in the First Lady and her insider knowledge. She had a great personal ability 
to form positive political alliances. However, Mrs. Roosevelt was clearly ill-informed 
on the stance of the DOJ, and regularly told Walter White that FDR hoped the bill 
would pass when he personally advocated for alternative solutions. They trusted her 
suggestions over their years of experience in communicating with the White House 
and the constant rejection they faced from federal law enforcement agencies in their 
attempts to bring lynchers to justice. 
  But with little direct communication with FDR, Walter White had to interpret 
the president’s intentions through Mrs. Roosevelt’s letters. Desperate for any scrap of 
presidential interest in the subject, White therefore read any positive message he 
received from Eleanor as confirmation of FDR’s support for the bill. White wrote once 
that, ‘I know personally of the President’s deep interest in lynching and of his desire 
to see the Costigan-Wagner bill passed.’361 This was evidence that Eleanor did not 
dispel the notion that FDR would not actively support the bill and that she had 
reinforced White’s belief instead. What was an attempt to instil hope when the 
outcome looked bleak led Walter White to believe that FDR supported a bill that he 
had openly said he would not push through Congress. Eleanor unambiguously told 
White that FDR wanted to see the bill passed. Instead of destroying the NAACP’s 
hope of realising their objective of securing presidential endorsement for their federal 
anti-lynching bill, Eleanor Roosevelt offered the NAACP hope despite knowing that 
FDR would not endorse the bill. Unsurprisingly, the access that she offered did not 
equate to influence as White was unable to secure endorsement for the Costigan-
Wagner bill. In suggesting that the executive branch would take more action than they 
actually did, and placing the administration in favour of anti-lynching legislation, Mrs. 
Roosevelt raised the NAACP’s expectations of FDR and the administration. 
Consequently, NAACP leaders became ever more frustrated when FDR did not speak 
out in favour of their bill. Mrs. Roosevelt’s communications therefore did not have 
entirely positive consequences for the administration. While black Americans may 
have seen the First Lady’s engagement with the lynching issue as a symbol of 
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friendship, in this case it only made the NAACP more sceptical of FDR’s ability to 
ensure that the civil rights of black Americans were protected. 
 
Federal Responsibility towards Crime 
The differences in how the NAACP and FDR aimed to stop lynching are clearer when 
the scope of presidential powers to prevent lynchings is taken into account. 
Essentially, there were limits to the President’s liberalism and although FDR’s 
speeches revealed plans to bring lynching in line with his broader program for federal 
crime control, FDR could not constitutionally accede to the NAACP’s requests to 
make lynching a federal crime. An examination of the federal government’s obligation 
to oversee crime control and criminal justice helps to explain why FDR pursued his 
own policy initiatives and did not endorse the NAACP’s Costigan-Wagner bill. 
On the surface, the NAACP’s demands for crime control appeared to ask more 
than was possible from the federal government’s constitutionally defined role in the 
criminal justice system. With the aim of ‘indicting and punishing the lynchers,’ 
NAACP board member Mary White Ovington wrote to FDR to convince him to make 
‘this barbarous crime a federal offense.’362 But until the 1930s, crime control—the 
specific ways in which law enforcement policed, investigated, and prosecuted 
crimes—was largely dealt with by the states.363 The only exceptions to this were 
outlined in the U.S. Constitution which established federal responsibility to provide 
for the punishment of specific crimes including counterfeiting currency, piracy and 
felonies committed on the high seas, offenses against the law of nations, and 
treason.364 The federal government had its own prosecutors in the U.S. Attorney 
offices nationwide, as well as its own prisons, but both of these institutions had a 
limited focus on the narrow-range of crimes that fell under the federal government's 
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jurisdiction.365 Overall, the federal government had a greater responsibility to ensure 
the proper function of government and to guarantee the rights of citizens than it did 
towards crime control. Crime, including lynching, was a concern of the states. While 
it was the job of the states to carry out justice, it was the federal government's role to 
observe that states carried out justice according to the Constitution. The Constitution 
did not, therefore, give the federal government the power to combat murder—which 
was what the NAACP demanded—so FDR could not easily make lynching a federal 
crime under contemporary laws. It meant that the institutions of federal law 
enforcement would require additional powers, granted by Congress, to do so. 
The NAACP’s demands were not born out of ignorance of the federal 
government’s responsibility towards crime control, instead they responded to a visible 
growth in the federal government’s role in crime control during the 1930s. During 
FDR’s first term, federal law enforcement agencies were reformed and expanded; both 
the DOJ and FBI underwent a period of significant transformation. This was largely a 
response to the DOJ’s ‘war on crime’ and as a result of official reports produced by 
the National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement that surveyed the 
status of the national criminal justice system in the years preceding FDR’s 
inauguration.366 In order to make a larger number of crimes a federal offense, the DOJ 
pursued the ‘Twelve Point Program.’367 While lynching was not on that agenda, 
federal law enforcement moved to obtain broader powers to fight crime throughout 
the decade. 
During this period, high profile interstate crimes contributed to a nationwide 
atmosphere conducive to an interventionist federal crime policy. The rise of 
kidnappings, in particular, captured the nation’s attention. Kidnapping was a crime 
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that targeted middle-class and wealthy Americans, where ordinary citizens were taken 
and held for ransom. In 1933 alone, there were twenty-seven kidnappings that made 
the national headlines.368 Crime was national entertainment, and subsequently the 
federal government’s responsibility to tackle crime appeared to increase due to the 
national coverage it received. One kidnapping had particular significance. The twenty-
month old son of famous aviator Colonel Charles Lindbergh was kidnapped on 1st 
March 1932. After a search of the home, a ransom note demanding $50,000 was found 
on the nursery window. A large-scale investigation was launched and a dozen more 
ransom notes followed. But after months of searching, the child was found dead on 
12th May less than five miles from the family home. Federal agencies were involved 
in the investigation almost from the start and the case was a success story for federal 
law enforcement, as the culprit, Bruno Hauptmann, was apprehended using the latest 
scientific approach to solving crime.369 Such crimes glorified the role of law 
enforcement, and demonised criminals, helping to legitimise plans to increase federal 
power to fight crime. When crime was prominent in the media and at the forefront of 
public concern, Americans looked to the national government to respond and take 
action on problems that affected the nation.370 The case led to the passage of the 
Federal Kidnapping Act, better known as the Lindbergh Law, which gave the FBI 
jurisdiction in kidnapping cases as well as some flexibility in pursuing public enemies 
across state lines. It was a significant step in increasing federal powers to fight crime. 
The NAACP saw the possibility for the government’s crime agenda to work to 
their advantage; they linked lynching and kidnapping to provide an alternative 
justification for federal intervention in lynching cases under existing laws. 
Acknowledging that ‘that there is no law at present authorizing [the DOJ] to proceed 
against the lynchers as lynchers,’ the NAACP recognised the potential to extend the 
Federal Kidnapping Act to intervene in specific cases of mob violence.371 This showed 
the NAACP’s awareness of the limitations preventing the DOJ from acting in cases of 
lynching, and highlighted their ingenuity at trying to find ways to stop lynching that 
were beyond the scope of their pending legislation but already within the remit of the 
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DOJ. In the wake of the Claude Neal lynching, when White wrote to Attorney General 
Cummings in an attempt to get him to punish the lynchers with the authority given to 
the DOJ under the Lindberg kidnapping law, Cummings explained that the matter of 
expanding the scope of the Lindberg Act was ‘primarily one of broad legislative 
policy,’ and their proposal should be submitted to the Congress rather than to the 
executive branch.372 But this was clearly an avoidance tactic because Cummings had 
already planned to strengthen the Lindberg law as part of the DOJ’s agenda for crime 
to extend the DOJ’s reach even further.373 
The proposed laws on the Twelve Point Program were mostly designed to 
protect property and capital, reinforcing the NAACP’s perception that the government 
was not there to protect civil rights under the scope of the New Deal. Despite constant 
pressure from the NAACP for the DOJ to add lynching to this program, the 
Department refused to accede to the NAACP’s requests.374 Consequently, Walter 
White referred to the institution as the ‘Department of (White) Justice’ in an article in 
the Crisis because of its apparent lack of concern for justice for the lives of black 
people.375 Historian Clare Potter reaffirmed this notion and argued that lynching was 
not specifically on the agenda because the war on crime ‘projected a vision of a moral 
and efficient state,’ designed to rally white middle class voters around the New Deal, 
strong government, and increased federal intervention without disturbing racial or 
class hierarchies.376  
But there was a more practical reason for the DOJ’s inaction: the Attorney 
General’s hands had been tied by a previous Supreme Court decision. In 1883, the 
Court decided in United States v. Harris that portions of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 
(popularly known as the Ku Klux Klan Act) were unconstitutional.377 The Civil Rights 
Act of 1871 was the third of a series of Enforcement Acts designed to stabilise a 
society in flux. During Reconstruction, members of the Ku Klux Klan terrorized black 
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citizens for exercising their right to vote, running for public office, and serving on 
juries. The Civil Rights Act was designed to diminish harassment of black voters and 
it empowered the president to use the armed forces to combat those who conspired to 
deny equal protection of the laws, and allowed them to suspend habeas corpus to 
enforce the act if necessary. But the Supreme Court’s 1883 decision stated that 
Congress could not extend its powers to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment to private 
conspiracies to violate civil rights, such as lynchings.378 The DOJ could not easily 
draw upon existing laws, such as the Civil Rights Act, to intervene in lynchings. This 
meant that in order for a federal response to lynching to be effective and constitutional, 
a targeted strategy was required to extend the powers of the department. 
Even though the NAACP hoped the DOJ would tackle crimes that deprived 
black Americans of life and liberty, the department had a lengthy history of neglect 
towards black Americans. The institutions of federal law enforcement had a record of 
persecuting blacks, particularly black activists. Leaders and members of the NAACP 
were the focus of Bureau of Investigation (BOI) suspicions for years.379 W. E. B. Du 
Bois was the subject of a BOI investigation during the First World War when the Crisis 
and other black papers such as the Chicago Defender were suspected of disrupting the 
racial status quo. Du Bois’ 1919 ‘Essay toward a History of the Black Man in the Great 
War,’ and a later essay named ‘Returning Soldiers,’ raised concerns that the Crisis 
was radicalising black troops.380 Black publications faced censorship and federal 
departments continued to collect evidence against black activists. Fears of bolshevism 
and anarchism resulting from the Red Scare led to suspicion of the phenomenon 
known as the ‘New Negro’—a black consciousness characterised by confidence, 
assertiveness, and militancy that emerged after the First World War.381 The chances 
of the DOJ seeking justice for lynchings at the request of the NAACP was therefore 
unlikely because radicals—such as leaders of the NAACP—were generally perceived 
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as suspects to federal law enforcement agencies.382 Of their own volition the FBI in 
particular would continue to investigate and collect information on black activists, 
making the connection between blacks and communists to criminalise black voices. 
Under laws at the time, then, the DOJ did not have any obligation to accede to 
the NAACP’s demands. Due to the increased demand for crime control placed upon 
the DOJ, Cummings suggested that federal intervention was not the answer to every 
social problem. ‘During recent years,’ he noted, ‘there has been an increasing demand 
for the extension of federal power under an apparent assumption that therein lies the 
remedy. Unfortunately, it is not a problem which can be so easily 
solved.’383 Cummings had to disavow the claim that FDR and the DOJ could solve 
everything; the federal government was limited to which crimes it could tackle and it 
was not simple for FDR to do as the NAACP asked. This meant that institutions of 
reform had certain constraints within which they had to work. FDR had to work within 
the powers of his presidency, and the DOJ could only act in accordance with 




Between 1933 and 1935 there was a disjuncture between the NAACP’s expectations 
of the federal government and the capability and capacity of the government to make 
lynching a federal crime, or use federal resources to prosecute recent lynchings, as 
they demanded. In the same way that the NAACP had to work in accordance with 
congressional procedures through their early lobbying efforts, if the NAACP wanted 
the support of the White House they had to make requests and suggestions within the 
constitutional constraints to which the President and institutions of federal law 
enforcement had to adhere. 
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  FDR argued, ‘I did not choose the tools with which I must work.’384 So, making 
use of the tools that were available to him—namely presidential rhetoric and the 
institutions of federal law enforcement—FDR laid the foundations for how he would 
tackle lynching. FDR rhetorically assumed federal responsibility for mob murder in 
his speech to the FCC, in his State of the Union address in 1934, as well as at the 
Attorney General’s Conference on Crime, by arguing that lynching was a problem of 
the function of government. FDR therefore aimed to solve lynching in the same way 
as the country’s economic problems, by expanding the powers of the federal 
government, this time for the purpose of federal crime control and criminal justice. 
Essentially, he aimed to bring lynching under the umbrella of the New Deal. But 
although this message was consistent, it was also very subtle; his anti-lynching 
rhetoric was often brief or presented alongside rhetoric on other economic or social 
issues. He never made lynching the sole focus of his speeches. 
  Mrs. Roosevelt confused FDR’s message by relaying it in her reassuring style. 
She contradicted FDR’s rhetoric and the NAACP came to expect a more active 
response from the President on its own federal anti-lynching bill. But after the 
Costigan-Wagner bill succumbed to the Senate filibuster without any words of support 
from FDR, Walter White resigned from his position as member of the Advisory 
Council for the Government of the Virgin Islands. In his resignation letter, White 
wrote, ‘It is a matter of great disappointment that you as President did not see your 
way clear to make a public pronouncement by means of a message to the Senate or 
otherwise, giving your open endorsement to the anti-lynching bill… It is my belief 
that the utterly shameless filibuster could not have withstood the pressure of public 
opinion had you spoken out against it.’385 White’s reaction was telling of his 
expectations of the President. White desired the executive action that Eleanor 
Roosevelt had suggested and was outraged enough to resign his position when that did 
not transpire. By placing the administration in favour of the NAACP’s anti-lynching 
bill, Eleanor only set White up for disappointment and anger when FDR remained 
silent. 
  But the federal government did not have an obligation to intervene in lynching 
cases regardless of the NAACP’s demands. The DOJ could not prosecute lynchings 
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as a result of the Supreme Court’s decision that portions of the Civil Rights Act of 
1871 were unconstitutional and the department could not extend their powers for this 
purpose. Even though the DOJ’s program for crime control was visibly expanding 
during the 1930s and the Attorney General’s Twelve Point Program offered hope that 
federal kidnapping laws could be extended to prosecute lynchings, the NAACP’s 
expectation for the federal government to act against lynchings was not one that the 


























FDR and the Shaping of Anti-Lynching Legislation 
When the Costigan-Wagner bill was introduced to Congress in 1934, the 
organisation’s legal committee declared that the legislation itself was ‘as effective a 
bill as [they were] able to draft.’386 But after the failure of the Costigan-Wagner bill in 
1935, there were subtle but noticeable differences in the NAACP’s anti-lynching bills, 
rhetoric, and legislative strategy. The key tenets of its subsequent anti-lynching bills 
focused more on law enforcement than it did on lynchers. Why these changes occurred 
is a central concern of this chapter. The Association rarely entertained criticism of the 
legislation itself and often arranged a battery of legal experts to refute challenges 
instead of changing any questionable parts of the bills. But the changes in the activists’ 
strategy suggest that the NAACP considered an alternative way to pass anti-lynching 
legislation. If NAACP lawyers were unable to produce legislation better than the 
Costigan-Wagner bill, it suggests that the NAACP’s legislative agenda was influenced 
by others outside of the NAACP. 
Historian Christopher Waldrep suggested that the NAACP changed their 
rhetoric in response to a battle between the Association, the International Labor 
Defense (ILD), the Association for Southern Women for the Prevention of Lynching 
(ASWPL), and Tuskegee Institute.387 Definitions of lynching became increasingly 
politically divisive throughout the 1930s and each organisation sought to define 
lynching in their own way to justify their activism. The ASWPL used a narrower 
definition with which fewer cases of violence could be categorised as a lynching. This 
benefited the southern women who claimed that their methods for preventing lynching 
were effective. But Waldrep argued that the NAACP shifted their rhetoric to define 
lynching less as a type of community punishment, as they had done for the previous 
decade, and more as a problem of law enforcement. A looser definition with which 
more cases of violence could be called a lynching made their case that lynching was 
still very much occurring and that there was still a pressing need for Congress to pass 
federal anti-lynching legislation. While this is a valid argument, it does not explain 
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why the NAACP’s rhetoric focused more heavily on law enforcement than on 
lynchers. 
In contrast, this chapter argues that the changes in the NAACP’s rhetoric and 
in the type of legislation they pursued after 1935 occurred because FDR had a hand in 
shaping the NAACP’s efforts. The legislative changes aligned neatly with FDR’s anti-
lynching rhetoric of the early 1930s. This chapter therefore asserts that FDR had a 
significant influence on the NAACP’s anti-lynching rhetoric in the second half of the 
decade. It was at this point that FDR granted the NAACP greater access to himself 
and the institutions of federal government, and used the powers of the executive office 
to help shape the future of the anti-lynching campaign. While a conservative Congress 
taught the NAACP about legislative procedure, the liberal executive branch taught the 
NAACP about how to draft more effective legislation, legislation that would enable 
both the NAACP and FDR to make the transition from anti-lynching rhetoric to anti-
lynching reform. This chapter ultimately explores the extent and constraints of the 
blossoming relationship between the NAACP and the White House and studies how 
they worked together to advance the anti-lynching agenda. 
 
From Rhetoric to Reform 
Between 1935 and 1937, FDR accepted the possibility of finding a constitutional 
legislative solution to lynching. During this time, FDR allowed NAACP 
representatives to meet with him to discuss the future of the anti-lynching campaign.388 
In November 1935, FDR’s assistant, Marvin McIntyre, wrote a memorandum to 
FDR’s appointment secretary saying that, ‘When the President returns from Warm 
Springs he wants to see Walter White.’ More significantly, McIntyre added, ‘he really 
wants to see him this time.’389 This move was clearly out of character as FDR had to 
reassure staff that he was serious, but it marked the beginning of several years of 
cooperation between the NAACP and the White House. At the President’s request the 
NAACP was granted access to the White House, was privy to his advice, reaped the 
benefit of his skills as legislative leader, and was given access to the institutional 
resources and personnel at the President’s command. This directly challenges the 
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thesis that FDR made no effort towards stopping lynching; while FDR did not support 
the Costigan-Wagner bill, the NAACP’s subsequent bills were heavily influenced by 
the Roosevelt Administration. The President’s efforts after 1935 built upon the anti-
lynching rhetoric of his speeches between 1933 and 1934; this reaffirmed FDR’s 
commitment to end lynching and demonstrated his willingness to facilitate reform. 
Using his experience as legislative leader FDR advised the NAACP on their 
future legislative strategy after the failure of the Costigan-Wagner bill.390 FDR 
proposed two measures: the 1936 Van Nuys Resolution and the 1937 Wagner-Van 
Nuys anti-lynching bill. The provisions of the Van Nuys Resolution, named after 
Democratic Senator Frederick Van Nuys of Indiana, authorised a Senate 
subcommittee to investigate the facts and circumstances surrounding the fourteen 
lynchings that took place after the filibuster of the Costigan-Wagner bill.391 While 
another anti-lynching bill may have seemed to be just another part of the NAACP’s 
national campaign, the Van Nuys Resolution, in particular, was somewhat of an 
anomaly. The NAACP previously rejected the idea of a congressional investigation 
because leaders considered it a diversionary tactic to the organisation’s overarching 
objective. In 1921, White said that such a commission would not serve any purpose 
other than ‘to give a few jobs and defer action by the Congress against lynching for 
several years.’392 But in 1936, against the wishes of the NAACP’s membership, White 
confirmed that the NAACP were concentrating their efforts ‘on the President’s first 
suggestion of a Senatorial investigation of the lynchings.’393 Given their prior 
reluctance, their agreement to pursue the Resolution suggested that the NAACP 
activists deferred to FDR’s experience and expertise. Maintaining a working 
relationship with the President required a certain amount of deference to FDR’s 
legislative suggestions. FDR thought that anti-lynching reform could be stimulated by 
the Van Nuys Resolution by putting up to date information about the practice into 
Congressional Record. But on this occasion the NAACP justified their support for the 
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measure because they hoped that ‘out of the revelation which this investigation will 
make that there will be a strong body of public sentiment’ for anti-lynching legislation, 
something that the NAACP had worked to achieve for years.394 This was 
demonstrative of the nature of the developing relationship between the activists and 
the President; even if the NAACP did not agree with the resolution, it gained them 
presidential support for an anti-lynching measure that could be built upon to pass other 
measures off the back of its findings. 
FDR’s input aligned the NAACP’s legislative rhetoric with his own anti-
lynching narrative, in which civil rights abuses were the result of the improper 
functioning of government. His influence shifted the focus of the NAACP’s legislation 
from the lynchers towards the role of United States law enforcement officers and their 
handling of lynchings. This was evident in the Van Nuys Resolution which primarily 
focused on how authorities dealt with mob violence by probing the actions taken by 
the responsible law enforcement authorities in their attempts to punish lynchers.395 
This resolution was significant because it asked the NAACP, as well as those debating 
the Resolution in Congress, to focus on the role of law enforcement over those who 
had committed the crime. 
Whilst FDR’s suggestion to introduce the Van Nuys Resolution did indicate 
that he started to use his powers as president to further the anti-lynching campaign, it 
also served as a reminder that his willingness to get involved had its limits. FDR did 
not use any of his other powers—such as lobby for the bill, generate public support, 
or use his relationships with congressmen—to secure passage of the resolution.396 So, 
when the Resolution faced obstruction just like every other NAACP measure, FDR 
did not take any action to secure its passage. The Van Nuys Resolution was actually 
approved by the Senate Judiciary Committee but was held up for over a month in 
1936 by the Audit and Control Committee as some of the committee’s members—
Democratic Senators James Byrne of South Carolina and Nathan Bachman of 
Tennessee—refused to meet to approve the $7,500 budget that had been allocated for 
the investigations. The NAACP remained the face of the legislation, and FDR took no 
action to smooth its passage, and so the measure was subject to as much obstruction 
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as the others. Input from FDR did not automatically equate to the passage of 
legislation; there were limits to the president’s involvement with the NAACP and its 
anti-lynching campaign, and public support for the Resolution was one of those limits. 
But the failure of the Van Nuys Resolution did not spell the end of the 
NAACP’s relationship with FDR. Instead, what followed was the drafting of an anti-
lynching bill more in line with the organisation’s previous efforts, and one that aligned 
with FDR’s rhetoric of underperforming offices of law enforcement on the lynching 
issue. It was at this point that FDR agreed to meet NAACP President, Joel Spingarn, 
‘in order to work out some form of anti-lynching legislation “that can pass.”’397 From 
Spingarn’s words, it is possible to infer that FDR did not believe that previous versions 
of the bill were good enough to be enshrined in law. But what resulted from Spingarn’s 
conversation with FDR was a piece of anti-lynching legislation—the Wagner-Van 
Nuys bill (Senate bill S.1709)—that was focused solely on the function of law 
enforcement. Working alongside the President forced NAACP activists to revise their 
legislation, consider the central concerns of the President, and meet his standards. 
Those standards were what he outlined between 1933 and 1934 to bring lynching 
under the New Deal framework. 
While the Van Nuys Resolution started to shift the focus of anti-lynching, the 
provisions in the Wagner-Van Nuys bill marked the NAACP’s deeper commitment to 
a more bureaucratic drive to fix problems in the criminal justice system, and their 
move away from legislating against lynching itself. The Wagner-Van Nuys bill made 
provisions to increase the federal government’s capacity to fight lynching. One 
provision detailed plans for criminal prosecution of an officer of the state in the federal 
courts if they fail to prevent a lynching, protect a prisoner in custody, or fail to use due 
diligence to apprehend and prosecute members of lynch mobs. Another part proposed 
civil liability enforceable in the federal courts against a sub-division of a state with 
police functions in which a lynching occurred. A third was that a civil suit could then 
be brought for the benefit of the victim’s next of kin. The bill also allowed for an 
extension of the Federal Kidnapping Statute to include the transportation in interstate 
commerce by the lynch mob. This was because some victims—such as Claude Neal—
were transported across state lines by a mob to be lynched. Lastly, the bill granted the 
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Attorney General of the United States powers to investigate and prosecute lynchings 
should a complaint be made to him, and if the lynching occurred under the 
aforementioned conditions.398 The provision for the prosecution of officers of the state 
instead of private citizens was the most significant. This aimed to encourage law 
enforcement officers to carry out their duties without prejudice, fixing the broken 
criminal justice system through the function of government in the same way that FDR 
had outlined in 1933. All in all, the NAACP made nine key changes to the Costigan-
Wagner bill to ensure that the Wagner-Van Nuys bill met the President’s standards.399 
In addition to suggestions regarding legislative strategy, FDR delegated the 
personnel and resources available to him as President to further improve the NAACP’s 
Wagner-Van Nuys bill. In doing so, FDR provided the NAACP with previously 
unattainable access to the institutions of federal law enforcement under his command. 
After an initial draft of the Wagner-Van Nuys bill, FDR asked Attorney General 
Homer Cummings to ‘study the bill with a view to determining whether it will survive 
the constitutional test,’ and to meet with NAACP activists to give them informal 
advice about how to refine their bill before they introduced it in Congress.400 In 
addition to twelve suggested changes that were ‘merely suggested improvements in 
the wording of the bill,’ Assistant Attorney General Brien McMahon recommended 
that the NAACP improve their amendment of the Federal Kidnapping Act—also 
known as the Lindberg Law—that covered lynching in interstate commerce.401 Joel 
Spingarn thought that the DOJ provided ‘very constructive suggestions’ on the bill, 
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changes that the NAACP were keen to adopt.402 This exercise in drafting legislation 
taught the NAACP that it was important to be detailed and specific in suggested 
amendments to reduce the likelihood of objections to the bill. FDR’s role in asking the 
DOJ to help the NAACP implied that FDR was invested in the NAACP’s success. It 
is also important to help understand how the NAACP improved in their abilities to 
draft legislation over the course of the 1930s, in this case with the help of DOJ lawyers. 
The DOJ’s engagement with the anti-lynching bill had great significance 
because FDR was reassured that the NAACP had produced effective and 
constitutional legislation—two of his main concerns prior to this point. The DOJ 
reaffirmed that the NAACP had seriously responded to previous congressional 
concerns in the legislation.403 In a report produced by McMahon, in which he 
evaluated the NAACP’s draft legislation as well as the need for such legislation at that 
point in time, he acknowledged that most objections to the previous anti-lynching bill 
were no longer relevant to the Wagner-Van Nuys bill. The claim that the bill was an 
infringement of states’ rights was no longer an issue as ‘it has been shown that the bill 
is a proper exercise of the power granted to Congress to enact legislation to prevent 
denials of the rights guaranteed by the first Section of the 14th Amendment.’404 It was 
argued also that the Costigan-Wagner bill was sectional and directed against the 
South. McMahon reasoned that contemporary scholarship, such as James H. 
Chadbourn’s 1933 publication Lynching and the Law, had already showed that mob 
violence occurred nationwide and not just in the South.405 Statistical evidence quashed 
Senator Borah’s objection that if the federal government should be given grounds to 
punish lynchers then it should also be given the power to prosecute all murders, 
whether by a mob or by an individual.406 By dismissing these objections, the DOJ put 
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some of FDR’s reservations to rest and reassured him that the Wagner-Van Nuys bill 
was much improved from the last.  
The second way in which the DOJ’s involvement was significant was because 
their findings gave credence to the NAACP’s arguments. For the first time the DOJ 
acknowledged that lynchings were handled differently to homicides by law 
enforcement. They provided the evidence needed to define police authorities as 
underperforming, supporting the President’s rhetoric of broken government, and 
justified the need for federal action. McMahon’s report recognised that there were 
specific institutional problems with law enforcement in cases of lynching.407 
McMahon acknowledged, ‘there is a breakdown in the local law so far as the 
prosecutions of lynchings are concerned,’ and that there had been ‘a denial of equal 
protection in the case of lynching.’408 In doing so, the DOJ recognised that there were 
institutional problems within law enforcement agencies nationwide. This confirmed 
the NAACP’s analysis of lynchings, and it validated their activism. 
Showing that FDR used the powers of the presidency to take action on lynching 
fundamentally challenges the historiography on the subject. Robert Zangrando noted 
that FDR made some legislative suggestions after 1935 but thought this was a 
suggestion to placate the NAACP and appeal to black voters before the 1936 
presidential elections—not a strategic move to give the federal government the power 
to combat lynching.409 The most credit that FDR has received in regard to lynching 
came from political scientist Kevin McMahon in 2004. McMahon argued that FDR 
instructed the Justice Department to find innovative ways to tackle lynching in 1939—
as part of a policy designed to expand federal capacity to tackle civil rights abuses. 
Ultimately McMahon reasoned that this was to create an institutional atmosphere 
conducive for the Supreme Court to also expand their civil rights agenda. Notably, 
McMahon does not claim that it was because of any particular anti-lynching agenda 
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that the President had.410 But for the rest of the 1930s, FDR is given no credit by 
McMahon or any other scholar for attempting to end lynching. Most end the story at 
the President’s choice not to support the NAACP’s legislation between 1934 and 
1935.411 However it was in the years following 1935 that FDR proved to be most active 
in the fight against lynching. 
After 1936, the NAACP’s strategy was aligned with FDR’s bureaucratic vision 
of America following the NAACP’s adherence to the President’s legislative 
suggestions. Given the activists’ desire to see federal anti-lynching legislation passed, 
and their longing for advice and endorsement from the President, it was not too 
difficult to see why White and Spingarn were easily persuaded that the Van Nuys 
Resolution and Wagner-Van Nuys bill were the best course of action, even if they 
were not convinced of the effectiveness of the Resolution. But the significance of the 
changes in their drafts of legislation lay in their engagement with the White House and 
the political issues that they addressed as a consequence. The NAACP drafted 
legislation that, according to the DOJ, could realistically be adopted by the federal 
government, giving them the powers they needed to intervene in lynchings. The 
NAACP came to the conclusion that they had a bill with ‘real teeth in it’ after FDR’s 
direction, and the DOJ’s suggested improvements.412 The NAACP’s relationship with 
FDR therefore proved to be very beneficial. By heeding FDR’s and the DOJ’s advice 
on the Wagner-Van Nuys bill, the Association produced a far more influential bill 
which, according to the DOJ, was capable of being upheld by the Supreme Court. 
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The NAACP’s Shift to Using New Deal Rhetoric 
The NAACP continued to seek advice from FDR after the failure of the Van Nuys 
Resolution because of what the President offered them. FDR presented an opportunity 
to collaboratively produce an improved anti-lynching bill that according to the 
president had a better chance of being passed by Congress.413 But as the NAACP 
gained greater access to the President, correspondence between FDR and the 
Association indicated that the demands that the NAACP made of the President after 
1935 changed. Previously, NAACP leaders demanded that FDR endorse and openly 
support anti-lynching legislation, and encourage Congress to pass the Costigan-
Wagner bill.414 But by 1936, the NAACP no longer asked FDR to make lynching a 
federal crime, or to get the bill passed for them; they did not ask him to act on their 
behalf. The anti-lynching activists adapted politically to benefit from the President’s 
expertise; in order to work with the president, the NAACP worked within the 
framework of the New Deal and within the constitutional constraints placed on the 
federal government’s ability to oversee crime control. Their communications show 
how they moved from protest—a tactic that did not progress their legislative agenda—
to communicate with FDR on his terms and engage with the political issues that the 
president raised when he spoke publicly about lynching.  
Increasingly after 1935, the NAACP sought advice from FDR about the 
function of government; they discussed rules and regulations with FDR and his staff 
to navigate the legislative process and secure the passage of the bills they had worked 
on together. In 1936, when the Association tried to submit a petition to call for a 
Democratic Caucus in the House of Representatives that would force the Party to 
express a definitive position on the anti-lynching bill, the move faced obstruction from 
southern Democrats.415 After the NAACP lobbyists were told that they had submitted 
the petition incorrectly, as the signatures were not all on the same piece of paper, 
Walter White questioned congressional practices with FDR. ‘Although the rules of the 
House, for example, do not prescribe the precise form in which a petition should be 
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signed,’ the way in which the NAACP had done it was ‘not acceptable to the Leader 
of the Caucus.’416 In this case, congressmen requested for the petition to take a certain 
format when the rules did not specify it. This was therefore a discussion about 
unwritten congressional rules, or norms. The NAACP questioned if they were being 
treated fairly or if they were being given the run-around by the Democratic Party, and 
they expected FDR to clarify the rules to ensure the proper function of government.    
NAACP leaders also wrote to expose corrupt and broken government. In doing 
so, the activists positioned themselves as advisors/experts who could be trusted to 
uncover unfair political behaviour and positioned themselves as allies of FDR’s New 
Deal philosophy. Even though much of the obstruction the NAACP faced in Congress 
was carried out in accordance with the institution’s rules, the NAACP favoured the 
explanation that they were being denied their democratic right to lobby. When the 
Association faced fierce criticism for attempting to call the Democratic Caucus—
because unsurprisingly, Democrats were not keen to declare their position on anti-
lynching legislation—White asked FDR: ‘Do you not agree that we have a right to ask 
that the caucus make a clear-cut statement of policy on anti-lynching legislation?’417 
By appealing to their ‘rights,’ the NAACP attempted to draw FDR in as an arbiter of 
justice, to enforce congressional rules and guarantee that the process worked in the 
activists’ favour. The insinuation that members of Congress denied the NAACP a 
‘right’ to call a Democratic Caucus painted the federal government as corrupt.  
Instead of asking the President to act to secure passage of their bill, after 1935 
the NAACP adopted FDR’s New Deal rhetoric about broken government to get the 
president to influence the legislative process to prevent unfair government action. The 
NAACP was mistaken if they thought that FDR could assist them with this; the 
president had no power to govern congressional procedures given the separation of 
powers. But the organisation’s rhetoric aimed to encourage FDR to do what he had 
suggested he would do in his speeches to the FCC and the Crime Conference in 1933 
and 1934 respectively: to fix broken government using the institutions of 
government.418 The NAACP did this by trying to get FDR to assure them that their 
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position on the congressional agenda would be secure. After a special order was made 
to make the anti-lynching bill the second order of business of the Senate, the NAACP 
requested ‘assurance from you that any and all efforts to circumvent this special order 
do not meet with your approval.’419 Senator James Byrnes—a leading opponent of the 
anti-lynching bill—stated that attempts would be made to make the government 
reorganisation bill a priority instead. Another example of this came in 1937, after the 
House Judiciary Committee reported out a weaker bill—the Mitchell anti-lynching 
bill—in an attempt to prevent passage of the Gavagan bill. NAACP lobbyists 
described this as an act of ‘trickery’ to FDR and declared that they would not tolerate 
‘chicanery and treachery of this character.’420 In this instance, the House Judiciary 
Committee had not done anything undemocratic. In fact, they had reported out an anti-
lynching bill favourably—something the NAACP had been trying to get them to do 
for years. But it was the rhetoric that the NAACP used that was important here. The 
NAACP wished for the President to ensure that the process was being carried out 
according to the rules and agreements that had been made, and if not, to intervene and 
rectify the agenda to make sure that their anti-lynching bill was brought up for debate. 
The NAACP was clearly asking too much of FDR because the order of business in 
Congress is typically carried at their own discretion. But the NAACP’s focus on 
process here was important; it was something that they took with them in all their 
future legislative endeavours. 
This focus on process was evident in the NAACP’s attempts to get FDR to 
direct their lobbying strategy when their own plans were knocked off course. In doing 
so, the activists hoped to determine the best way to pass legislation and increase the 
likelihood that their bill would be passed. By 1937 there were over sixty anti-lynching 
bills introduced into the House of Representatives. Unfortunately for the NAACP, 
they were not the only ones to introduce anti-lynching legislation.421 The NAACP 
complained to the President that ‘our initiative has been taken away from us’ and that 
they were waiting for word from him to ‘give us our cue to further action,’ after New 
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York Representative Hamilton Fish circulated a discharge petition to take the anti-
lynching bill with his name on out of the hands of the Judiciary Committee in just the 
same way the NAACP had planned to do with the Gavagan Bill.422 When the 
NAACP’s plan did not work as they hoped it would, the activists turned to FDR for 
instruction. But it is worth noting that FDR was much more amenable to answering 
the Association’s requests at this time. In response to the NAACP’s dilemma, FDR 
replied he would be ‘glad to discuss it’ in person, showing that he was more open to 
giving the NAACP strategic advice, especially when it was he who had suggested the 
strategy in the first place.423 This was a stark shift from earlier years when FDR would 
not even read the NAACP’s correspondence, let alone respond personally. FDR 
willingly discussed strategy and problems that arose with the NAACP periodically, 
suggesting that the relationship between the NAACP and FDR was built and 
strengthened on the NAACP’s ability to adapt their rhetoric and strategy to one that 
FDR was willing to work with. 
There was a clear shift to New Deal rhetoric in the NAACP’s communications 
with FDR; they had learned to communicate with FDR on his terms. In the same vein 
as in their legislative changes, their communications with the President shifted from 
focusing on lynching to the function of government. Not only did the NAACP look to 
FDR for advice but they also appealed to the president to ensure that he fulfilled his 
duty—even if he was limited by the constraints of the executive office and was not 
able to do all that they asked. Walter White summed this up by stating that they looked 
to FDR, ‘to establish the principle of federal guaranties against derelict state officers 
and state governmental subdivisions which fail to do their duty in according equal 
protection and due process of law against lynching mobs.’424 The Association had a 
greater degree of success with this approach in soliciting responses from FDR than 
they had with their previous protests against lynching. Their shift to New Deal rhetoric 
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played a significant part in how the organisation was viewed politically. The 
NAACP’s ability to adapt to their political environment has been noted by scholars, 
and by the end of the 1930s, even though the NAACP still criticised the Roosevelt 
administration for the treatment of blacks in New Deal agencies and for its failure to 
fully address the needs of blacks during the Depression, nevertheless, the NAACP 
gained the label of liberal New Dealers.425  
 
Working on the President’s Terms 
The President’s engagement with the anti-lynching movement, and his help to shape 
their bills, had both positive and negative consequences. It reaffirmed the notion that 
the President was interested in the cause, and it gave the NAACP access to the White 
House and some of the resources and personnel at FDR’s disposal. Though while the 
NAACP’s expectations of their anti-lynching bill had been realigned—for example, 
they knew that the federal government could not make lynching a federal crime and 
that their bill would have to extend federal powers so it could intervene—their 
expectations for FDR on one level had not changed. They still expected open public 
engagement with the bill, especially because FDR had helped shape this legislation 
and quietly supported it. For the NAACP, his help and support was not enough because 
they still believed that his endorsement would secure the passage of the bill, which to 
the NAACP was the most important aspect. But this was something that they would 
not get; any engagement with anti-lynching had to be on the president’s terms. 
Increased interaction with the president created a bond of trust between the 
activists and the President, and the NAACP was keen for the President not to renege 
on his promises. The NAACP’s demand for public endorsement of their legislation 
occurred, in part, as a result of the meetings that they had with FDR. Joel Spingarn 
protested to FDR that in past interviews, 'you have assured me that you would throw 
your support behind the Anti-Lynching Bill or at least in favor of immediate action in 
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regard to it, in such a manner that would receive public attention.’426 But NAACP 
member, Carl Murphy, complained that ‘the President has made no public statement 
on the anti-lynching bill since it has been in Congress.’427 The problem was that FDR 
kept some promises and broke others, but the NAACP expected he would keep them 
all. FDR had worked on the bill with the NAACP when he said he would, and so the 
activists expected him to keep his word in just the same way when he promised to 
openly support the bill. But this was not the case and even though FDR had not spoken 
publicly about the bills throughout the 1930s, they expected him to do so at that point. 
The NAACP justified their expectations in strategic terms. The NAACP’s 
reason for such requests shifted from their previous moral stance, and instead they 
argued that the president should comply because the bill needed active support to pass. 
While the Wagner-Van Nuys bill was up for debate in the Senate in 1938, FDR’s 
Relief Bill— a bill for additional appropriations of $250,000,000 for the relief of the 
unemployed as provided for in the Emergency Relief Appropriation Act of 1937—
threatened to spell the end for the anti-lynching bill.428 Senators voted 58 to 22 to put 
aside the anti-lynching bill to debate the Relief Bill, ending a six-week filibuster. 
While there was talk of continuing the debate on the anti-lynching bill after the Relief 
Bill was dealt with, the NAACP feared that if FDR did not ensure the anti-lynching 
bill was scheduled for debate again on the Senate calendar that it would cause the 
‘death of the bill,’ and it would encourage ‘the forces of reaction and bigotry’ to use 
the same methods to defeat other legislation.429 In theory, this was within FDR’s 
power, he could have asked congressmen to ensure the anti-lynching bill was brought 
up again. But FDR did not comply. Despite his help in drafting the bill, FDR’s silence 
on the bills led the NAACP to doubt the depth of FDR’s commitment. They argued 
that FDR should speak publicly to ensure passage of the bill to prove that he supported 
a bill that he had helped shape. But this was not enough of an incentive for FDR to try 
to influence the Senate’s agenda. 
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The reality was that the NAACP needed FDR’s public support because they 
still depended upon his political influence to overcome legislative obstruction. During 
the 1938 filibuster, both of the NAACP’s attempts to invoke cloture in January and 
February were unsuccessful.430 Despite learning methods to bypass obstruction, giving 
the activists hope that they could finally defeat a filibuster, the NAACP was not yet 
able to achieve this and their bills continued to be obstructed. Once again, the 
NAACP’s last resort was to appeal to the President. All the NAACP wanted was ‘One 
strong word’ from FDR to, ‘practically assure passage’ of the bill.431 During the 
filibuster, the NAACP pleaded to FDR that ‘your intervention and your intervention 
alone can end this disgraceful filibuster.’432 The NAACP still had not perfected their 
lobbying strategies at this point, and even though they had the knowledge of how to 
get the bill passed, they were unable to secure the passage of the bill. While they had 
a much improved piece of legislation, they still had the same problems in getting the 
bill passed. The NAACP’s error was to assume that on this occasion, FDR would help, 
given that he helped to shape the bill. 
FDR only remained publicly silent, though. In 1938, he offered more quiet 
support than he had ever done previously. Joel Spingarn thanked the President for the 
action he took to secure passage of the bill: ‘I cannot tell you how deeply I appreciate 
the promise you made to me on Thursday that in your letter to Senator Barkley at the 
close of the Special Session you would include the Anti-Lynching Bill among the bills 
that demanded immediate action on the part of the Congress.’433 But Spingarn was 
grateful, not just to get the anti-lynching bill on the calendar, but because he was ‘most 
anxious’ that people should realise what part FDR took in the enactment of the 
measure.434 Not satisfied with quiet support for the bill, the NAACP was keen to 
publicise FDR’s involvement when it would further their cause and potentially help 
the enactment of the Wagner-Van Nuys bill. The NAACP wanted congressmen to 
know of FDR’s involvement because it would show that he supported the measure, 
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even if he did not openly say it. They also wanted the President to be on the record, 
once and for all, in support of the legislation. 
 While it was within FDR’s capability to accede to many of these demands, the 
President benefitted from the legislation passing through Congress with as little 
personal involvement as possible. Anti-lynching was still contentious and therefore he 
would retain a greater amount of support from congressmen if his name was not 
heavily associated with the measure.435 At the time, the administration and Attorney 
General’s office were keen to suggest that there was no evidence to document FDR’s 
involvement with working with the NAACP, or that the DOJ had given the NAACP 
any assistance with the anti-lynching bill. Attorney General Homer Cummings 
suggested to FDR that ‘we should limit our approach to this matter to oral discussion. 
We can give all the necessary help in this way without putting the Department in the 
position of having given advice to any private group.’436 The DOJ did not want to be 
seen to be prejudiced when they would be later be asked for an opinion on it by a 
Senate Committee when the bill was under consideration. But it implied that the 
President also did not want himself, or his Administration, to be associated with the 
Wagner-Van Nuys bill. Whilst there is no direct evidence to suggest why this was the 
case, that year FDR was running for his second term in the presidential elections and 
needed to win the public’s vote. Additionally, he was trying to push through legislation 
to replace the New Deal measures that were deemed unconstitutional by the Supreme 
Court. For this FDR still needed the support of southern congressmen. Either way, 
FDR would evade controversy if he avoided voicing any sentiments in support of an 
anti-lynching bill publicly. Once again, FDR’s staff believed that pragmatism should 
prevail, and that it would be politically expedient for the administration to help the 
NAACP quietly. 
FDR’s public silence reaffirmed for the NAACP once and for all that working 
with the President would always be on his terms, and they did not have any influence 
over how FDR would act on behalf of the bill. FDR would only give as much support 
as he wanted to, not what the NAACP expected. This was significant for the NAACP 
because it reminded them of their place at the bottom of the political hierarchy of 
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influence. The NAACP depended upon FDR to speak out for the legislation this time 
around, especially after the assurances the President had made. But while the 
relationship between the NAACP and the White House had definitely improved, this 
taught the NAACP that access to FDR’s knowledge and resources did not lead to 
political influence with the President, and they should not rely on others to pass their 
legislation for them. 
 
Conclusion 
From their relationship with FDR, the NAACP gained tremendous insight into the 
legislative process. One way that the NAACP improved relations was to adopt the 
strategies and rhetoric of the New Deal. It was easier and more fruitful to communicate 
with FDR using similar rhetoric that centred on law and order instead of lynching. 
This was evident in the NAACP’s new focus on the function of government. With 
greater recognition of federal limitations and capabilities to intervene in lynching the 
NAACP found FDR more amenable to working with the organisation. The wording 
of the Van Nuys Resolution, and Wagner-Van Nuys bill were evidence that the 
NAACP had seriously attempted to accommodate these limitations as the Wagner-
Van Nuys bill clearly set out to grant the Attorney General the power to intervene 
according to the Constitution. They were no longer focused on bringing lynchers to 
justice, and this was an important shift for an organisation which had spent the 
previous three decades protesting the crime and attempting to prosecute lynchers. 
From this the NAACP learned how to work with the White House, and the 
Department of Justice, two institutions previously hostile to the NAACP’s efforts, to 
produce effective legislation. This achievement can largely be attributed to the 
previously undocumented relationship the NAACP had with FDR that endured for the 
duration of the Van Nuys Resolution and Wagner-Van Nuys bill campaigns after 1935. 
This relationship taught the NAACP how to write better legislation, and it granted the 
NAACP access to political spaces and personnel, allowing them to build relationships 
in more influential circles. 
The relationship also confirmed that there were limits to what the NAACP 
could achieve with the support that the President offered. The NAACP was at the 
mercy of the President, and they had no influence over him, his legislative agenda, or 
his actions. Despite years of trying, the NAACP did not convince FDR to secure 
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passage of the bills they had worked on together and the bills floundered without a 
word from FDR. As Joel Spingarn told FDR, if the Wagner-Van Nuys bill was 
defeated because of the filibuster then it would be ‘a fatal blow to those of us who 
have accepted your leadership and held out to Negro citizens that your administration 
would see that the threat of lynching would be lifted from over their heads by federal 
legislation.'437 The NAACP looked to FDR throughout the latter half of the 1930s and 
relied on his legislative and strategic expertise. FDR’s silence on the bill was a 
disappointment but this only highlighted the NAACP’s dependence on the President 
at a time when their lobbying skills were still imperfect. 
FDR’s involvement highlighted his ability to manipulate a situation to his 
advantage, without public knowledge, in order to minimise controversy. The public 
were unaware of FDR’s influence and were disappointed that the President had not 
verbally endorsed the Wagner-Van Nuys bill. In a letter to FDR, one member of the 
public wrote, ‘your failure to give active support to the Wagner-Van Nuys Anti-
Lynching Bill, when it was before the Senate, caused grave concern and deep 
disappointment to the many citizens like myself who have supported and rejoiced in 
your courageous and progressive leadership of our great country.’438 Mr Weston 
interpreted a lack of verbal endorsement as a sign of inaction—exactly as the majority 
of Americans did during the campaign for the Costigan-Wagner bill—and had no 
knowledge of FDR’s involvement in shaping the legislation itself. The White House 
were keen to protest, assuring Weston that, ‘the Administration had put forth every 
effort.’439 But FDR was given no credit by the public at the time or by historians in 
subsequent years. 
FDR’s engagement with anti-lynching throughout the 1930s showed the 
President’s enduring—but limited—commitment to anti-lynching. FDR’s actions 
since the failure of the Costigan-Wagner bill showed that he became significantly 
more invested in finding a solution to lynching after that point. Without the federal 
authority to prosecute lynchings, the President met with NAACP activists to talk 
strategy, and advised them about what they should do to push legislation through. 
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More significantly, FDR worked together with these men in order to draft legislation 
that had a better chance of being voted favourably on than any previous legislation. 
The nature of the Van Nuys Resolution and the Wagner Van Nuys bill suggest FDR 
had a hand in shaping them. The legislation centred the language on law enforcement 
and sought to give the federal government the authority to prosecute in lynching cases, 
echoing the sentiment of his anti-lynching rhetoric of the 1930s. Furthermore, the 
campaign for the passage of the Wagner-Van Nuys bill led to at least one noteworthy 
moment: the Department of Justice admitted that lynch victims were denied due 
process of law, and that states did not have effective laws against lynching. 
This is a very different interpretation of FDR’s anti-lynching legacy compared 
to the silent and inactive president who is portrayed in literature on the anti-lynching 
movement. The evidence in this chapter suggests that FDR effectively transformed his 
anti-lynching rhetoric expressed in the early 1930s into anti-lynching initiatives in the 
second half of the decade. It is evident that FDR’s influence was substantial, both 
rhetorically and strategically, as he actively and consciously shaped the NAACP’s 






















Learning to Lobby 
1937 was arguably the height of the NAACP’s lobbying campaign. In that year, the 
House of Representatives passed the Wagner-Van Nuys anti-lynching bill, the Senate 
Judiciary Committee also voted favourably on it, and a special Senate resolution 
guaranteed the bill would be brought up on the Senate floor for debate and kept there 
until it was disposed of.440 This was the most promising outlook for any anti-lynching 
bill. Consequently, the optimism of NAACP activists was high and they were surer 
than ever that the bill would pass at that time. Polls published in Congressional 
Intelligence agreed with the NAACP’s independent Senate vote counts which claimed 
that the Wagner-Van Nuys bill had the required number of votes to pass should it be 
brought up for a vote.441 It was as close to the passage of an anti-lynching bill that the 
NAACP would ever get.442 
 But instead of being proud of their own achievements and consider this as 
proof that the NAACP activists had gained more effective lobbying skills and tactics 
since the beginning of the decade, Walter White sought to praise FDR instead. ‘It 
seems too bad’ that FDR did not openly support the Wagner-Van Nuys bill, he wrote 
to Felix Frankfurter, Professor of Law at Harvard University, ‘since passage of the bill 
is now almost definitely assured he should… get some credit since he has done some 
things for the bill without publicity.’443 While FDR did help the NAACP to refine their 
legislation, gave them strategy suggestions, and worked quietly behind the scenes, he 
never openly supported any anti-lynching bill in Congress. Realistically FDR could 
have done a lot more for the anti-lynching bills than he did. Although they did not 
achieve it—unsurprisingly, as a filibuster postponed the Wagner-Van Nuys bill’s 
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position on the Senate calendar in the first few months of 1938—the NAACP learned 
about the process of legislation and the workings of government during their anti-
lynching campaign. While NAACP activists did not recognise their own achievements 
as important at that moment, this thesis does. 
 Anti-lynching was the movement through which the NAACP gained their 
national political education. They shifted from an approach rooted in their progressive 
era values of positivism, morality, and protest, to one that adhered to traditional 
Congressional processes. They learned to appreciate that the tactics used outside of 
the legislative process did not marry well with congressional norms. Their demands 
were not met with action, and so the organisation adapted, learned new skills and 
strategies, in order to function more effectively as lobbyists in Congress. 
 This was significant for the organisation both for the remainder of their anti-
lynching campaign, which spanned another decade, and for the future of their activism. 
Fundamentally, the NAACP learned to lobby. They learned to work within 
institutional structures and to use congressional procedures to their advantage. The 
NAACP learned both of these things during the course of their anti-lynching campaign 
and while they were not always successful in executing them, their newfound focus 
on procedure put significant pressure on congressmen who wished to see the bill fail. 
By the end of the decade, congressmen who opposed the bills doubted their own 
abilities to hold off the NAACP’s efforts and had to pull out all the stops to prevent 
the passage of the anti-lynching bills. 
 
A Decade of Opportunity 
This thesis re-examined the barriers that the NAACP faced and what this meant for 
their anti-lynching efforts, as well as their greater objectives as a civil rights 
organisation. It is undeniable that the NAACP faced a myriad of hurdles throughout 
their anti-lynching campaign. To name just a few, their lobbying methods were 
criticised by congressmen who argued that they did not act appropriately, they 
encountered fierce resistance to their legislation, and NAACP leaders were side-lined 
by White House staff who sought to keep them and their campaign from the 
president’s attention. But it was these challenges of lobbying that offered the greatest 




The challenges they faced propelled them forwards instead of holding them 
back. NAACP activists were required to look for alternative—and often more 
effective—methods than persuasion to legislate whenever a barrier was placed in their 
path. When congressmen objected to their improper behaviour, the NAACP found 
allies to lobby on their behalf. When bills were held up in committee hearings, 
delaying any movement of the bill through Congress, the NAACP found procedural 
methods—such as gaining the required number of signatures for a discharge petition—
to stimulate progress. When the anti-lynching bills faced repeated filibusters, the 
NAACP attempted to invoke cloture to bypass debate. It was the activists’ ability to 
lobby more effectively, and their newly acquired knowledge of what they needed to 
do in order to push the anti-lynching bills through that spurred them on. The way in 
which the NAACP adapted their lobbying approach to respond to, directly challenge, 
or bypass congressional conservatism proves that the organisation was not completely 
powerless in the face of obstruction. The NAACP had a great deal of agency 
throughout the anti-lynching movement, even if this is not immediately obvious given 
the outcome of their efforts. 
The 1930s was therefore a decade of opportunity for the NAACP. This helps 
to explain why their anti-lynching campaign continued with such determination 
despite repeated failure to push the bill through. New skills and knowledge of how to 
push legislation through in the face of obstruction provided untapped opportunities for 
the Association. While the activists antagonised congressmen and defied the norms of 
lobbying in Congress at the start of their campaign, they continued to adapt their 
strategy to employ tactics they picked up, learned to act appropriately in Congress, 
and found ways to reduce opposition to their bills. One of their biggest gains was the 
knowledge of the legislative process because this allowed the organisation to try and 
bypass a lot of their struggles in Congress against congressmen who opposed anti-
lynching legislation. But as the decade progressed and the NAACP gained both 
knowledge and lobbying experience, NAACP leaders also became increasingly 
confident about the outcome of their lobbying efforts. Each time they learned a new 
tactic it offered a greater chance of success in their next legislative attempt. Their 
education was cumulative, and their optimism appeared to increase with experience as 
the 1930s progressed. 
Furthermore, the NAACP created opportunities for themselves by being 
politically flexible. At the beginning of the decade, the NAACP clung to their 
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progressive ideology and tried and tested strategies of fact finding, education, and 
protest. But their lobbying methods sometimes fell short of congressional expectations 
and they were accused of inappropriate behaviour at times. The NAACP activists took 
account of these experiences, the negative as well as the positive and increasingly 
conformed to congressional norms and procedures in order to function more 
effectively as lobbyists. Additionally, the NAACP adopted the language and methods 
of the liberal President in order to gain access to the White House, and to advance their 
anti-lynching bill. This shows that the NAACP adopted the suggestions of both 
conservatives and liberals and learned how to work amongst competing ideologies in 
the branches of federal government. Once they realised they had a better chance of 
success, NAACP activists shaped their campaign—at the suggestions of both 
congressmen and the President—to give themselves the greatest chance of success. 
The political education that NAACP activists gained instilled in them confidence in 
their tactics and optimism about the possibility of achieving their overarching 
objective. In contrast to the undertone of failure that runs through existing literature, 
the events of the anti-lynching movement instead highlight a theme of opportunity and 
hope for the NAACP.  
 
The Federal Government and Anti-Lynching 
The role of the state in anti-lynching has been explored in this thesis, and it has been 
shown that the federal government influenced how NAACP activists operated within 
both the executive and legislative branches. Both Congress and the White House made 
it clear to the NAACP that they had to work according to the procedures, and 
capabilities of those institutions. Activism—within the federal government at least—
is therefore in part determined by the structures in which it operates. Scholars have 
never considered how the NAACP were influenced by the federal government apart 
from the obvious obstruction the organisation faced in trying to pass legislation. But 
there were many ways, some subtle and some more obvious, in which both the 
legislative and executive branches of the federal government affected the NAACP’s 
campaign. In doing so, this actually gave the NAACP more agency as they learned to 
function effectively in Washington political circles. 
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Congress was racially conservative during the 1930s. Consequently, attempts 
to influence and hinder the NAACP’s efforts occurred almost daily. When attention is 
diverted from Senate filibusters, it is evident that congressional conservatism 
manifested itself in many ways. This included congressmen disapproving of the way 
in which the NAACP lobbied, to making the organisation jump through hoops in order 
to submit petitions, what Walter White referred to as ‘subterfuges’ and ‘political 
trickery,’ to senators not voting to invoke cloture.444 Obstruction was always carried 
out according to the democratic procedures of Congress, as congressmen took 
advantage of loopholes, but it was nonetheless frustrating for the activists. These 
different examples of obstruction meant that there were gradations in the level of 
congressional opposition to anti-lynching; the filibusters were just one example of the 
most extreme type of opposition in Congress, not the total extent of congressional 
resistance to the NAACP’s lobbying. Different examples of obstruction, particularly 
the NAACP’s failed attempts to invoke cloture, highlight that both Democrats and 
Republicans stood in the way of economic and political opportunities for black 
Americans. But what seems clear is that the attempts to stop the NAACP from pushing 
any anti-lynching legislation through Congress were evidence that congressmen 
actively chose to suppress NAACP efforts. They did not just passively allow the status 
quo to prevail, it was an active process into which some congressmen expended a great 
deal of time, federal funds (in sustaining filibusters for so long), and effort to stop the 
NAACP from achieving their objectives. The anti-lynching bill could have set a 
precedent and been a stepping stone for the NAACP to pursue further federal 
legislation. Members of Congress openly said that they wanted to deny the NAACP 
this. In doing so, they chose to deny black Americans legislation that would have 
benefitted them politically or economically.  
Standing in stark contrast to Congress, President Roosevelt adopted and 
maintained a much more liberal approach to anti-lynching throughout the 1930s. FDR 
spoke out against lynching, and framed the solution in terms of the New Deal. His 
influence on the NAACP was also significant. He used the resources under the 
umbrella of the modern presidency to influence the NAACP’s anti-lynching rhetoric—
shifting the NAACP’s focus from lynchers to law enforcement—as well as their 
                                                 




strategy in shaping their legislation to make it more effective, enforceable, and 
constitutional. This is an important departure from the standard narrative in previous 
scholarship that stated that FDR shunned the anti-lynching movement for political 
expediency. Interpreting FDR’s words and actions in light of his presidential power to 
act alters his record on civil rights in the decade. 
 After the Wagner-Van Nuys bill fell victim to a filibuster in the Senate in 1938, 
FDR continued his commitment to fighting lynching without the NAACP. On 3 
February 1939, the president’s new Attorney General, Frank Murphey, announced the 
creation of a Civil Liberties Unit to work within the Criminal Division of the 
Department of Justice.445 FDR restructured the DOJ to make it more efficient, giving 
it the personnel to investigate violations of civil rights guaranteed by the federal 
government. Though FDR’s creation of the department reflected the broader context 
of political reform and judicial activism in the 1930s, racial equality was never 
emphasized per se. The creation of the department recognized the black struggle and 
included them, albeit in a separate administrative program.446 Later renamed the Civil 
Rights Section (CRS), the subdivision had significant consequences for FDR’s plans 
to stop lynchings using the federal government and was a visible effort to address civil 
rights concerns. 
 The establishment of the CRS offers an explanation to why FDR decided to 
help the NAACP between 1936 and 1938 with their legislative agenda yet still largely 
remained silent about his involvement. FDR’s anti-lynching rhetoric in the early 1930s 
was geared towards finding institutional solutions for lynching instead of legislative 
solutions. Bringing lynching under the umbrella of the DOJ’s war on crime suggested 
that the President wanted to find a way to give the Attorney General the power to fight 
lynching. But it was only after the establishment of the CRS that FDR had the 
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infrastructure—in the form of a specialised government department designed for that 
purpose—filled with staff who were dedicated to stopping lynching and civil rights 
violations. In the meantime, the most viable solution to lynching was the NAACP’s 
anti-lynching bill. FDR pursued this legislative avenue as it was the best option 
available to him at the time—and because he wanted to take action to stop lynching as 
soon as possible, before he had the capacity to implement a bureaucratic strategy to 
do so. And so, after the Brownlow Report was published, FDR started to expand the 
institutions under the umbrella of the executive branch. At this point he had the option 
to either continue to support the NAACP and their anti-lynching bills, or use the 
institutions under his control to intervene in lynchings. FDR chose to diverge from the 
NAACP’s legislative program and pursue bureaucratic methods. With the option to 
pursue other avenues, FDR did just that, suggesting that FDR thought it would be 
better to stop lynching in this way than pursue a legislative solution. This also implies 
that between 1936 and 1938, the NAACP’s anti-lynching legislation was the most 
viable option at the time.  
 The establishment of the CRS signalled FDR’s rejection of the NAACP’s 
strategy to pass federal anti-lynching legislation and an acceptance of the federal 
government’s responsibility towards ensuring civil rights. The creation of the 
department did not mean, however, that the Attorney General had the authority to 
prosecute lynchings. Lynching still was not a federal crime. Attorney General Francis 
Biddle, appointed in August 1941, directed CRS lawyers to use existing laws to punish 
lynching. Lawyers Albert E. Arent and Irwin L. Langbein devised the strategy a couple 
of years earlier under the direction of the section’s first head, Henry A. 
Schweinhaut.447 The scheme called for the utilization of Reconstruction statutes to 
prosecute violations of federally protected rights. Sections 51 and 52 of Title 18 of the 
U.S. Code were derived from the 1866 Civil Rights Act and the 1870 Enforcement 
Act and with some imaginative interpretation could be used to allow the federal 
government to act in lynching cases when law enforcement clearly failed in their 
duties.448 FDR did not ask the department to place lynching on the department’s 
federal legislative program but by using existing statutes it signalled an important shift 
from legislative initiatives to bureaucratic ones. 
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FDR’s new civil rights department was not only an attempt to bring lynching 
within the remit of the Department of Justice, but it was also an anti-lynching strategy 
that bypassed the legislative process. By having the Department of Justice investigate 
lynchings using existing statutes, the Attorney General did not require additional 
congressional authority to take action on lynching. The department had to find a way 
to tackle lynching, knowing that any new legislation would be blocked by an 
‘inevitable’ filibuster.449 They used the existing statutes to investigate and prosecute 
lynchings in the hope that the Supreme Court would accept their methods.450 
Regardless of how the department operated to stop lynching, the move was a clear 
development of FDR’s pre-existing anti-lynching plan and evidence of a decade long 
commitment to tackle mob violence. 
It can therefore be said that anti-lynching was an issue that divided the federal 
government. There was a constant tension between conservatism and liberalism 
throughout the decade. Congress did everything in its power to prevent the federal 
government from taking responsibility for lynching, and the President did (almost) 
everything in his power to find a solution in the face of obstruction. But this dichotomy 
between obstruction and reform was not exceptional to the anti-lynching movement 
and was instead indicative of the way in which the federal government works and 
reflective of the checks and balances system built into the federal government. 
Nevertheless it was these competing ideologies of the legislature and the executive 
branch that gave the NAACP different insights into the political climate, and the ways 
to achieve reform. The federal government therefore had a significant impact on the 
NAACP’s campaign. 
 
The Legacy of Anti-Lynching 
The legacy of the NAACP’s congressional lobbying was long lasting and had a 
significant effect upon the NAACP’s future program. The overt congressional 
obstruction practiced by both Democrats and Republicans called into question how 
NAACP leadership perceived the barriers to political and social equality. Overt 
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legislative obstruction was designed to actively suppress any policy with the potential 
to benefit black Americans politically or economically. Only a few years earlier, in 
response to the NAACP’s Future Plan and Program in 1935, Roy Wilkins wrote a 
memorandum to Walter White saying that he was convinced ‘that the masses of 
Negroes in this country are concerned with lynching, discrimination, segregation… I 
am afraid that if we go off too heavily on a theoretical social and political and 
economic program, we will find that we shall have cut ourselves loose from the 
support of the bulk of our followers.’451 Their focus in the 1930s was on the issues that 
they thought black people wanted to be tackled, not on securing the process through 
which they would be able to address those issues. Through lobbying for anti-lynching 
legislation the NAACP’s perceptions of what should constitute their organisational 
programme changed.  
By 1938, White realised that it would be easier to agitate and push for reform 
if black Americans held a more secure economic position and had significant political 
power. Essentially, the ease with which the NAACP’s efforts were stymied by senators 
highlighted the importance of voting rights to the NAACP. In an analysis of the 1938 
anti-lynching fight in the Crisis, one article noted that this was the ‘true lesson of the 
anti-lynching bill,’ and that black Americans must act quickly ‘to secure the franchise 
which is now being denied them through one method or another.’452 A new focus on 
voting rights was swiftly integrated into the NAACP’s program. Usually, after a 
legislative set-back or defeat of an anti-lynching bill, the NAACP met with 
sympathetic organisations and members to formulate a new plan of action for the 
future of the anti-lynching campaign. However, after the filibuster on the Wagner-Van 
Nuys bill, a press release reported that the Association ‘is not calling any conference 
on the anti-lynching bill at this time.’453 While the anti-lynching campaign was not 
completely side-lined, work began immediately on the ‘fight to secure the ballot.’454 
An NAACP press release noted that by March 1938 the Association had already sent 
instructions to its 400 branches, youth councils, and college chapters ‘to stimulate 
registration and voting.’455 Legislative obstruction required the NAACP to see the 
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bigger picture. By moving to increase voter registration, the organisation admitted that 
there were more prominent issues than anti-lynching at that point because black 
Americans were being held back politically. The logic followed that with more black 
Americans voting, the balance of political power would tip in their favour at a local 
level as well as in the national political arena, and in turn, black voices would be both 
heard and respected by politicians. 
 The NAACP used tried and tested methods of legal redress to tackle the 
barriers to voter registration; it sought legal precedents to prove that the Fifteenth 
Amendment was still being violated and secure voting rights. Some states adopted 
numerous measures such as the poll tax, or literacy tests, designed to systematically 
disenfranchise black Americans and poor whites; at this point in time only three per 
cent of black Americans were registered to vote. The NAACP reported that ‘suitable 
test cases will be instituted in the courts’ and that legislative measures were being 
considered.456 The proceeding decade witnessed many drives for black voter 
registration by the NAACP and other organisations. In 1946 the Atlanta Urban League 
spearheaded a campaign that included a coalition of organisations to register new 
black voters in the region. Groups including black Republicans, black Democrats, and 
the NAACP managed to register 14,368 new black voters in a two-month period.457 
Subsequently, Mayor of Atlanta, William B. Hartsfield, was willing to make more 
concessions to the black community as a result. This helped to affirm the belief that 
black political power could actually result in fairer political representation. The anti-
lynching fight therefore concentrated the NAACP’s attention on how the organisation 
would achieve some of its national aims. 
 The other great legacy of the anti-lynching movement came as a result of the 
NAACP’s interaction with FDR and the executive branch of government. Even though 
they never fully got what they wanted from FDR at the time—active support or open 
endorsement for their anti-lynching bills—they maintained pressure on the President 
over the years as they realised that presidential endorsement of their efforts could 
benefit them greatly. The organisation’s rapport with the President taught them how 
to operate in the White House, how to behave around the president and his staff, and 
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how to build a relationship with the nation’s leader. Walter White went from being 
blocked from the President by his staff after being labelled ‘one of the worst and most 
continuous of trouble makers,’ to enjoying the benefits of the President’s quiet 
engagement with their campaign.458 During that transition, the NAACP learned both 
about the role of the president and the limitations on the powers of the office, that FDR 
had to work within institutional constraints. This was a valuable lesson because it 
adjusted their expectations of FDR—and subsequent presidents—and of what he was 
willing and capable to do for them. 
 This stood the NAACP in good stead in the future, especially when civil rights 
became a national issue on a far greater scale than it was in the 1930s. By the time of 
the civil rights movement in the 1950s and 1960s, the tables had turned. Instead of the 
NAACP seeking presidential support, the NAACP was being courted by presidential 
candidates, as well as Presidents. Both John F. Kennedy (JFK) and Lyndon B. Johnson 
(LBJ) sought the NAACP’s help in pushing through civil rights legislation. JFK and 
LBJ both sought a relationship with the NAACP. They contacted Roy Wilkins for 
advice and assistance. The day after JFK was assassinated, Wilkins received a phone 
call from LBJ, the first of dozens over the coming years. Johnson wished to open his 
administration by completing the most important tasks that the Kennedy 
administration had yet to accomplish. When he met with LBJ, Wilkins recalled that 
‘he wanted to talk about the Civil Rights Bill and what the people in the civil rights 
movement needed to do to get the bill past Congress.’459 President Johnson saw 
Wilkins and the NAACP as leaders of the civil rights movement, especially in the area 
of legislative reform. Wilkins had a significant and long lasting relationship with the 
executive branch, and several presidents. Advising on the state of race relations in the 
United States, and working with the President again on civil rights legislation was a 
significant position to be in and a testament to what Wilkins learned as White’s 
assistant during the anti-lynching movement. Writing on Wilkins, Yvonne Ryan noted 
that Wilkins largely advocated for process rather than protest, having a preference for 
the machine of reform.460 As Walter White’s successor as Executive Secretary of the 
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organisation, Wilkins took heed of the lessons of the anti-lynching movement and took 
them forward into future campaigns. 
 In summary, the anti-lynching movement was significant for the NAACP, as 
well as for the civil rights movement in general, in which the NAACP played an 
important role. This thesis challenges the historiography of both the anti-lynching 
movement itself, literature on the federal government’s engagement with civil rights, 
as well as FDR’s record on civil rights. The lessons of anti-lynching, for the NAACP, 
drove them forward as what they learned gave them greater opportunity for success. 
The competing political positions of both the legislature and the President shaped the 
movement, and forced the NAACP to learn how to lobby the institutions it was 
working with. This resulted in a much more knowledgeable NAACP which afterwards 
knew exactly what it would take to achieve effective political reform and realise the 
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The NAACP’s Federal Anti-Lynching Campaign Timeline, 
1918-1940 
1918 
Mar  11 – Leonidas C. Dyer asked the NAACP to sponsor a federal anti-lynching 
bill. The NAACP were initially hesitant because NAACP lawyers were 
concerned about the constitutionality of the bill. The NAACP agreed to 
sponsor the bill later in 1919. 
Apr 8 – Dyer introduces his anti-lynching bill, H. R. 11279. 
 
1921  
April 11 – Dyer introduces his latest anti-lynching bill, H. R. 13, to the 67th 
Congress of the United States. 
 
Oct 20 – Dyer bill reported out favourably by the House Judiciary Committee.  
 
1922 
Jan 25 – House agreed to debate the anti-lynching bill. The speaker had to close 
the chamber and send the Sergeant at Arms in search of absentees to achieve 
a quorum.  
 
26 – House of Representatives passes Dyer bill with a vote of 231 to 119.  
June 30 – Senate Judiciary Committee endorsed the Dyer bill.   
Sept 21 – Dyer bill brought up for debate in the Senate in the final few days of that 
sessions of Congress.  On the same day, Democrat Byron Harrison of 
Mississippi was given the floor, and a filibuster started on the Dyer bill to 
prevent a vote from being called. 
 
Dec 2 – Republicans held a caucus and decided to scrap anti-lynching from their 
legislative agenda.  
 
1933 
Nov 9 – Walter White informs the NAACP’s Board that the Association’s Legal 
Committee were preparing a new anti-lynching bill. 
Dec 7 – The NAACP convened a meeting in New York City of several 





Jan 5 – Costigan-Wagner bill, S. 1978, introduced to Congress. 
Apr 12 – Senate Judiciary Committee reported the Costigan-Wagner bill 
favourably to the Senate.  
Jun 18 – End of Senate filibuster on the Costigan-Wagner bill. Filibuster was led 
by South Carolina’s ‘Cotton Ed’ Smith 
 
1935 
Jan  Costigan and Wagner re-introduced the anti-lynching bill at the start of the 
74th Congress.  
Feb 12 –Senators Costigan and Wagner made a fifteen-minute radio presentation 
to gain support for the Costigan-Wagner bill on CBS network. This was 
facilitated by NAACP activists. 
Mar 15 – NAACP organise an Art Commentary on Lynching held at the Arthur 
U. Newton Galleries, New York City. 
Apr Costigan-Wagner bill faced another filibuster in the Senate and eventually 
succumbed to it. 
May 6 – Walter White resigns as member of the Advisory Council for the 




Jan 2 – Walter White met with FDR to discuss anti-lynching.  
 6 – Van Nuys introduced the Van Nuys Resolution, Res No. 211. 
Feb 13 – Senate Judiciary Committee reported the Van Nuys Resolution 
favourably to the Senate. But the resolution then languished for over a month 
in the Audit and Control Committee.  
May 22 – House Democratic Caucus met to discuss its anti-lynching agenda but 
no quorum was present. 
Jun 74th Congress adjourned with anti-lynching still unresolved. 
 
1937 
Jan  5 – Joseph Gavagan’s anti-lynching bill introduced to the House, H.R. 1507. 




Feb 15 – Wagner-Van Nuys anti-lynching bill introduced to Senate, S. 1709. 
19 – Gavagan introduced a resolution to make his anti-lynching bill a special 
order of business.  
Apr  15 – Gavagan bill voted on and passed by the House. 
Jun 10 – Senate Sub-Committee reported favourably on Gavagan Bill, H.R. 1507, 
substituting it with the text of the Wagner-Van Nuys bill, S. 1709. 
 
Aug  11 – Vote on Resolution making H.R. 1507 special order of business of 
Senate until it was disposed of at the next session of Congress immediately 
following the Farm bill. Carried by a 2/3rd vote. 
 
Nov 23 – Farm Bill taken up for debate, putting the Wagner-Van Nuys bill aside. 
Dec 20 – Unanimous consent agreement on Senator Barkely’s suggestion to take 
up H. R. 1507 on 6 January 1938. 
 
1938 
Jan  6 – Debate began on Gavagan-Wagner-Van Nuys anti-lynching bill, 
H.R.1507. 
 Filibuster by southern senators began. 
 27 – First attempt at cloture. Lost by a vote of 37 to 51. 
Feb  17 – Second attempt at cloture. Lost by a vote of 42 to 46. 
  
22 – Senators voted 58 to 22 to put aside the anti-lynching bill to debate the 
Relief Bill, ending a six-week filibuster, in order to debate the President’s bill 
for the Senate to appropriate an additional $250 million to the Works 
Progress Administration (WPA) budget. 
 
1939 
Jan Gavagan acted as sponsor for a new NAACP anti-lynching bill in the House. 
Senators Wagner, Van Nuys and Capper acted as sponsors in the Senate. 
May 3 – NAACP gained 218 signatures required to discharge the Gavagan bill 
from House committee. But Congress adjourned days later with no vote on 
the anti-lynching bill. 
Nov Arthur Spingarn, Walter White, and Thurgood Marshall met with 
Representatives Gavagan and Fish to plan a bipartisan effort to pass the 






Jan 10 – House passed Gavagan-Fish anti-lynching bill by a vote of 252 to 131 
for the second time ever. 
Feb  7 – Spingarn and White meet with FDR to discuss anti-lynching. 
Mar 25 – Senate Judiciary Committee reported the Wagner-Van Nuys-Capper bill 
favourably to the Senate.  
Oct  By this point in time, the Senate had done nothing to push through the 
Wagner-Van Nuys-Capper bill despite the recommendation of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee and the bill was buried. 
 
Information in this timeline was collected from NAACP Papers, Library of Congress 
as well as from Zangrando, R. L., The NAACP Crusade Against Lynching, 1909-
1950 (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1980). 
 
